OCEAN TO OUTBACK

COSMOPOLITANISM IN CONTEMPORARY AUSTRALIA

Edited by Keith Jacobs and Jeff Malpas

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Keith Jacobs and Jeff Malpas

Introduction

Keith Jacobs and Jeff Malpas

Cosmopolitanism has, in recent times, become both a commonplace and a contested term. Historically, it refers to the idea of the 'world citizen' – the *kosmopolites* – whose group loyalties lie not with any single polity or state, but with the world as a whole (the cosmos, or '*kosmos*' to use the Greek term). It is thus that the term is employed by the Cynics and the Stoics, as well as by later thinkers whose most notable representative is, perhaps, the Enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant. Today, the term appears with a variety of meanings: as a contrast concept to be set against the parochial, local, or national; as referring to the idea of a certain international outlook or mode of life that may be variously realised; as designating (as it does in Kant) a particular moral and political position that emphasises the need to give equal weight to the interests and needs of those who belong to polities and communities distinct from our own.

What comes to the fore in some of the more contested discussions of cosmopolitanism is not the dry semantics so much as the question of what it actually implies, along with

the philosophical, perhaps even ideological, presuppositions that accompany it. If cosmopolitanism is set against the parochial, the local, or even the national, does that also mean that it entails a neglect of, or a disdain for, the concerns and interests of particular groups and communities? Might cosmopolitanism actually function to camouflage what is essentially the continuation of a colonialist or Eurocentric mode of discourse? Might it be simply the extension of a certain European parochialism to the world as a whole?

Tensions around the idea of cosmopolitanism, even when not explicitly expressed in its conceptual vocabulary, have had a significant impact on Australian political culture in recent years. A number of writers have pointed out that the Howard government adopted a more parochial, and, in this sense, more anti-cosmopolitan attitude on a number of fronts during its eleven years in office. This manifested not only as an antagonism towards certain international initiatives (including the idea of a permanent international war crimes tribunal), but also in an apparent willingness to endorse, and to make political use of, what might be seen as insular and xenophobic attitudes on matters such as immigration, the treatment of refugees, and even multiculturalism. Under the Labor government meanwhile, it might be argued that while a more cosmopolitan rhetoric is the norm, some forms of anti-cosmopolitanism have resurfaced, particularly on matters of immigration. At the same time both conservative and labour administrations in Australia, as elsewhere in the world, have maintained a strong commitment to what might be thought of as a form of financial and economic 'cosmopolitanism' aimed at encouraging economic globalisation. Indeed, the character of globalisation as corrosive of local and national identities and structures, as well as its insensitivity to the interests and needs that are operative at more 'parochial' levels, may be thought to exemplify the darker side of the cosmopolitan compact. Here, contemporary cosmopolitanism turns out to be allied

in the final instance, not with the forces of 'democracy' and 'morality', so much as with globalised capital and corporatised self-interest.

Yet in spite of the tensions that surround the concept of cosmopolitanism – or perhaps, in part, because of them – it seems to us that cosmopolitanism remains an important concept in any attempt to address a range of debates concerning contemporary politics and society. For example: how do we make sense of the significant communal challenges that have surfaced in recent years in relation to race, identity and belonging? How can the tensions that emerge from an increasingly global world economy be successfully managed within the nation state? What possibilities are there for forging social cohesion in contemporary Australian cities? These debates require us to attend to exactly the sort of connections that are at stake, even if sometimes equivocally, in cosmopolitanism's own thematisation of our relation to, and place in, the wider world. What is at issue in cosmopolitanism then, and in the various anti-cosmopolitan responses to which it gives rise, is the nature and significance of plurality and difference in a world that, precisely in virtue of its being a *world*, is also a cosmos within which we are variously brought together, and in which we are always drawn into connection and into a certain sort of commonality.

This suggests that rather than abandon the notion of the cosmopolitan altogether, we should redouble our efforts to make it a more focussed object of inquiry and perhaps to rethink, reanalyse and reconfigure it in substantial ways. This is even more urgent because the wide-ranging employment of the conceptual vocabulary of cosmopolitanism in both empirical research and social theory is sometimes marred by conceptual confusion and excessive abstraction. It is also often used in ways that seem to have only a tenuous connection to material practices and lived experience.

The approach to cosmopolitanism adopted in this collection, while not uncritical of the concept or unaware of its definitional

plurality, also aims to retain and even revitalise its positive, optimistic implications. For the most part, this collection seeks to engage in a recuperative response to some of the contemporary challenges with which cosmopolitanism is associated – retrieving a sense of the cosmopolitan as referring to the way our own individual and often parochial circumstances relate to the cosmos in which we are situated. We take the contemporary situation in Australia to be one in which our own lives as 'Australians' are inextricably tied to the way we understand ourselves in relation to a complex international and multi-ethnic environment. The tensions that Australians see overseas are also tensions that we can see played out in our own communities. Indeed, the very idea of the Australian community as such, is itself in contention. In our view, the issues at play here need to be worked out in concrete ways, paying attention to the lived details of particular places and circumstances. As Falzon has pointed out, 'all cosmopolitanisms are to some extent actually-existing in that they are located within some historical and geographical framework'[1], and this has been a key idea in the framework of this collection. The essays that appear here are thus, for the most part, explicitly anchored to specific locations, and it is out of and in relation to those locations that their arguments are developed.

Before looking more closely at the essays that make up this volume, it is worth briefly surveying the way in which the idea of cosmopolitanism appears in the existing literature. While overlapping with the broad forms of cosmopolitanism sketched above, four different uses of the term, sometimes operating in combination, can be identified within contemporary theory: normative; descriptive; methodological; and ideological.

It is the normative sense of cosmopolitanism that is perhaps most familiar within a theoretical context, and it is also a use that corresponds to the first form of cosmopolitanism that we distinguished initially – the form that, originating among

the Stoics but continuing in Kant and others, is associated with the idea of the 'world citizen'. In this normative usage, cosmopolitanism names an ethical project in which individuals commit themselves to advancing a shared sense of humanity that transcends nationhood, kinship and religion.[2] The leading exponent of this normative tradition is Martha Nussbaum who draws on the Stoic tradition to argue that an adherence to cosmopolitanism does not necessitate a disavowal of local identity, but rather a commitment to humanity as a whole.[3] For Nussbaum it is through education that we are able to develop a cosmopolitan outlook.[4] Other important contemporary theorists who have conceptualised cosmopolitanism in accordance with this interpretation include Jürgen Habermas and David Held.[5] Both Habermas and Held draw explicitly upon a Kantian vision of cosmopolitan order to argue for new modes of postnational and transnational governance.

The normative employment of cosmopolitanism is more particularly associated with the use of the term within philosophy and political theory. Within more sociologically oriented discussions, the term is often used to refer to certain aspects of the contemporary world that are seen as deserving of further analysis.[6] In this respect, sociologists often deploy the term 'cosmopolitanism' to refer to everyday happenings, or what Robbins has termed 'actually existing cosmopolitanism', in terms of the ways that individuals and communities make sense of cultural difference. Cosmopolitanism is thereby used as a descriptive term to frame contemporary practices and attitudes towards, for instance, migrants and refugees.[7]

In a usage that reflects the third of the three broad forms we distinguished initially (cosmopolitanism as an 'international' outlook or mode of life), cosmopolitanism appears within some sociological contexts as referring to forms of behaviour in which individuals actively seek out spaces in which cultural exchanges can take place; for example migrant neighbourhoods and multicultural festivals. Here one might characterise

cosmopolitanism as a term used to denote a willingness to embrace the 'Other' or the stranger.

A further development within this descriptive use of cosmopolitanism arises explicitly in relation to contemporary processes of globalisation. Ulrich Beck, for example, has defined cosmopolitanism as meaning '(a) the erosion of clear borders separating markets, states, civilizations, cultures, and the life worlds of common people, which (b) implies the involuntary confrontation with the alien other all over the globe'.[8] This descriptive usage gives rise to a methodological imperative with which cosmopolitanism is also associated. For Beck and other sociologists, cosmopolitanism does not function merely to describe certain contemporary processes, but also implies an epistemological shift that encourages us to cast aside rigid demarcations of the local, global, national and international and instead consider new social formations and interconnectivities which are a feature of the modern age.[9] A similar view of cosmopolitanism is evident in recent scholarship within the field of international relations and politics. Here cosmopolitanism is used to critically engage with a range of strategies and tactics of contemporary governance that have cosmopolitan implications or influences such as the use of multiculturalist policy settings to manage intra-communal tensions within urban spaces.[10]

Another important cosmopolitan perspective is provided by writers conversant with postcolonial theory.[11] It is tempting to treat these writers as part of a generic and unified grouping on the grounds of their shared normative and methodological concerns. Such a move would not do justice, however, to the specificity and diversity of their work. Yet the differences between them are not always fundamental or decisive and those who address the cosmopolitan from a postcolonial perspective share a number of analytic and intellectual preoccupations. Most significantly they often develop normative descriptions and situate their understandings of cosmopolitanism outside the confines of a Western nationalist tradition by embracing notions

of hybridity and the 'Other'. In terms of methodology, a number of postcolonial contributions place an emphasis on translation as an analytical frame to consider the ways that cultures have become intertwined in the context of globalisation (see Nikos Papastergiadis's chapter in this collection). For writers such as Homi Bhabha, it is through the methods associated with translation that we are able to shed light on the deficiencies of our society and forms of exploitation that take place within it.[12]

In its normative employment, cosmopolitanism appears as a positive ethical notion directed at ameliorative ends. In its descriptive and methodological uses, cosmopolitanism also appears in a largely positive light. There are, however, a number of contemporary theorists who are highly critical of cosmopolitanism, particularly in its normative form, but also in many of its other guises.[13] One of the best known is David Harvey, who has criticised cosmopolitanism as a proxy for the ideologies of global capitalism and market democracy, and for being too abstract and global (hence unable to make a contribution to struggles within the spaces of cities) to provide the basis for any form of progressive politics.[14] He castigates those writers who have sought to link cosmopolitanism to discussions of universal ethics. For Harvey it is only through political intervention at the level of material practices that the challenges of the contemporary era can be addressed.

Although, the various approaches to cosmopolitanism that can be distinguished in contemporary theory all appear in different ways in the pages that follow, the volume is not predicated on the emphasis, elevation or endorsement of any single one of these approaches. The viewpoints and perspectives that figure in the discussions collected here are quite diverse. What they share, *pace* Harvey, is a conviction that the idea of the cosmopolitan continues to offer something that is of critical significance. Thus, while the volume is not uncritical of the cosmopolitan project(s) or of more general cosmopolitan tendencies, it does attempt a rethinking of the cosmopolitan,

and so also a renewed deployment of the concept, in the light of our contemporary situation.

The chapters that make up this volume have been arranged thematically. Within the overall framework of the discussion there are three discernible strands that we would foreground and that correspond to the three divisions into which the volume is organised: Varieties, Tensions, and Encounters.

The chapters encompassed within the first strand are less directly concerned with the investigation of cosmopolitanism in 'place', but rather offer a discussion of the cosmopolitan political sensibility and its capacity to throw light on some of the most pressing contemporary global challenges. Val Colic-Peisker's chapter 'Cosmopolitanism as a civilising project' reviews the political ideal of cosmopolitanism by drawing upon the writings of Norbert Elias.[15] The author poses a number of questions about the efficacy of cosmopolitanism to counter bigotry and promote a shared sense of collectivity. For Colic-Peisker, supra-national global challenges necessitate some form of cosmopolitan response. Yet the challenges of pursuing a cosmopolitan agenda are immense because, as a unifying principal, it has less appeal than the nation state and it is difficult to see how a sense of 'global humanity' can be enhanced. In the second part of her chapter, Colic-Peisker explores the cosmopolitan 'predisposition' through interviews with transnational knowledge workers. She notes that for these workers, understandings of what cosmopolitanism entails requires a capacity to transcend national frames of reference, to reach out to others. She concludes her chapter by arguing that the cosmopolitan project has little chance of succeeding unless we are able to cast aside our obsessive preoccupation with economic status and material wealth and instead embrace an altogether more generous set of social dispositions.

The opportunities afforded by physical distance can provide a valuable vantage point to reflect on contemporary Australia. Keith Jacobs draws on his own transnational experiences to reflect

upon the 7 July 2005 London transport bombings to mount a critique of narrow forms of identity politics. Jacobs considers the potential use of cosmopolitanism as a platform from which to reflect upon reactions to terrorism post 9/11. He takes issue with explanations of terrorism that are framed entirely in Western forms and instead seeks to consider the assumptive worlds of those who engage in such acts. Drawing upon the conceptual language of psychoanalysis, he argues that we risk 'infantilising' those who perpetrate acts of violence unless we acknowledge more fully their moral culpability. Cosmopolitanism for Jacobs provides us with a contextual space to work through some of the complex challenges we encounter when attempting to respond to acts of terrorism and state violence.

Nikos Papastergiadis's chapter 'Cultural translations and cosmopolitanism' considers the capacity of art to forge new spaces for cosmopolitan forms of engagement. Papastergiadis discusses contributions on cultural identity by authors such as Ihab Hassan and Paul Carter, drawing upon the example of Aboriginal artists working in Western Australia in the early 1970s that came to be known as the Papunya Tula movement. For Papastergiadis, art and philosophical meditation have the potential to transform our understanding of our relationship to others. Debates in relation to cosmopolitanism need to proceed, not so much in respect of methodology but by 'taking a closer account of the link between the kenotic ideal of self-dispossession and the cross-cultural process of inter-subjective immersion, interaction, feedback and transformation'. For Papastergiadis, the meaning of a work of art is always the outcome of the process of translation in which to some extent the individual undergoes a form of subjective transformation. The vision of Indigenous cosmopolitanism provides us with a starting-point to re-think who we are from the perspective of the social interactions that surround art and creative endeavour.

While Colic-Peisker, Jacobs and Papastergiadis make use of the conceptual space that comes from looking at Australia

through the prism of a transnational or an Indigenous optic, other chapters in the collection are more grounded in the actual geographical spaces within the Australian nation-state. In particular, the essays that make up the second part of the collection, 'Cosmopolitan tensions', centre on turbulent events that took place in the southern beach suburbs of Sydney, particularly Cronulla, in December 2005. Asquith and Poynting, and Miller and Malpas, as well as Noble, all draw upon the so-called 'Cronulla riots' to discuss the significance of place and the imaginary of the 'Other'.

For Nicole Asquith and Scott Poynting, the form of the Other is a constructed Arab/Muslim identity. The racist attacks at Cronulla beach provide an example of 'anti-cosmopolitanism' in which the Arab/Muslim Other was understood in this process as inherently violent, irrational and misogynist. Asquith and Poynting provide a detailed account of the riot using the frame of 'hate crime' as a basis for interpretation, noting that both instigators and perpetrators often justify their crimes by claiming that their victims deserve banishment. Their account provides some truly disturbing quotations which make clear the deep and extensive antipathy towards the Arab/Muslim Other. The events that took place in Cronulla are at the extreme end of a continuum of hostility that has remained close to the surface. In their conclusion, Asquith and Poynting ask if there is a way forward for cosmopolitanism. They are not optimistic; pointing out that there is no evidence for believing any significant social movement will emerge to embrace cosmopolitanism.

Linn Miller and Jeff Malpas engage in a critical reading of cosmopolitanism in their chapter, 'On the beach: between the cosmopolitan and the parochial'. For Miller and Malpas, the riots that took place on Cronulla beach are used as a setting to reveal the dislocation that is experienced in relation to place when specific forms of identity politics are enacted; in this sense, the symbolism of the 'shore'. They explore evidence of cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan feeling and argue that

the riots can themselves be understood within the context of a larger framework of social, and so also spatial, dislocation. They make the case for a form of alternative cosmopolitanism that, while foregrounding a 'sense of place', does not view such locatedness as a barrier to wider forms of engagement. In many respects contemporary cosmopolitanism actually shares with contemporary nationalisms a tendency towards an abstracted and displaced form of understanding in which a sense of connection with those around us is lost. The people we meet on the beach cease to be individuals we know, and with whom we can engage, and instead become representatives of an identity that we reject.

The consequences of John Howard's time as prime minister continue to reverberate in many of the discourses that surround cosmopolitanism, so it is important that some assessment is made of his legacy. One of the objectives of the chapter authored by Greg Noble is to reflect on Howard's influence in shaping constructions of 'identity' and 'belonging' in contemporary Australia. He considers what form an 'Australian' cosmopolitanism might take in a post-Howard era and how it can be differentiated from existing nationalist sentiment. In his chapter 'Belonging in Bennelong', Noble provides two examples of cosmopolitanism in practice: a musical presentation at a primary school in Epping; and the Granny Smith festival celebrated by large numbers of local people. For Noble, cosmopolitanism is best understood as a process. He is critical of those accounts, therefore, which conceptualise it as a virtue or locate cosmopolitanism simply in terms of an opposite to racism and bigotry. Our understanding of what cosmopolitanism entails can only really be achieved by exploring shared practices. In a wide-ranging discussion, Noble contrasts the politics of the Howard era and his narrow vision of multiculturalism with the sense of joy and conviviality that is possible in shared moments of belonging. The key point Noble makes is similar to the one advanced by Miller and Malpas; namely that the cosmopolitan project does not necessitate an abandonment of our attachment to place (be it locality or

nation). Rather, cosmopolitanism is really nothing more than an affective investment in what Marion Young has called 'living in togetherness'.

The final three essays, written by Ashley Carruthers, Jesse Shipway and Mary Zournazi, that make up the section 'Cosmopolitan encounters', also take their points of departure from particular places, and explore the scope for cosmopolitan encounters. But their explorations involve sites other than Cronulla, as well as a differently focused set of issues and concerns. Much of the empirical focus of cosmopolitan informed research is situated within the narrow confines of migrant/host relationships. This configuration of how we understand cosmopolitanism is challenged by Ashley Carruthers in his chapter 'Alternative multicultural subjectivities? Indochinese cosmopolitanisms in Western Sydney'. He makes a strong argument to include minoritarian and intra-cultural exchanges that are not referenced in the usual binary of migrant/host relationships in cosmopolitanism discourse. His detailed ethnographic study of Fairfield, Sydney as a 'contact zone' provides us with a vantage point to understand the 'minor cosmopolitanisms' negotiations and manoeuvres that are a feature of similar urban locations across Australia. Carruthers provides us with lucid descriptions of his fieldwork encounters and successfully engages in the problematic aspects of these 'multicultural' spaces that some researchers are reluctant to engage with for fear of being misinterpreted. Amongst the conclusions to his chapter, is his argument that reluctance amongst migrants to engage with host cultures should not be interpreted as evidence that other intercultural exchanges are not taking place. For Carruthers, we need to cast aside narrow constructions of cosmopolitanism and take more notice of the diversity of experiences taking place within contemporary urban spaces.

Jesse Shipway's chapter poses the question as to why positive accounts of cosmopolitanism are so difficult to articulate. We have a clearer idea of what it is not than what it is. In other

words, our understanding relies on making binary distinctions. He draws upon his experiences living in both Melbourne and Hobart to argue that cosmopolitanism requires us to find ways to make connection with the plight and tribulations of others while at the same time attend to our immediate relationships in the context of place. For Shipway, our feelings in relation to cosmopolitanism rest on whether we experience it as either a basis for renewal or view it as some form of destabilising ethic that undermines our desire for individual autonomy and cultural expression. In this sense, the cosmopolitan ethic can only succeed in a context in which individuals feel rooted in place.

Mary Zournazi's chapter 'Love on the streets' provides an altogether more optimistic interpretation of cosmopolitanism. Her chapter examines the connections between patriotism and nationalism in the context of suburban Sydney. She draws upon her experiences of watching Portuguese and Greek soccer fans celebrating their respective national team's participation in the 2004 European championships as a setting to develop her arguments about the possibilities for cosmopolitan modes of political engagement. Zournazi makes use of the writings of Hannah Arendt (whose work also makes an appearance in Miller and Malpas's discussion) and argues that it is our sense of living in the world with others that provides us with the ability to forge new possibilities. As she writes of her own feelings about this sense of living, 'My identity dissolved and the boundaries of who and what I was seemed to evaporate and become part of the communal experience'. For Zournazi, it is the act of being together that creates a different social bond. Whether or not we are persuaded by Zournazi's argument on this point, it undoubtedly reflects an important feature of what might be understood as the phenomenology of a certain cosmopolitan experience.

The fact that cosmopolitanism is indeed such a widespread, as well as contentious, concept is one of the reasons for taking it as the focus for a volume such as this. Moreover, as the essays contained here demonstrate, cosmopolitanism also seems to present itself as a concept that stands at the centre of many of the issues and challenges that confront contemporary Australia. However, as one might expect in a world in which the cosmopolitan is already such a salient notion, the issues and challenges that confront us in this country are not peculiar to Australia alone. The variations, tensions, and encounters that we find instantiated within a cosmopolitan frame are repeated in many different localities and circumstances. Cosmopolitanism and anti-cosmopolitanism thus name tendencies and dispositions that are characteristic of the world in which we currently find ourselves, even though they are tendencies and dispositions that are best understood as always working in and through the concrete circumstances of specific places, particular social and political formations, particular experiences, and modes of life. While contemporary Australian experience is indeed framed 'between outback and sea', the very specificity of that placing is also what makes cosmopolitanism an issue and a challenge, since it is only within the horizon opened up by the specificity of place that what lies beyond that horizon is made accessible. This is perhaps the real significance of the cosmopolitan: the world itself is only ever brought to appearance in relation to the concrete singularity of what is here and now, of what is local and immediate, and yet it is only against the wider background of the world that the local and the immediate has any meaning and significance of its own. It is thus that the essays in this collection eschew any meta-theoretical standpoint removed from connection with lived experience, and look instead to a series of explorations of the cosmopolitan through its own concrete situatedness.

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Varieties of Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism as a civilising project

Val Colic-Peisker

Introduction

This chapter conceptualises cosmopolitanism as part of an ongoing civilising project. Cosmopolitanism is seen as an ethical position and practice developing with certain inevitability from cognitive cosmopolitanism, that is, most people's increasing knowledge of the Other[1]. Cosmopolitanism is defined as a willingness and ability to identify as a citizen of the world in preference to a citizen of any particular country. Applying ideas of Elias[2] and Bax[3], the process of civilisation is defined as people's expanding range of identification beyond various, latently or manifestly conflictual group particularisms and towards a universalistic identification with humanity. It should be noted at the outset that the concept of civilisation in this chapter bears no connection and holds no connotation to the European and broadly Western 'civilising' of the non-Western Other through colonial expansion, articulated as the 'white man's burden' by R. Kipling[4] at the peak of the British imperial

era and carried through to the current American wars for global control. It will soon become clear that the project of civilisation is defined as exactly the opposite of the meaning it had in colonialism: as gradual diminishing of the barriers between people erected during the modern history through the ideas of developmental, power and cultural differentials between nations and ethnic groups. Opposed to this modernist discourse is the process of cosmopolitanisation as identifying with those who belong to polities and communities culturally distinct from our own. This attitude can be described as a humanistic content of globalisation: a force of global democracy and morality opposed to the brutality of global capital and corporate self-interest.

The latest wave of globalisation – usually defined as the past three decades of communication and long-distance mobility revolutions – has provided unprecedented possibilities for cross-cultural awareness and mixing, and opened a multitude of opportunities to learn about the Other. Globalisation is therefore a necessary although not a sufficient condition of the development of cosmopolitan attitudes on a significant scale: while learning about different cultures (conventionally attached to nation-states) and communicating with people who inhabit them, we are likely to broaden our horizons and learn to appreciate narratives and practices that differ from those dominant in our own socio-cultural context. This may lead to expanding our range of identification beyond primordial, territorial and otherwise familiar groups and communities. In the process of learning about the Other and their 'cultures', Turner[5] argues, we are likely to develop a critical distance and 'irony' towards our own 'taken for granted' culture. Therefore, the processes of global communication and mobility implicit in the idea of globalisation facilitate development of cosmopolitanism as a civilising process. As elaborated below, the association of the processes of globalisation with the dominance of global, and predominantly Western, capitalism, cannot be disregarded; this

connection represents an obstacle to the civilising project of cosmopolitanism at least implicitly. As illustrated by narrative data gleaned from interviews with 'transnational knowledge workers', such an openness towards the Other and accompanying universalist identification is more likely to develop among mobile and educated people who actively enjoy globalisation and the opportunities for professional and personal development it affords them, rather than suffering its unwanted consequences, as is the case with the less privileged 'locals'. The transnationals may, because of this, have the responsibility of taking on a 'cosmopolitanism burden' as a *mission civilisatrice* – that is, act as the avant-garde in advancing the civilising process towards a universalism appropriate to the age of global interdependency. The globalisation of dependencies and risks is perfectly illustrated by, although not limited to, the pervasive global warming discourse.[6] Therefore, the concepts of civilisation, globalisation and cosmopolitanism all imply an increasingly complex and differentiated, and consequently increasingly interconnected and interdependent web of global society.

In this chapter I take an optimistic, though not uncritical view of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism means various things to various people, social theorists included. Just like globalisation, it has been theorised through its 'good' and 'bad' aspects. In this chapter, I theorise the advance of cosmopolitanism – the real as well as desired – as a civilising process; indeed, as a much-needed late-modern 'second enlightenment'. This second enlightenment should change and emancipate the globally dominant Western rationality, currently reduced to economic rationality and chained to the idea of self-interest, manifested in the global arena as national interest. Before elaborating on this thesis I have to address queries that readers may have at this point: what is the evidence that cosmopolitanism is actually advancing, and, an even more acute and controversial question: are we really becoming more 'civilised', regardless of whether we count cosmopolitanism as an ingredient of this process?

Clearly, the awareness of the world – the planet Earth – as one entity has never been as strong as it is today and there has never existed a more urgent need to develop it further. Regardless of the fact that a majority of non-Westerners still live in 'traditional'[7] rural communities, perhaps having little opportunity to see beyond the horizon of their quotidian pursuits, and deprived – or free from? – mass media and the knowledge of distant uprisings, tsunamis and financial upheavals, the number of people who live a 'global' existence that includes everyday awareness of, and communication with, faraway places, has risen exponentially since the postwar decades. Since that time the mass media – first radio, then television, and finally the internet – gradually destroyed the innocence of local life, and made more and more people aware not only of what is going on thousands of miles away, but also of the consequential interconnectedness: of the fact that faraway events bear on their existence. The twentieth century with its two world wars and global initiatives that followed after them saw a development of a global consciousness that has reached zenith in a decade-old political upheaval around global terrorism and the 'war on terror', and the current incessant media attention on global warming, as well as the multitude of other global issues. In fact, everything is gradually turning global or at the very least 'glocal'.[8]

Following the war atrocities committed in the name of nation, initiatives such as the League of Nations after World War I and the United Nations after World War II were expressions of an acute political need to acknowledge human rights and human solidarity beyond national borders. The universal solidarity and the institutional recognition of the community of humans beyond national boundaries found expression in the 1948 UN Charter of Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee Convention. The declaration of universal human rights implies that a community of human beings should have primacy over any existing political community. Of course, the ideology of humanitarianism remains inefficient in the

world where *Realpolitik* driven by national interests still reigns supreme; this in spite of mounting evidence that advancing the 'national interest' in competition with other nations may not be a rational stance any longer. Climate change is currently the most prominent, but not the only case in point. The institutions of global governance, however inefficient in achieving the goals of global peace and cooperation, have fostered the development of a widespread awareness of the globe as a unified cosmopolis through a universalist discourse and their global action mandate. Within these institutions new universalist concepts such as human rights have been developed, emphasising the sameness of human beings and their equivalent entitlements across national, racial, ethnic and gender differences. Human rights discourse, and to a lesser degree the associated international legal practice, is an application of moral universalism, which in turn is an aspect of 'ethical cosmopolitanism', as elaborated below. In the early twenty-first century, mass media and instant satellite-based communication are available to people in almost every corner of the Earth and provide daily nourishment to the feeling of the closeness of faraway things, people and events. Therefore I claim cosmopolitanism is advancing.

Expanding the range of identification as a civilising process

In what way is this purportedly apparent development of cosmopolitanism associated with the civilising process? This question has to be followed by another underlying conceptual query: how is the civilising process to be defined? If we turn to Norbert Elias who devoted his life to defining the 'civilising process'[9] – which he saw as an ongoing developmental process inherent in human society – we find a point that is of great importance to my current argument about cosmopolitanism: that the process of civilisation means an increasing awareness

of other people. According to Elias, becoming more civilised means a growing sensitivity to the presence of people around us: becoming more observant of them and having a more acute understanding of them. The increasing awareness of the Other – from the close Other who eats and sleeps with us to a distant Other whose everyday practices may be very different from ours – inherently means expanding the range of identification with other human beings. Being observant of others and caring to understand them signifies encountering them as creatures of equal worth and, at least at a moral if not emotional level, identifying with them. E. B. Bax argued that the 'barbaric [non-civilised] stage of human society is throughout based upon the kinship community, the clan or the tribe, and [that] its feeling towards humanity outside the narrower social organisation is entirely subordinated to the interests of the latter'[10]. With the advancement of civilisation, the category of 'us' expands.

Elias gives examples of increasingly more elaborate table manners and increasingly discreet sexual behaviour, that is, 'civilised' humans becoming more socially regulated.[11] Such civilising process implies a profound discontent as nature's unrestrained and instinctive id, in search of pleasure here and now, is increasingly controlled by the delayed-gratification superego[12] which dictates the awareness of other people and care for them. Such 'unnatural' behaviour that stems the purported basic 'selfish' instincts becomes a necessity of a complex human society, as the 'chains of social action and interdependence' lengthen.[13] The everyday sensitivity to the physical and moral presence of Others logically expands towards the awareness of distant Others, once information about them becomes increasingly present in our everyday lives through expanding communications. If we take the Australian perspective, in this process of stretching our attention to more and more distant Other it is likely that we regularly reach those on the other side of the globe. As social 'chains of interdependence'[14] reach farther and farther it is not just benevolent and disinterested curiosity

that makes us pay attention to people far away – we are also heeding our own interests.

There is a considerable step, logical but not inevitable, from such 'cognitive cosmopolitanism' towards its 'ethical' variety: when we acknowledge that close as well as distant Others have the same essentially human characteristics and goals, we imply that they should therefore be given the same opportunities, guaranteed through human rights, to pursue those goals. It is a job of governments (Elias used 'nobles' in the meaning of 'elites') to regulate and institutionalise such inclusive, universalist, cosmopolitan ideas. Many political and moral thinkers, from Plato to John Stuart Mill who deliberated on what constitutes the 'good society' and what may be the purpose of human society, came to a conclusion that the (good) government should develop in its citizens a sense of mutual duty and solidarity: in other words, civilise them.[15] Mutual solidarity is at the centre of the Christian doctrine (as *benevolentia*) and features in the main slogan of the French revolution as *fraternité*. In the twentieth century it became progressively easier to argue that developing a universalistic recognition and identification advances the common good of humanity because humanity has become interdependent. At the political end of this ideology is a much-repeated claim that a world government is needed: a claim that so far remains in the realm of utopia.

Clearly, the process of civilisation as development of universalist values and institutions is not smooth and suffers constant setbacks and episodes of 'decivilisation'. Wars are the most prominent example of such regression. M. Bax, writing about the Bosnian war, described ethnic mobilisation as a process of 'decivilisation': a 'reduction of the range of identification to the ethnic base'[16] or, to use a concept of social psychology, shrinking of the in-group to the ethnic base. This is usually achieved by political manipulation and mobilisation that portrays the out-group as inferior but threatening. Those at the bottom of the social hierarchy are more likely to succumb to

this manipulation and, even if they see through it, they may not be able to insulate themselves socially, or simply leave. Ethno-nationalist mobilisation may achieve short-term political ends but it is politically and socially dysfunctional and 'decivilising' in the longer term.

The process of decivilisation is not rare or geographically limited: to use a shares market metaphor, the shares of civilisation often drop in value, sometimes dramatically – take European fascism and World War II with its dramatic shrinking of the range of identification for many people – but the long-term trend is upwards. This does not mean accepting the still widespread eighteenth-century Enlightenment assumption that all human progress is in a straight line and we are inevitably becoming more civilised. However, the universalist cosmopolitan identification, as it inevitably diminishes conflictual particularistic (national, ethnic, religious) tendencies, is inherently part of the civilising process.

The relationship between localism/patriotism/nationalism and cosmopolitanism has been extensively debated from various theoretical and ideological positions. Some authors, if not most, see these two value perspectives as opposed. [17] Kant theorised that cosmopolitanism in association with the 'perpetual peace'[18] was hardly possible in the world structured as the system of competing nation-states. Martha Nussbaum placed patriotism on the list of particularistic passions. Some authors did not formulate the relationship between patriotism and cosmopolitanism as one of logical opposition. For example, J. S. Mill saw patriotism primarily as care for fellow countrymen rather than as competitive opposition towards other nations; in this sense, such patriotism can easily be extended to humanity and made part of cosmopolitanism.[19] Those who look at the issue of cosmopolitanism from a 'subaltern' perspective (either a non-Western-middle-class perspective or a working-class perspective) do not necessarily see the contradiction between nationalism and patriotism either.[20] K. Appiah's notions of

'cosmopolitan patriotism' and 'rooted cosmopolitanism' in the context of Ghanaian anti-colonial struggle are well known.[21] Cheah criticises the alleged opposition of nationalism and cosmopolitanism as an oversimplification while Delanty argues for a 'limited cosmopolitanism' and 'cosmopolitan citizenship' practised in real, lived civic communities.[22]

Cosmopolitanism has also been critiqued as a 'cool' rational stance with little mobilising power, in contrast to the hot and highly mobilising passions of nationalism and patriotism. Further, cosmopolitanism has been criticised for allowing people to distance themselves from their community ties and commitments. Due to this very 'stepping back' from our immediate milieu and its claims, the 'cosmopolitan virtue' (just like other virtues and virtuous acts) involves rational self-reflexion and may appear cooler and less engaged than the passions that drive pursuing immediate interests. But even if cosmopolitanism could remain cool and 'theoretical' in the past, it may now become a politically mobilising force through a global necessity, as environmental devastation subsumed under the formula of 'global warming' compels humanity to act in unison. This and other global threats make cosmopolitanism not only an ethically preferable position, but also the only rational one. This is the meaning of the call for the 'second enlightenment'.

Nation, however, remains a strong point of identification for most people – this in spite of the alleged weakening of its sovereign prerogatives through the process of globalisation. Neoliberal globalisation, primarily economic and profit-driven, may present another challenge to the nation-state: it may undermine its legitimacy as a moral community. Market ideology, having reached its fundamentalist extremes over the recent decades[23] is often seen as legitimising social Darwinism. Further, neoliberalism erodes the sense of nation as a community by diminishing mutual solidarity for the sake of competition, and by shrinking protection offered to citizens by the welfare state. This, coupled with daily political and other developments

that keep building our sense of the world as one, may gradually shift the claim to a moral community towards global humanity. At the present moment, however, this may sound as mere wishful thinking, because the struggle for economic, political and military predominance (e.g. between the West and the rising Asian superpowers) and overt conflicts (primarily in the context of the 'clash' of the Western and the Islamic worlds) stand in the way of the substitution of a national identification with a cosmopolitan one.

Today's ability to travel and communicate at an unprecedented speed also means a heightened immediacy of threat in the situation of conflict: of nuclear or terrorist attack for example. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s did not lead to a more harmonious world: in fact the twenty-first century world resembles more than ever a hostile anti-utopia of Orwell's *1984*, where alliances change but hostilities are constant. What results is a situation of permanent national mobilisation, caused by real or perceived threats, and manipulated by national government as nation-building opportunities. In this situation, the individual freedom of identification is significantly reduced. If one is not ready to unequivocally align oneself with the mobilised group, and define oneself primarily, if not exclusively, as a member of that group, one is automatically the subject of suspicion and in danger of being excluded. This exclusion can have grave consequences for the individual. In Nazi Germany, one's failure to strongly identify with the nation was, if not fatal, then at least very dangerous. One can safely guess that it was unpopular to declare oneself a 'cosmopolitan' in the US in the aftermath of 9/11. Even identification with a subgroup of the mobilised nation – e.g. women – can be seen as divisive and reprehensible. During the war in my native Croatia in the early 1990s, the publication of my scholarly feminist article was described by a senior colleague, in a public situation, as 'frivolous': while the nation was at war fighting for its independence, there was no room for emphasising 'divisive' gender differences.

Therefore, while internally mobilised during the situation of external threat, the nation – or any other group for that matter – reduces the individual's 'vertical' range of identification with either smaller subgroups or larger super-groups. At the same time, in the grip of the 'us and them' discourse, the mobilised nation becomes 'horizontally' more confrontational and intolerant towards other nations. This is a familiar dynamic that applies to human groups of all types and sizes, with nations and ethnic groups being the most pervasively analysed example.

At the same time, in modern mobile societies, the sedentary territorially based loyalties and belongings are becoming increasingly anachronistic. The modern urban individual has much broader identity choices than was the case with rural villagers of not-so-distant past (still present in some parts of the world) who used to live and die without venturing far from the boundary of their face-to-face community and therefore without ever encountering the Other. In such (fast disappearing) *Gemeinschaft*, the 'natural' reproductive groups of family and kin – which were also productive groups working collaboratively to fulfill their material and spiritual needs – in terms of identity and solidarity only extended to the local community on a shared territory.[24] Once technological advances increased the range of mobility, territorially defined belonging started expanding into abstract territory beyond the quotidian scope of face-to-face communities. Therefore, ethnic groups and nations needed to be imagined beyond everyday encounters: perfect strangers came to be included in the idea of 'us'.[25]

This process of nation building – 'imagining the nation' via the expansion of communications and spatial mobility, and the consciously engineered community feeling[26] – is, technically, a blueprint for the development of a cosmopolitan community and identity. However, when we think about the development of cosmopolitan identification beyond the nation-states, one of the questions we need to ask is: who is interested in encouraging such identification, let alone engineering it? At the Copenhagen

Climate Change Summit in December 2009 such identification would have been a prerequisite for success but there were no representatives of the human race; no-one had a mandate to represent Earthlings endangered by global warming. We only heard representatives of nation-states bartering with each other over measures for the reduction of carbon emission. This is arguably more democratic: there are no world elections and no world government, while our national representatives are allegedly bound to promote our 'national interest'. This chapter hypothesises that there may be an increasing number of people who tend to identify and think beyond national enclosures and interests. Important for this, I argue, is spatial mobility and other opportunities to encounter the Other. Australia, for example, is a multicultural nation consisting of people different from each other, often in plainly visible ways such as race, ethnicity, religion and language. Does cosmopolitanism as a 'progressive humanistic ideal [...] embedded in the structural conditions of modernity'[27] have more chance of developing strong roots in such a place?

The modern individual, unlike her traditional counterpart, is socially and territorially mobile and significantly defined by the possibility to choose and create her identity – largely by choosing to belong to certain groups and communities. Occupation or profession is one such obvious choice, and also one of considerable consequence for the individual social status and identity. The modern individual is also territorially mobile rather than stuck in the place of her birth: one can choose another locality, city or in many cases also another country of residence. Unlike in more traditional societies, one can choose most identity markers: one's job, one's marital and parental status, and even choose/change one's gender. The modern individual desires the freedom to be what s/he wants to be and to identify the way s/he wants, to exist without being pinned down by a label representing an essence imposed by her native community, its 'culture' and its 'tradition'.

This is not to say that modern individuals choose their identities without constraints. Clearly, the room for identity manoeuvring, for inventing and reinventing oneself, increases with one's social endowments: education, wealth, status and power. In this context, one of the more important aspects of social power is not to be locked in the identity determined by others. Until very recently, for example, women have had fewer choices in this respect than men – their freedom was more restricted and their life path more prescribed through the social pressure to assume the role of wife and mother. Therefore, expanding the range of identification and becoming more civilised is a process in which more privileged members of society engage more easily. This is elaborated in the next section using interview data and illustrated by citations from interviews with transnational professionals.

The expansive lightness of cosmopolitanism: what does it take to be a 'citizen of the world'?

This section presents some insights into cosmopolitanism gathered from research into a relatively new breed of Western globetrotters, a highly mobile people that I call 'transnational knowledge workers' (TKWs) and who have some important predispositions to hold cosmopolitan attitudes. They are different from traditional expatriates, who, since the British colonial times, have carried the 'White man's burden' of 'civilising' the 'childlike and savage' non-Western Other.[28] In accordance with the main intention of this chapter, my participants may also be seen as 'spreading civilisation' but in an essentially different way, not from the position of dominance but by potentially spreading cosmopolitanism as an ideology and practice by engaging with the Other – and being open to the Other engaging with them – thus expanding their range of identification and becoming more civilised in the process.

My research participants have on average lived in more than five different countries. In order to differentiate them from 'ordinary' settler migrants and short-term visitors or tourists I adopted a rule of 'at least three countries for at least a year'. The selected sample consisted of the same number of men and women, all highly educated, majority with PhDs and other higher degrees, aged forty to sixty-nine at the time of interviews. By the nature of their professional background and work role (mainly academics and international developmental workers employed by the UN), and no doubt partly due to their high mobility and experience of life in different countries, most of them adopted a 'one world' epistemology and ethic. I conducted in-depth interviews with sixteen participants in Australia and Indonesia; five participants were from Australia originally while others were from Germany, Norway, Vietnam, Croatia, Bosnia, South Africa and UK. Australia is a convenient place for researching such a group of people: according to OECD it is the second most attractive destination (after US) for 'highly skilled expatriates'. The intake of long-staying scientists and academic to Australia grew four-fold in the decade 1996–2006.[29] In addition, due to strong connections with global metropoles, especially the main English-speaking countries, Australian professionals are an outwardly looking and highly mobile group. The interviews which are the source of quotes below focused on transnational mobility, feelings of identity and belonging, and cosmopolitanism. For the reader's orientation, the quotes are marked by numbers. Under these numbers, details about respondents' gender, age, profession, transnational movements and other characteristics can be found in endnote thirty. [30]

The participants gave a wide range of answers to the question of what cosmopolitanism meant to them. As illustrated by the following quotes, cosmopolitanism was conceived in various ways: valuing the learning from other cultures; valuing the preservation of cultural diversity against Western dominance; being comfortable in the globally dominant Western culture;

having a transnational frame of reference; and being able to cross national boundaries with ease. The understanding of cosmopolitanism tended to be focused on the cognitive aspect – knowing about the Other – while appreciating and asking for preservation of Other's culture before the relentless spread of Westernisation came closest to the normative aspect of cosmopolitanism as expanding the range of identification:

> It's important to learn the local language…I have learned a lot from the people I was supposed to teach [in Papua New Guinea]… It was an eye-opening experience. We [Westerners] think that we know everything…and have solutions for all problems…but then you see these other people doing things differently and you think 'No, we definitely don't know everything'. (8)

> [It is a] good and important experience to see how things are done elsewhere, for example how they work in hospitals [here in Australia]. (12)

> Yes, I am cosmopolitan. This means that I appreciate and enjoy diversity of cultures and I think it should be maintained. Not like…in a nice hotel in Santiago [de Chile] […] we have to put up with this American [US] music in the dining room morning after morning […] When we asked why they don't play Chilean music, we were told [that] 'most guests expect this'. (10)

> Yes, to a degree I was cosmopolitan even before I went anywhere… that was probably part of the attraction of going overseas. But certainly very much so after being over there…I am taking it as probably having interest and values and other things that are really drawn from [a] much wider field, globally almost, than one particular national group…and I probably do that in terms of tastes, interests, sports, food, movies, a whole range of things… (14)

A majority of participants did not fail to notice the ambivalence that marks this concept. Being 'cosmopolitan', or, symbolically and ideologically, a 'citizen of the world' was generally acknowledged as a positive attitude, but the implication of pretense and privilege not available to everyone was not lost on some. In consequence, some participants were reluctant to identify as 'cosmopolitans'.[31]

> Citizen of the world? I do not know, it's a difficult question. Cosmopolitan? Does it mean a nomad, a globetrotter; wherever I lay my hat is my home? Hmm […] I come from a humble background. I associate cosmopolitanism with money […] like having a house in France and […] you're very interested in art and you've just come from India experiencing all these wonderful things [laughs]. (12)

> Citizen of the world…yes…hmm…yes…but which world? There is a cosmopolitan world where people who would answer 'yes' to that question hang out…perhaps Europe, America and parts of Asia…where there is a substantial share of the population who travel and have contacts with other cultures…and another half of the world which is not cosmopolitan…(15)

Global political divisions were also brought forward as a serious impediment to the normative project and everyday practice of cosmopolitanism:

> Citizen of the world? Um…well…I'd rather see myself as a citizen of the world than that of any particular country but unfortunately I am very aware this does not work…I cannot be the citizen of the world [given that] the world is divided politically and economically and it is hard to cross the divide… you have to belong to one part. (6)

All participants associated cosmopolitanism with cross-cultural competence and an ability to move and work globally. A minority saw cosmopolitanism as an ethical value and a commitment to humanity, the value that should be put to work whenever one has a chance – if not professionally then privately. To express this commitment they used a universalist reference to 'humanism' and 'humanity' as the global community they identify with. One participant whose range of identification was clearly universal referred to her transnational work for a UN agency as 'service' to humanity:

> What enables me to work all over the world…well, I speak languages […] but I think, also, people appreciate me for my humanistic values […] I work with people and I always appreciate very much what these people do for me, you know, teach me things, and I try my best, you know, to serve… (1)

Another interviewee also articulated his cosmopolitanism as identification with humanity, in an ethical (commitment to human rights) and also in an ontological sense (belonging to a category of humans as rational beings):

> I feel strongly about human rights…it's a global commitment if you like, not local. I would not feel any more strongly about the Oslo chess community [that I am part of] […] A strong reference point of my identity…is perhaps that I am a rational being. […] Perhaps that's my idealised version of myself. I may be highly deluded…you should ask my wife or children [laughs]. (12)

When asked about their sense of identity, many interviewees chose their profession as its strongest base. All participants argued their profession was intrinsically important rather than being just a means to earn a living and social status.[32] Yet, they considered a reference to national identity 'unavoidable': the issue of 'country of origin' was conventionally raised in transnational

social encounters. In the transnational context, national identity was regularly reinforced through the gaze of others. In addition, it is hard to forget the nation-state while traversing the globe: through the elaborate border crossing regulation, the nation-state firmly remains the final arbiter of transnational mobility. Hence, once outside one's country of origin, national identity was hard to ignore:

> I certainly identify as Australian but you see I am a terribly conventionally looking Australian…a tall, white, blue-eyed male… (2)

> I'm often recognised as 'Scandinavian'…I think I am a typical Norwegian…but I do not mind…There are lots of foreigners in Melbourne, so it's not like, wow, you're a foreigner, where are you from? (13)

The interviewees reported using nationality as a conventional, and often convenient, presentation of self in transnational contexts, rather than a personal and intrinsic link between identity and nation of origin:

> I could say I'm Norwegian if I had to say something [to describe myself when outside Norway]. But I do not really know what that means…apart from meaning that I was born there. (12)

It was implied in these narratives, and sometimes also stated explicitly, that a crucial ingredient of cosmopolitanism is transcending the national frame of reference, rising beyond the nation as a mental horizon, as indicated in the following quote:

> Cosmopolitan…hmm…[is] having a more global view, not being nationalistic…Yes, I see myself being like that…I'm not going around saying Australia *über alles* [laughs] (16)

Learning about the Other during long stays in different countries was normally seen as crucial in developing cosmopolitan credentials. Cosmopolitanism was understood as a 'rational' commonsense universalism often found in highly educated and reflexive people, and considered logically opposed to particularistic, especially nationalist, passions. Even if cosmopolitanism was not developed into a conscious ideology, and even criticised as a concept, the effect of cosmopolitan practices on expanding the range of identification towards a unitary humanity was easy to establish during interviews. Such as normative position differs from certain types of cosmopolitanism conceptualised in the literature – for example the business-class-flying 'global capitalists' and their ideological opposition, the anti-establishment artists, bohemians and dropouts from the Western cultural canon.[33] However, the nature of professional roles and 'class position' of this specific sample made them closer to the counter-cultural position: prone to questioning the still largely taken-for-granted capitalist-nationalist cultural frame of reference.

Conclusion

Many different conceptualisations of cosmopolitanism have emerged over the past two decades. This chapter engages with some of them but seeks to find its original angle through theorising cosmopolitanism as a civilising process. In doing so it refers to works of classical philosophical and social theory but also uses recently collected ethnographic data to illustrate theoretical points.

My research on cosmopolitanism confirms the insight by other authors that cognitive cosmopolitanism – knowing about the world beyond one's native environment and encountering the Other that inhabits that wider world – is a prerequisite for ethical cosmopolitanism. The latter advances civilisation

because of its inherent identification with universal interests of humanity and global commitments. Only through cross-cultural and global awareness and knowledge can we transcend narrow local and short-term self-interest. Szerszynski and Urry count '*connoisseurship* [emphasis in original] of places, people and cultures' among 'cosmopolitan predispositions'.[34] Consequently, people living in isolated, small traditional communities (which are also 'poor' by Western material standards) lack cosmopolitan awareness by sheer lack of opportunity to know the Other. Local isolation and immobility are nowadays disappearing even in the poorest parts of the world and, according to Gidwani and Sivaramakrishnan, the possibility of cosmopolitanism exists in these places as well. They conceptualise 'rural cosmopolitanism' through a figure of the Indian circular labour migrant and argue that cosmopolitanism operates at various scales. Mobility is implicated in their definition of the cosmopolitan as a 'person who disrupts conventional spatial divisions'.[35] Using a different mobility scale, in this chapter I also argue that the 'real' and immediate rather than 'virtual' (e.g. through mass media) engagement with the Other, primarily through spatial mobility (living in a 'multicultural' society created through such mobility also implies an immediate engagement) is a more powerful source of a 'cosmopolitan consciousness' – this in opposition to the view held by Szerszynski and Urry that the ceaseless global imagery in the mass media has the same 'cosmopolitan' effect as mobility.[36] The fast and furious succession of images that is the imperative of commercial (that is, most) media is not likely to allow enough time for reflection that would lead to a gradual shift of consciousness – something that a day-to-day experience or co-presence with the Other is more likely to achieve. Intense mobility is also likely to challenge the conventional geographies of identity and bring closer to home the idea of fraternity of humans and solidarity beyond national borders. 'Doing cosmopolitanism' through the engagement with the Other is more effective in undoing of at least some of the original local

conditioning than observing or even admiring the Other at one's TV or computer screen.

My sample of transnational knowledge workers seemed to be considerably distanced from the weight of 'tradition' and 'culture' of their native community and liberated from primordial 'blood and soil' attachments to the nation or native locality. They inhabited their own culture 'from afar'[37] – a stance close to Turner's 'cosmopolitan virtue as irony'.[38] The claim this chapter makes – that this universally inclusive stance connotes a higher stage of 'being civilised' – should, of course, withstand a critique of cosmopolitanism (often associated with the anti-globalisation position) as a selfish detachment from local concerns.[39] Cosmopolitanism has also been associated with the mentality of the neoliberal 'global bourgeoisie', who run their business with little regard for any particular local or national interests.[40] The global expansion of capitalism is clearly much older than the last three decades of neoliberal globalisation: capitalism indeed directs the current global stage of civilisation, with cosmopolitan consciousness as its cultural superstructure.

One of the problems with global capitalist expansion is that it nowadays threatens the sustainability of the planet not because of its cosmopolitan nature but because the opposite is true: it advances in the context of utter disregard for the universal interests of humanity in the pursuit of particularistic interests reduced to the profit motive. Cosmopolitanism, as an expansion of the range of identification towards the idea of one humanity and its most fundamental interest – survival – has a potential to become an ideology in which ethical and instrumental rationality converge. The latter, so far devoted to economic growth and indeed reduced to economic rationality, must expand to include cosmopolitan ethics. Such an environmental focus should logically extend its cosmopolitan range of identification from existing humanity to future generations and, if we are consistent, also to animals and plants – to all that is vulnerable to blind and quintessentially barbaric exploitation of nature in

pursuit of profit and overconsumption. Such a civilising process leaves much to be desired at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Theorising it is beyond the scope of this chapter but it needs to be mentioned as a logical extension of my argument.

Even before eminently global challenges of today such as global warming and human rights (including refugee protection) came to the fore, such cosmopolitan ideas were subversive. Pursued to their logical end, cosmopolitan ideas de-legitimise not only the nation-state and its demand for loyalty opposed to interests of other nations, but also capitalism in its short-term-focused economic rationality. Cosmopolitanism as a civilising process is therefore inherently subversive in a world of global capitalism and competing nation-states. Cosmopolitanism remains a distant utopian ideal (or an anathema, depending on one's political position) with some moral power and nominal regulatory power through the UN – the power that usually increases enough to achieve practical effects when the pendulum swings far in the direction of decivilisation, as in the genocides of World War II for example, or the more recent genocides during the war in ex-Yugoslavia.

Australia is one of the most diverse and potentially cosmopolitan societies on Earth and a great experiment in the civilising influence of diversity. While conservative commentators and populist radio hosts take a simple critical line on the 'divisiveness' of multiculturalism as a demographic fact and political doctrine[41] in the context of the conventional idea that a nation-state should be based on 'one culture' – in this case a vaguely defined Anglo-Saxon one – most social scientists feel an understandable duty to criticise various aspects of the performance of Australian multiculturalism, but they wholeheartedly support multiculturalism as an 'enriching' demographic reality. However, the fear of the Other, articulated in the everyday politics and conveyed through the media, is sustained in the nation's consciousness.

This is evident in suspicion towards immigrants, especially certain groups perceived as the far-end Other such as Muslims and black Africans. The fear of the Other was at the centre of the asylum seeker debate and its political and electoral manipulation at the turn of the century (1999–2001). The fear re-emerged in October 2009, focusing on seventy-eight Tamil asylum seekers rescued by an Australian navy ship in Indonesian territorial waters. As the group endured a four weeks' long unwanted cruise on *Oceanic Viking*, beyond the minutiae of international legal obligations and asylum and refugee law loomed a larger moral dilemma: should human rights and international obligations come before the 'national interest'? Although cosmopolitan voices were heard, the fear of the Other or simply accepting the conventional border-protection national sovereignty and national interest arguments was a predominant attitude. The same is likely to apply to the poor political support for the climate change measures. Clearly, Australia needs more cosmopolitan civilising, alongside, no doubt, most other nations not yet appreciative enough of the unity of humankind: not only ethical, as defined by philosophers, but the more obvious practical unity: financial, economic, and environmental. There is no point in looking for salvation by denying and rejecting globalisation – instead we should help along its cultural and political sequitur by accepting and following its logical inferences.

Strengthening cosmopolitanism as an expansive rationality of the global era is a demanding but urgent task. As such, it cannot be solely left to the new breed of Western (or Westernised) globetrotters, a sample of whom is described in this chapter, and who may be granted the honorary, and honourable, title of the cosmopolitan avant-garde. Yet, their attitudes, thoughts, practices and transnational networks may give some clues for advancing the civilising process in an era when late-capitalist globalisation, entangled in its own contradictions, struggles to engender its cultural offspring: cosmopolitanism.

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Notes

1 The concept of 'Other' is used throughout the chapter as a shorthand for social and cultural difference. The process of 'othering' is part of the process of identity and community formation (differentiation of the Self; or the community/'Us' from 'others'). The concept originated in modern European philosophy and has been much used in postcolonial studies. In social sciences, the idea of Other often implies social exclusion of those who are different from a dominant group. This is not how I use it: in this chapter Other denotes the persons recognised as different in a social or cultural sense.

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6 See U. Beck 'Cosmopolitan realism: on the distinction between cosmopolitanism in philosophy and the social sciences', *Global Networks*, vol. 4, no. 2, 2004, pp. 131–56.

7 I use the concepts of 'modern' and 'traditional' communities/individuals as ideal types close to the classical dichotomy of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. This is indeed a continuum starting from (members of) 'traditional' relatively isolated and self-sufficient rural communities with rigid but relatively simple social structure and rigidly defined roles, usually along the 'natural' gender and age lines, and ending with 'modern', impersonal and complex urban societies composed of individuals who are socially and territorially mobile and as Gellner (1994) suggested 'modular': whose identity is composed of many different and replaceable pieces.

8 The terms 'glocal' and 'glocalisation' have been in use among English-speaking social scientists since the 1990s.

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30 1. Vietnamese woman, 40, environmental scientist, lived in Indonesia, Australia, Japan and France
2. Australian man, 60, academic, lived in France, US and India
3. Australian man, 49, medical scientist, lived in the USA and Denmark
4. Croatian woman, 53, language teacher/visual artist, lived in USA, Australia and UK
5. British woman, 50, teacher, lived in Italy, France, Australia, Korea and Qatar
6. Bosnian woman, 43, academic, lived in New Zealand, Ukraine and Australia
7. British man, 51, journalist/'sea-changer', lived in Jordan, Israel, US, Indonesia
8. Australian man, teacher, 69, lived in Indonesia and PNG
9. South African woman, 52, writer/academic, lived in Zimbabwe, Kenya, Australia, Uganda, UK, USA, Saudi Arabia, Hong Kong
10. Croatian man, 56, senior engineer, lived in Australia, Brazil and South Africa
11. Croatian woman, 55, linguist, lived in Australia, Brazil and South Africa
12. Norwegian man, 44, academic, lived in Tanzania, Sweden, US, Brazil, Australia
13. Norwegian woman, 43, medical scientist, lived in Tanzania, Sweden, US, Brazil, Australia
14. Australian man, 51, environmental scientist, lived in Dubai and Vietnam
15. German man, 41, academic, lived in Denmark and Australia
16. Australian woman, 40, lived in Kenya, Netherlands and Korea

31 See also S. Ossman, 'Beck's cosmopolitan vision or plays on the nation' *Ethnos*, vol. 71, no. 4, 2006, p. 562.

32 This has been elaborated in more detail in V. Colic-Peisker, 'Free floating in the cosmopolis? Exploring identity-belonging of transnational knowledge workers', *Global Networks*, 10 (4) Sept 2010, pp. 467–88.

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36 See Szerszynski and Urry, pp. 121–22.

37 See Szerszynski and Urry.

38 B. Turner, 'Cosmopolitan virtue, globalization and patriotism', *Theory, Culture and Society*, 19, 2002, pp. 45–63.

39 See for example C. Lasch, *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy*, W. Norton, New York, 1995.

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41 See A. Wood, 'Multiculturalism becomes poison for social capital', *The Australian*, 26 September 2007, p. 16 ('Opinion').

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From the London Underground

Keith Jacobs

> In the colonial world there is a Centre, a Home (or a 'back home') – a fixed reference point. Even if you've never been there, you know about it, can feel its presence, its gravitational pull and navigational utility: the district administrator in Malaya wondering about what's on in the West End of London, the magistrate in Senegal dreaming about arguments in Paris cafés. There is a Somewhere Else whose imprint you bear.[1]

Introduction

The London transport bombings that took place on 7 July 2005 caused the deaths of fifty-two people and injured over 750 others. Yet, the repercussions of the bombings extend far beyond London and have, in Australia for example, precipitated vigorous debates about multiculturalism, national identity and the meaning of terrorism. My aim in this chapter is to use the example of the 2005 London transport bombings as a context to understand

these debates, explore the possibilities of cosmopolitanism as an ongoing political project and consider the implications for Australia's sense of connection to the wider world. I begin by setting out my own emotional response to the bombings – London was my home for forty years before I migrated to Australia in 2002. I then develop a critical discussion of recent work that has sought to locate terrorism within wider sociological debates. In the final part of this chapter, I argue that the project of cosmopolitanism, despite its problems, offers our best hope for tackling the political challenges that now confront us.

I can clearly recall the moment when I heard the newsflash on Australian television reporting the London bombings. It was a cold winter evening, twenty-four hours after I had been celebrating the decision by the International Olympic Committee to name London as the site of the 2012 games. I was shocked and felt a strong emotional connection with those affected even though I was 11,000 miles away at the time and 'on the other side of the world'. In the words of John Lanchester, London was my 'Centre'[2], it was and still is 'back home' to me. I quickly checked my computer to get live updates from the BBC website and was soon desperate to understand what had happened and why. The awful novelty of the attacks was palpable; these were the first suicide bombings on UK territory and once the full extent of the carnage became clear I, like many people, started to look for explanations. My initial impulse was to locate the London attacks within a context of problematic relationships between the West and the Muslim world. The invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and the discrimination against Muslims in the West were all factors that I held to be significant in understanding why four young men would choose to murder so many people and, in the process, kill themselves too.

Even though this explanatory frame shaped and contained much of the critical press's extensive media coverage of the

bombings, I began with time to feel that it was too simplistic. While the schema helped set out the context, its conceptual value was limited by the presence of a number of significant lacunae. In particular, it overlooked the agency of the individuals themselves and their intention to destabilise intra- and inter-ethnic community relations. I wanted an analysis that acknowledged the responsibility of the perpetrators while avoiding caricature and generalisation.

I remember how my anxiety intensified after I heard some of the explanations about the London bombings, including a claim that the British Government had deceived the perpetrators into believing they were undertaking a dummy run to test the adequacy of the anti-terrorist response. In other words, the bombers were unaware that they would be killed and believed instead that they were helping the UK Government. Similar versions to this were common. In the same way that the 9/11 attack was framed as a US and Israeli government plot to stir up and legitimate Islamophobia, the London bombings were portrayed as a clever ploy to justify attacks on the Muslim community in the UK (see Channel 4's news investigation of these conspiracies).[3] While irritated that these conspiracy theories were in circulation, I was aware, at the same time, that such stories provided a kind of psychic comfort to their authors and audiences partly because they projected a narrative to explain unpalatable and confusing events. For some people, much of what was wrong in the world could be attributed to the then US presidency of George W. Bush and his then ally Prime Minister Tony Blair. The fact that the bombings were planned meticulously and intended to cause death and mutilation was an inconvenience that could be explained away!

Vicki Bell, in her thoughtful paper, argued that suicide bombings are performative interventions that oblige a response through their sensory dislocation and their incomprehensibility.[4] Hearing about a terrorist attack that is in some way close to us (physically or psychically) 'provokes a series of confused and

rapid questions in which the witnessing subject struggles in a sea of present horror'.[5] Drawing upon the work of Arendt[6], Bell points out that the violence has the effect of interrupting our sense of being and reminds us starkly of the fragility of our own lives and yet also forces us to consider life as a whole and our shared connections with others.[7] Certainly, the London bombings had this kind of impact, compelling us to think about the fragility of our existence and our vulnerability. It also served to remind us of the ease with which we disengage from the problems of the world. Most terrorist acts do not receive major coverage in the Western media and we often fail to engage with the victims of such acts in any meaningful way. I would like to suggest that it is only when an incident is of this magnitude and has an immediate connection with our lives that we are forced to respond emotionally.

As well as contemplating the precariousness of life, I was also searching for some kind of explanation. Yet in my discussions with friends and colleagues in the days following the bombings, I noted a degree of cognitive dissonance about how we framed our response to what had happened. We were uneasy about attributing culpability to the perpetrators who committed the acts and seemed to feel more comfortable in putting forward explanations that blamed the UK government or identified a causal chain originating in our own acquiescence to policies that undermine civil liberties.[8] Surely, though, these responses were flawed and possibly over-determined by shock and bewilderment. Instead, I saw promise in an analysis that avoided reactionary Islamophobia and racist stereotyping, but offered a more nuanced account that went beyond fraught Western/Muslim relations. I was certain that construing terrorism almost entirely through the prism of UK and US government policy was missing the most important point. Yet in the analysis that surfaced over the next few months, much of what I read and heard ranged from outlandish conspiracy theories to detailed and impassioned critiques of British foreign and social policy. Of

course, it would be comforting to think that only a tiny minority supports conspiracy theories but I learnt that many people saw the UK government as somehow complicit in the attacks. I wish to argue here that conspiracy theories constituted one end of a continuum which had, at its opposite limit, explanations that, while not as extreme, nonetheless presented a one-dimensional and reductionist analysis based on a similar set of assumptions.

The denial of agency

To support my argument, I draw upon Sivanandan's article 'Race, terror and civil society' where he argues that the London bombings are a direct consequence of the US and UK invasion of Iraq in 2003 and of the form of multicultural politics pursued by the British government. As he notes, the war in Iraq 'has increased divisions in the country, led to insurgency on all sides, attracted terrorists to Iraq and furnished the basis of terrorism at home.'[9]

Sivanandan pursues a line of argument that eschews the moral agency of the perpetrators and instead attacks the UK government in its response. More specifically, he writes that since the London bombings, 'the Muslim community is being driven into a siege mentality, reinforcing the very segregation that the government wants to prevent.'[10] Sivanandan recognises that multiculturalism has been unfairly identified as the chief causal factor driving the rise of Muslim fundamentalism in the UK. Such a view is premised on a failure to distinguish between multicultural society as a description of British society 'arrived at through anti-racist struggles of the 1960s and 1970s and multiculturalism as a cure-all for racial injustice, promoted by successive governments.'[11] The problem of social division is a direct consequence of what he terms 'culturalism' or 'ethnicism' which ignores institutional racism and instead locates racism as 'racial disadvantage'. Such misguided policies equate culture with

its commodities and rituals and encourage associations that link multiculturalism with practices such as music, cooking, dancing. For Sivanandan, multiculturalism as practised by governments 'was instrumental in creating enclaves.'[12]

In effect, Sivanandan is positing two versions of multiculturalism, the first a description of pluralist society which has been established through anti-racist struggle and the second, a failed attempt to 'give people their cultures [when] they already have them' through 'pouring money into ethnic projects and strengthening ethnic cultures.'[13] On the subject of terrorism, there is a need 'to make the distinction between a liberation fighter for whom terrorism is the tactic of last resort and a terrorist for whom terrorism is a categorical imperative.'[14] If this distinction is not upheld, then a differentiation cannot also be made between 'state terrorism' and individual terrorism. 'State terror' thus becomes an act of 'choice' while 'liberation fighters' who use terrorism as the tactic of the last resort are acting out of 'choicelessness'.[15] Again, Sivanandan is denying agency to the terrorist in his use of the word 'choicelessness'.

The third denial of agency is apparent in the view that everything can be blamed on 'globalisation and market fundamentalism'. He writes:

> The greatest threat to Western values, however, arises from globalisation and market fundamentalism – changes that affect personal morality, which, after all, is the transliteration of abstract Enlightenment values into living practice.'[16]

Here, an abstracted ideological and epistemological formation (the Enlightenment) is located as the main driver of particularised behaviours while the role of individual agency is pushed into the background.

I have discussed Sivanandan in some detail because his arguments, in my view, display a similar logic to the analysis that he himself criticises.[17] While he castigates colonialism, his

arguments replicate a colonial narrative by rendering Muslims powerless and interpreting all their actions as a response to injustice. A clear distinction is evident; the *bad* West and the *good* but oppressed Muslim 'Other'. On this reading, the problem of terrorism is reducible entirely to the actions of a Western culture that, despite a range of multiculturalist gestures and concessions, still refuses to embrace the Muslim 'Other'. I find this form of reasoning problematic on a number of counts: first, it infantilises terrorists; secondly, it fails to acknowledge the way in which understandings of the West and the Muslim world are strikingly similar in that there is a willingness to essentialise each other in negative ways; thirdly, his casual deployment of terms such as 'the West' and 'the Other' construct a simplistic binary distinction to encapsulate cultural relationships when the reality is really far more complex.

Searching for analysis

Returning to my desire to find a more nuanced analysis, it is heartening to acknowledge some of the more lucid contributions to this topic, particularly those that show how perceptions of the social have been affected by fear of terrorist attacks. Here it is helpful to consider terrorism in the context of history, an approach which has been developed to good effect by Tilly, Hobsbawm, Williams and Said amongst others.[18] Charles Tilly, for example, provides some valuable advice for sociologists seeking to understand terrorism.[19] He warns against essentialising terrorism and instead suggests we see terror as a bounded political strategy. He notes how our understanding of terrorism has changed. While the term was first deployed to describe the actions of revolutionaries in France against their combatants, its usage has since expanded to incorporate the executions enacted by Stalin and the attacks perpetrated by nationalist groupings such as the Irish Republican Army, ETA

(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) in Spain and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Tilly is adamant that no useful generalisation covers all the variants of terrorism because terror is a strategy not a creed or a single causally coherent phenomenon.[20]

In asking whether the nature of terror changed in the late twentieth century and discussing the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) in Sri Lanka, Hobsbawm informs us that 60,000 people have been killed in conflicts with the Sri Lankan government since the 1960s. The most prominent change has been 'the rise and theoretical justification of indiscriminate murder as a form of small group terrorism.[21] Since the late 1960s, states have lost some of their legitimacy and power because of increasing globalisation and this has accentuated individuals' sense of alienation from the body politic. The international reach of the mass media has had an impact on terrorists who now develop 'politically more effective actions aimed not at decision-makers but at maximum media impact.'[22] With respect to Muslim fundamentalism, the theoretical justification for this form of terrorism first appeared in 1992 when a Fatwa was issued by Osama Bin Laden's spiritual advisor formally permitting the killing of innocents.

For Hobsbawm, two aspects of fundamentalist terrorism stand out. First, terrorist groups, though normally consisting of and representing small minorities, are often cast in a sympathetic light by certain 'mainstream' constituencies, and second, their recruits are often better educated 'than other members of the community to which they belong.'[23] Horrifying though the 9/11, Bali, Madrid and London bombings were, possibly their only major long-term impact was to encourage governments to tighten up on security and to reduce civil liberties. Hobsbawm argues that recent faith-based terrorism is symptomatic of modernity and terrorists are, in themselves, not significant historic agents. Instead, they operate in a 'climate of irrational fear' that most of us have difficulty imagining and which is, in itself, the more important dimension of the problem. As such,

the dangers of the war against terror do not come from the Muslim suicide bombers acting as individuated or small-group actors. They are, in fact, more important from the long historical perspective as symptoms of broader and deeper social dynamics. Hobsbawm suggests that the movements and organisations to which they belong are an expression of significant social dislocation, catalysed by rapid change and a crisis in traditional structures of authority. As a result, terrorist logics are likely to be impervious to the power of neo-liberal political elites who seek to combat them through policy initiatives that tend to operate in a national frame and on short time-scales.

There have been other valuable contributions that further our understanding of this topic. Edward Said's outline of a secular humanism in *Orientalism* sought to question the assumptions of Western representations of an imagined orient and resisted the advancement of national identities by seeking a form of politics in which communities were not bounded by their geographical location but rather sought ways to extend cultural and political affiliations.[24] Said saw the risk of fundamentalism in all its guises:

> Religious enthusiasm is perhaps, the most dangerous of threats to the humanistic enterprise, since it is patently anti-secular and antidemocratic in nature and, its monotheistic forms as a kind of politics, is by definition about as intolerantly humane and inarguable as can be…Religious fanaticism is religious fanaticism no matter who advocates or practices it. It is inexcusable to take an 'ours is better than yours' attitude toward it.[25]

Now with the benefit that hindsight affords, I want to suggest that a dual response is appropriate. We must be unequivocal in condemning terrorism and we should resist the urge to assign a moral equivalence to terrorist acts on the one hand and forms of state violence on the other. Yet, we have to understand the assumptive world of the terrorists and their rationale for engaging in such drastic action for political ends.

I was attracted to explanations that sought to understand such terrorist identities as catalysed by a crisis of the self. This led me to consider literature that explicitly considered the subjective component of terrorism. Psychoanalytical explanations seemed relevant as they offer us a view of the social world through a prism that subordinates 'structure' to the saliency of *agency* and the choices we are able to make in its name. In short, it provides us with the means to develop an understanding that acknowledges the moral agency of individuals and the choices we make rather than a view that construes all activity as a fully determined response or reaction to (real or perceived) injustice.

Multiculturalism and colonialism

In reading material for this chapter, I found Ghassan Hage's deployment of the conceptual language of psychoanalysis useful in situating the politics of racism and multiculturalism post 9/11.[26] He suggests that 'essentialising' figurations of Islamic culture(s) tend to overwhelm understandings that emphasise its dynamism and contingency. Hage views the multicultural project as a 'colonial' one that seeks to establish a relation in which the dominant culture is able to 'encompass' the Other and use the status of the law to entrench this 'encompassment'. He construes multiculturalism as a colonial ideology in which the dominant Western society seeks to depoliticise the Other while offering the compensatory accommodation of acknowledging their traditions. Depoliticisation is therefore an essential component of the multicultural project and it establishes a relationship which, in schematic terms at least, turns the Other into a powerless 'subaltern'.

The exploitation of the colonial subject requires this form of depoliticisation and Hage uses the term 'colonial necrophilia' to describe the relationship which multiculturalism establishes – the love of the dead other. That is, the culture of

the Other can be embraced because it is denied political power. Multiculturalism is a variety of 'colonial necrophilia', in that it is always dependent on the Other not having political power. For Hage, it is increasingly difficult for those who embrace Islam to accept this form of multiculturalism because of geopolitical events such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In addition, the embracing of religious law by many Muslims is perceived as a threat to the legal system of the nation-state. Colonial encompassment can be subverted by rejecting national law and this helps explain the hostility expressed toward specific practices. Islam is seen as threatening because of its transnationalism. It is not 'encompassable', unwilling, that is, to be non-political and unwilling to acquiesce to demands for assimilation. But the 'fact' of Islam being a threat is a subjective one. Western sensitivity is very fragile (regarding Islam) and Muslims are *perceived* as threatening.

For Hage, multiculturalism has failed to provide a sense of belonging especially for second-generation-Australian-Muslims. He argues that multiculturalism does not address forms of racism such as 'non recognition'. This racism of 'invisibility' works in more or less overt ways to circumscribe the physical, political and rhetorical space allotted to the cultural Other.[27] Hage identifies another form of racism in the processes of 'negative recognition' where the cultural Other is not invisible because indifference has been replaced with active, livid rage. In this modulation of the racist impulse, an acknowledgement of the Other is based almost entirely on reductionist, essentialist and, often well nigh, mythical animosity. Fortunately, multiculturalism has been quite successful in challenging this form of racism.

Nevertheless, the most virulent form of racism is what Hage calls the racism of misrecognition or the racism of 'misinterpellation' when society as a whole has turned against you. Here, he draws upon Althusser's theory of interpellation, i.e. the effects that society has on forming the individual subject. For Hage this is often the experience of many Muslims who

have embraced Australian identity but then find that their efforts at assimilation count for little. The person who experiences misinterpellation will often resort to seeking a new identity as a way of overcoming the trauma. A variant of misinterpellation is 'assimilation fatigue'. Hage uses this phrase to describe the state of mind in which people give up on trying to assimilate because it can never deliver what is hoped for; in other words, assimilation is something that cannot be fully achieved – it is a never-ending game in which 'people are always trying to fit in.' Individuals look for space in which they can avoid the trauma of these racisms without 'having this superego that is always judging you negatively'. The move to Islam is therefore 'the struggle to reconstitute the self without a Western superego always judging you negatively'.

The crisis of the West

The West, according to Hage, is in 'crisis' because the integration of its citizens can no longer be reliant on structural factors such as employment. A feature of globalisation is the detachment of the 'economic' from national belonging. Economic integration is no longer sufficient to secure national belonging. Nationalist ideology has been found wanting in its efforts to secure integration. Nationalism is incapable of achieving this state because it is, at its very root, a competitive ideology; it relies on a 'phallic modality of living'. People who espouse nationalism have an underlying fear that it might be wrong and, hence, within nationalism there is a 'castration' complex. Western forms of nationalism create a paranoid sensibility that projects on to Islamic culture many of the insidious and contradictory aspects of its own ideology.

We might take issue with some of Hage's more sweeping statements and with his tendency to generalise but there is still much to commend his analysis; particularly in relation to the power relations that underpin multiculturalism. One limitation

that does need to be noted, though, is his reluctance to really consider the subjectivities of individuals who engage in acts of terrorism. Useful for this reason is Wieviorka who observes that explorations of the mindset of individuals who engage in acts of terrorism are often determined to isolate some kind of pathology or instrumental rationality as the psychological driver of the action.[28] He suggests the need to consider terrorism not in terms of political tactics, but, rather, as a sociological phenomenon. Drawing upon the work of Khosrokhavar, the desire to become a martyr is linked to a difficulty to adjust to modernity and a feeling of persecution towards the Muslim world.[29] In this sense, terrorists are bounded to the changes wrought by globalisation and attempt to construct a role as 'actors'. The social dynamics within small groups thus provide a sense of moral superiority and a belief in a collective future.

Also helpful is Fakhry Davids who argues that there are two components of Islamophobia.[30] First, there is 'a constant but largely invisible level of everyday out-group prejudice directed at Muslims and, second, there is 'an acute intensification of these trends since 9/11.'[31] Fakhry Davids is interested in exploring the animosity towards Muslims as a group within Western nations and uses a psychoanalytical frame to help us understand racism. Racism relies on the construction of an us/them divide from which negative projections can be developed. The relationship between subject and object is inscribed in a paranoid frame which inevitably leads to distortion. Fakhry Davids expands on Frantz Fanon's argument that one of the legacies of growing up in a divided colonial world is that a black person develops a dual self, one in relation to being black and one in relation to white people.[32] This sense of duality can generate a distortion in which one is idealised and the other denigrated. Fakhry Davids, a practising psychoanalyst, sees this splitting as a factor that can generate hatred towards specific identities, for example 'Westerners'. He writes 'I am suggesting that the violent hatred characterizing the relationship in the mind between Muslim

and non-Muslim can be accounted for by the violence against the Muslim self attending the process by which the white/Western identification was inscribed in the mind.[33]

Cosmopolitanism

So far my discussion has been primarily analytical in that I have sought to explore the factors that help explain the London bombings. I wish also to consider, however, the kinds of reconciliation that might be possible in the wake of the incident. My question is superficially simple: Does cosmopolitanism as a political project offer a way to negotiate through these difficult issues relating to power and control? One of the key attractions of cosmopolitanism is its embracing of shared values and commonality. As Woodward, Skrbis and Bean note, cosmopolitanism can be viewed as an outlook or sensibility that 'delight(s) in difference'.[34] I draw upon the definition advanced by Anderson that 'in general cosmopolitanism endorses reflective distance from one's cultural affiliations, a broad understanding of other cultures and customs, and a belief in universal humanity' and Hannerz's use of the term to describe individuals who are willing to engage with others and act in a reciprocal way.[35] Alternatively, Massey has termed it an 'outward-lookingness, a consciousness of the wider geographies and responsibilities of place'.[36] Beck and Turner contrast a cosmopolitan attitude with nationalism and democratic authoritarianism.[37] For Beck, a post-national cosmopolitanism world order is necessary to address the complex and deep-rooted structural problems such as global poverty and environmental degradation. Turner sees cosmopolitanism as a bulwark against intolerance.[38] In other words, cosmopolitanism is a universal ideal that is appropriate to all societies regardless of specific conditions or histories.

Some caution is required in any discussion to avoid the trap identified by David Harvey, that espousing and embracing cosmopolitanism and its associated politics risks having as

much to do with 'making the world safe for capitalism, market freedoms and social democracy as it has to do with any other (formulating a) conception of the good life.'[39] For Harvey, 'the cosmopolitanist point is to ground it in a dynamics of historical-geographical transformations'.[40] He suggests here that an active intervention is required in the political sphere rather than a hopeful statement of universal principals. Michael Keith provides a similar warning in his chapter 'After the cosmopolitan? Multicultural cities and the future of racism'.[41] Keith argues that cosmopolitanism has been abstracted from the spaces of the city which is a problem because reading and responding to urban contexts is essential to understanding an emerging world system where the majority of humankind lives in high-density settlements. This brings into relief the paradox that, in the city itself, the most intolerant spaces are those where the actuality of intercommunal dialogue take place.[42] Szerszynski and Urry argue that a culture of cosmopolitanism has been accentuated by a 'banal globalisation' that is reproduced and re-enforced by mass media vectors.[43] They argue that cosmopolitanism involves a kind of 'connoisseurship of places, peoples and cultures' Szerszynski and Urry.[44] Some of the predispositions and practices include: mobility (both corporally and imaginatively), a capacity to consume, a sense of curiosity, a willingness to take risks and the skill to interpret images of others and exhibit openness. They argue that the implications of cosmopolitanism are that we increasingly inhabit our world from a distance. Szerszynski and Urry make the case for 'a form of cosmopolitics' if we are not all to be fated to become mere visitors in our own worlds.'[45]

Taking Harvey's, Szerszynski and Urry's, and Keith's warnings seriously, we have to be careful not to equate cosmopolitanism with a romanticisation of social relationships. Useful here is Appiah's *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers*.[46] Appiah argues that cosmopolitanism presents a new way of thinking about an age-old challenge for us all. It does not, as its more optimistic proponents might have us believe, set us on a clear

course toward a permanent state of inter-ethnic, inter-national and inter-subjective reconciliation or amelioration. What it does do, however, is require us to recognise our connections, our interdependency and our commonality and to work much harder to put aside our differences and the small issues that divide us. Appiah uses the concept of 'universality plus difference' to express this view. In spite of the risks, cosmopolitanism opens up the possibility of transformation, in that it enables us to provide a way through the complexity that has engulfed us.[47]

Returning to the discussion of Hage, we can note a cosmopolitan prescription in his work as he argues that the politics of recognition/toleration implicit within multiculturalism is no longer sufficient because it cannot allow for the will or the sovereignty of the Other.[48] He argues that sovereignty should not be a zero-sum game in which one person's power can only come at the expense of a victory over the other. Rather we have to embrace negotiation as it enables us to see individuals as subjects and not as objects. Negotiation requires a relationship of equality in which recognition is not premised on an unequal power relationship. Whether we can move to a society where there is a culture of negotiation rather than recognition is an interesting question. Hage's prescription has similarities with the arguments espoused by Modood,[49] who states that the 'unacceptability of Muslim identity is no doubt partly to do with the conservative views on gender and sexuality professed by some Muslim spokespersons, not to mention issues to do with freedom of expression as they arose in the Rushdie affair.'[50] He suggests that we should recognise Muslims as:

> legitimate social partner(s) and include them in the institutional compromises of church and state, religion and politics, that characterise the evolving, moderate secularism of mainstream western Europe…Ultimately, we must rethink 'Europe' and its changing nations so that Muslims are not a 'Them' but part of a plural 'Us', not mere sojourners but part of its future.[51]

Conclusion and implications

What is the significance of these debates for Australia in respect of its sense of connection to the wider world? I would suggest that the bombings in London and the responses to it reveal how easy it is to rush and cling to reductionist forms of analysis when we are fearful and angry. We are especially prone to this mode of response in that the diagnosis of terrorism relies on a critique that extols the failures of our politicians, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the contradictions implicit within multicultural politics. The challenge is therefore to overcome our fear and, instead, embrace forms of engagement that elevate our shared experiences. In an interview with *The Guardian* in 2007, the Tasmanian writer Richard Flanagan spoke of a wider crisis in our society. In his words:

> There is a crisis that is not political – an epidemic of loneliness, of sadness – and we're completely unequal to dealing with it. We're obsessed these days with believing the answer is always individual, that it lies in ourselves…But the reality is it lies in other people and making connections with them, yet it is a world where it's ever harder to make those connections.[52]

Flanagan is, in my view, correct in his diagnosis; the fear of terrorism is symptomatic of wider anxieties about belonging, identity and our relationships with others that characterise (post)modern life. I want to conclude by contending that our understanding of terrorism and politics needs to be located within a much broader context; especially our difficulties in adjusting to the rapidity of social change and our sense of powerlessness. As Flanagan stated in his interview, 'terrorism blinds us. Terrorism is simply murder…the word terrorism has been misused for so long that it clouds our understanding of what happens'. In other words, we have allowed ourselves to see terrorism as *the problem* when a more insightful analysis requires

us to locate terrorism as a feature of modernity and rapid social change. The individuals who engage in terrorism rationalise their acts as a means to an end but as I sought to show, this is not an adequate way to interpret their agency. At the very least, cosmopolitanism (as a political project) offers us a space to reflect and work through some of the difficult societal challenges that have beset multiculturalism and multicultural society in its most recent phase of development.

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Cultural translation and cosmopolitanism

Nikos Papastergiadis

Introduction

Globalisation has made the act of contact with strangers and different cultures a routine feature of everyday life. The rapid acceleration of urbanisation, unprecedented patterns of mobility and new modes of communication have prompted debates concerning the basic structures of society. Furthermore, the term cosmopolitanism has in the past decade been used to give focus to discussions on the shifts in the order of international relations, the powers of the nation-state, the forms of cultural production and even the sense of personal belonging. At one end of the spectrum, commentators such as Ulrich Beck have embraced these changes as inspiring new forms of governance, expanding the realm of social relations and stimulating cultural exchange.[1] At the other end, David Harvey takes a more pessimistic view on globalisation as he sees it as both a mechanism that has deepened power differentials and the source of a new rhetoric that masks its own exploitative logic.[2] One of the most contentious

aspects of the debates on globalisation is whether an emergent cosmopolitan disposition can either enrich our understanding of cross-cultural contacts and thereby provide a basis for new forms of global solidarity, or legitimate a new hyper-consumerist mode of agency that feeds on geopolitical inequalities and paradoxically encourages a defensively provincial mindset.

In this essay I will explore the challenges and innovations that have emerged from cross-cultural contacts by outlining a cosmopolitan theory of cultural translation. I take cosmopolitanism as a term that refers to both objective conditions in which cultural differences are increasingly entangled, and as a normative concept for addressing a specific orientation towards this process of mixture. Cosmopolitanism therefore includes both a way of being in the world that entails a universalist aspiration for moral connectedness, and an emergent social order that extends political rights beyond exclusivist territorial boundaries. However, in order to feel an individual sense of moral connectedness and organise these collective modes of solidarity, there must be an attendant mode for comprehending and evaluating the cultural similarities and differences. This process, which is both an expressive and comparative act, is best understood through the concept of cultural translation.

Aesthetics and the ethics of kenosis

My starting point is a common scene in an academic forum. The prominent cultural theorist Ihab Hassan[3] displayed a reproduction of a painting by the Australian Aboriginal painter Rover Thomas and in all sincerity turned to the audience and asked: 'how would you interpret this painting?' The question provoked a moment of stunned confusion because everyone was aware that Hassan already knew how to 'read' the aesthetic and symbolic properties in this painting. This was not the moment in which the invited international guest merely opened the floor

so that the audience could inform him with local knowledge. As a participant in the seminar I felt the nervous energy run through the room. The anxious silence was not just shyness. It was as if a group of strangers was being asked to explain something familiar but for which they lacked words. Suddenly, there was a confrontation with the possibility that neither the art historian's 'good eye', nor the anthropologists 'access' to the cultural context, would suffice as tools for interpreting Rover Thomas's painting. In my view, Hassan's rhetorical question, and the anxious silence that it provoked, exposed a limit point in the conventional ways of both defining cosmopolitanism and conducting cross-cultural analysis. Hassan, in a number of recent essays, has claimed that much of the cultural turn in literary criticism, and in particular, the commentary on multiculturalism and contemporary identity has now descended into tendentious and narcissistic hype.[4] Hassan's frustration with the influence of political and psychoanalytic discourses on identity and cultural creativity has sharpened his attention towards religious concepts and literary expressions of the self/other relationship. As a reaction against the deterministic tendencies that trailed in the wake of the cultural turn, Hassan redirected his focus towards the nihilist tradition in critical thought and claimed that the process of creative transformation is better explained through mystical concepts such as kenosis.

'I am Nobody. Who are you?' Emily Dickinson's probing declaration provides a paradoxical starting point for Hassan's quest for identity. Sceptical of the idealistic claims by humanitarian NGOs, annoyed by the boastful hype of global roaming executives, and repelled from the bile of the leaders of transnationalist jihadism, Hassan turns to an ethical modality of self-dispossession that he claims is rapidly fading from everyday life but still 'perdures' in art and theory. The constant in Hassan's criticism is the expectation that at any point in history, 'art may move toward a redeemable imagination, commensurate with the full mystery of human consciousness.'[5] This expectation

remains profoundly disappointed by his review of the literature on cosmopolitanism. Even at its 'genuinely admirable' best, as in the example of Edward Said's attempt to articulate universalism through the dual respect for cultural difference and the abidance to a single standard for human behaviour, Hassan considers this to be a variant of wishful thinking and regretfully informs us that such a stance is 'heroically naïve'.[6] He concludes that this body of work fails because it adopts an instrumentalist perspective on human subjectivity, and ultimately serves no other function than to lubricate the geopolitical spread of global corporations and collude in the commodification of culture for global consumption.

Hence we can appreciate the extent of Hassan's despair when he claims that the debates on cultural identity have now become dominated by either a self-obsessed narcissistic version of identity as a happy consumer, or the self-abrogating notion of identity that demands strict codes of loyalty and obedience. This perspective on the permissible forms of identity and the conditions for accepting strangers is grossly inadequate because, as Hassan acknowledges, even the civic debates on identity are no longer confined by the category of the nation-state, but are a matter of contention in both the 'micro' version of communitarianism, and the 'macro' platforms of transnational fundamentalism. This shift in the social and political contexts of cultural identity therefore compels greater sensitivity to the wide range of forces that shape contemporary subjectivity. However, rather than finding companions who are shaping an expanded vision of culture and identity, Hassan sees intellectuals as being implicated in ideological 'abstractions that demand human blood to maintain them for a higher end'.[7]

The only trace of a genuine dialogue between self and other that Hassan identifies is within the nihilist tradition of aesthetic and philosophical thought. But Hassan also knows that this is not enough. He pleas for a social space in which differences can coexist before they collide and explode, or

as he suggests: 'flare into rage'. Hassan has already rejected cosmopolitanism as a political ideal, noting that it is both too general to sustain the bonds of transnational solidarity, and not specific or appealing enough to be woven into the fabric of everyday experience. But this leaves his poetic quest for a 'civitas without borders' in an abstract space. At one level, it remains as a yearning. At another, it adopts the burnt and gritty gaze of an ascetic who decrees that: 'You need to see with the "eye of flesh" as well as the "eye of fire"'. Neither a 'bloodied nationalist', nor a 'utopian cosmopolitan', rejecting both liberal tolerance and corporatist cannibalism, Hassan cuts through contemporary criticism claiming to have both feet firmly on the ground, and dares to pose such unfashionable questions as: 'What releases us from blood and belonging? What frees us from implacable self-interest? What gives us to the widest horizon of life?'[8] Hassan proposes that answers to these questions are best grasped through a broader vision of the creative transformation in human consciousness, and he repeatedly reaches for St. Paul's use of the term kenosis. Paul described Christ's 'humbling' of himself in his transformation from God to man as a form of kenosis. By emptying out his divinity, Christ could make space for becoming mortal. For followers of Christ there is a similar expectation. In order to live in a state of grace, they too must clear away their identity and thereby receive the 'flesh' of Christ.

By turning to this mystical concept of transubstantiation, Hassan risks dropping deeper into the older trap of idealising and caricaturing the effects of public intellectuals who engage in cultural politics.[9] It would be all too easy to interpret this spiritual turn as evidence of the poverty of modernist subjectivity and the failure of vanguardist ideologies to produce a meaningful cosmopolitan imaginary. However, rather than accept the view that a secular vision of cosmopolitanism is 'over' and it is time to get into something else, I will propose that this is a good moment to reflect on the contradictory forces

that shape contemporary subjectivity and cultural production. Other than gloss the biting critique that Hassan unleashes on the cultural theories of cosmopolitanism, I will seek to recast his annunciation of a terminus as yet another 'way-station' in which over-simplified claims are unloaded and the complexity of cultural translation is revisited.

Translation as trope for cultural transformation

In the second line of Emily Dickinson's poem 'I'm Nobody! Who are you?' she turns to the reader and poses an equally penetrating query: 'Are you nobody, too?' Hassan is right to claim that the force of nothing, the power of the abyss and the kenotic ideal of self-dispossession are not questions that feature prominently in the debates on globalisation and cosmopolitanism. However, these questions are not entirely absent from the lineages of critical and cultural theory. At the end of his career, the critical theorist Kurt Wolff proposed the phrase 'surrender and catch' to describe both the state of vibrant oscillation in the self-conscious act of letting go of one's identity, and the creative transformation of the self in its encounter with the other.[10] Peter Sloterdijk, a second-generation critical theorist, began his commentary on modern subjectivity with a provocative investigation into 'kinetic nihilism'.[11] The image of being as both nothing and an unfathomable source of energy was also vital to Homi Bhabha's exploration of the 'contingent tension' and 'temporal break' that constitutes hybrid subjectivity in the postcolonial context.[12] In each of these sources we not only find comparable accounts of the confrontation of the void and the passage from one state of consciousness to another, but also a common quest to break free of instrumentalist codes of subjectivity. While the trope of translation has been well and truly used, and some say 'abused'[13], as a tool to address the cross-cultural process of adoption and adaptation, I will argue that in the context of globalisation,

a new non-mechanistic paradigm is necessary to address the creative function of the void in cultural translation.

Translation is conventionally understood as the process by which the meaning in one language is conveyed in another. It usually involves the discovery of linguistic correspondences between different languages, or the transfer of terms from one language into another. The similarity that exists between different languages or the introduction of new terms does not always entail an exact replication of meaning. As correspondent terms are grasped, or new ones inserted, there is always an uneven fit. This unevenness or non-equivalence inspires both a lament for what is lost in translation, and a celebration of the extension in conceptual understanding through creative improvisation and hybridisation. Translation is a process of bringing an element in from the outside that then reconstitutes the inside and activates the generalising capacity for coding and evaluation. Gayatri Spivak describes the shuttling action of translation as an act of reparation. While Spivak notes that the subject who performs translation must possess an intimate knowledge of the rules and possible forms of both languages, she also claims that in the process of moving between languages, the translator sees his or her own language as just another language among many, and thereby experiences both the guilty feeling of pricking the narcissistic totality of the mother tongue and the conscious coming into being of ethical responsibility. To move between languages is not only to negotiate the discrepancies between the specific languages as one idiom refuses to be carried over to the other, but also to reinstate the possibility for transcoding the generality of the semiotic that Spivak claims can 'appropriate the singularity of the other's idiom by way of conscientious approximations.'[14]

At the broadest level, the concept of translation has also been adopted as a meta-concept for addressing the constitutive function of difference in all forms of knowledge production.[15] From this perspective, translation is not confined to either

interpretation across linguistic boundaries or articulation of perception into language but is extended to address the tension between the universal and the particular in philosophy, the process by which transformation occurs in politics, and even the ethical form of intersubjective relations. By claiming translation as a meta-concept, I am not seeking to demonstrate that translation only works because there is either a primal linguistic pool from which all languages are derived or an ultimate conceptual horizon at which all meanings will converge. Meaning does not derive from some original source, or remain in abeyance until a messianic moment of unity. I do not believe that the continuous iterations of translation will eventually lead to a point of linguistic resolution and ultimate transparency. While the impulse for translation draws from a boundless curiosity over difference and the fundamental desire to communicate with others, the production of meaning is also relatively open-ended. The untranslatable grows out of each new translation. Paul Ricoeur argued that translation proceeds 'in spite of difference': 'A good translation can aim only at a supposed equivalence that is not founded on a demonstrable identity of meaning. An equivalence without identity.'[16] Subsequently, he also quite rightly added that the paradigm for representing translation should be recast beyond the stifling polarity of fidelity/betrayal.[17] Therefore, a more affirmative perspective would see translation as being produced *through* the encounter with the awesome infinity of difference, and take the imperfect labor of translating meaning as a stimulus for both creative modification and conceptual extension.

To tease out the need for a new conceptual framework adequate in representing the relationship between cultural translation, cosmopolitanism and global culture, let me return to the question posed by Ihab Hassan: how do you interpret this work of art by an Aboriginal artist? The very existence of Aboriginal artworks seems to defy all historical projections and thrusts us into the jaws of a cultural paradox. Contemporary

Aboriginal art emerged in a context in which Aboriginal culture was at best registered as an ethnographic relic of the primitive world. From this perspective, Aboriginal culture should have been doomed and deleted. Yet, the example of Aboriginal art disturbs this apocalyptic conclusion. Out of the 'cataclysms' of colonial domination there are now numerous accounts of the processes by which Indigenous groups have adopted new media to renew traditional cultural forms and embraced the communicative technologies of globalisation to create new networks of cultural belonging.[18] The novel techniques and unique cultural forms that emerge from these practices are usually interpreted as evidence of the vitality of cultural translation in the age of globalisation.

While there has been considerable attention paid to the pioneering role of key individuals and the adoption of new circuits of communication in this process of cultural reconfiguration, hybridisation and innovation, it is not clear how a model of cultural translation can address the creativity that seemingly arises from a void. How could there be an interaction, let alone a dialogue when it was presumed that the other had nothing to exchange? Have we not also become accustomed to claims from within Aboriginal communities that they have lost touch with their own cultural base? If this is the predicament of Aboriginal people, and they are aware of their loss of control over either the composition of their own idiomatic boundaries or the flows that enable a generalising system for exchange, then how do they create for themselves a unique and distinct cultural language? We need to take a step back and explore how this cultural production emerged without the interacting 'rub' of rival symbols. In the context of contemporary Aboriginal art it would be false to presume that cultural translation can only occur across an existing boundary that separates two distinct entities, and through the force of mobility.

One must take another view into this creative process and consider the form of the void – a space in which, at best, only

fragments collide, where cultures do not meet as rivals, but where identification occurs in the absence of coherent models, and where signs seem to leap out of their history. In short, I aim to consider whether the innovation that emerges from cultural translation, is not just evidence of the nexus between boundedness and mobility, but also a response to the void. Naoki Sakai redefined the starting point of cultural translation in a similar manner. He shifted attention away from the interactive dimension, and proposed that cultural translation is a mode of address that occurs in a field where the subject is absent and the ground for securing shared meaning is not yet formed. In the commonplace multicultural scene, where a plurality of languages and perspectives cohabit, it cannot be taken for granted that the subject to whom you address yourself can understand you, just as there is no guarantee that their worldview can converge with your own.[19] I will now examine the emergence of a process of communication where the aim was not to deliver a pre-existing message to the next generation of family, or like-minded neighbour, or even to a knowable world at large, but rather, I will focus on the act of communication as a mode for inventing both a new addressee, and creating the ground upon which such an exchange can occur. I will suggest that the difficulty faced by the audience in response to Ihab Hassan's question on the meaning of Rover Thomas's painting comes neither from the problem of decoding its symbolic status, nor the task of situating it within an historical context, but the challenge of addressing the groundlessness of creation and the void to which the painting gives form.

The void and cultural translation

Cultural translation entails a commitment to imagining an alternative community. The most useful contribution offered by the conceptualisation of cultural translation as immanent

transcendence is its connection to the driving force of the imaginary. The imaginary is not in contrast to reality, it is the process by which an individual and culture are constituted from the 'unceasing and undetermined image' of the inner void and near infinity of worldly differences.[20] Cultural translation is both an inventive leap that creates *ex nihilo,* and an interactive process that emerges from the 'succulencies' of mixture, fusion and hybridity.[21] It is motivated by the threat of effacement and the desire to enunciate identity amidst a particular combination of signs. To address this relationship I turn to the emergence of the Papunya Tula art movement – one of the crucial moments in the emergence of contemporary Aboriginal art. In the first instance it is worth grasping some bare details about the context in which the art movement emerged. Papunya was a remote camp in the Western Desert. It comprised of a diverse group of displaced people from Pintupi, Anmatyerre, Arrernte, Luritja and Walpiri. Disease and death were endemic in the camp. The elders were also confronted by the problem of educating an 'out of control younger generation, whose delinquency they blamed not on the alcohol or fast cars in which it found expression, but the breakdown of their own authority'.[22] In short, this community was a like a cluster of displaced and fragmented communities. There was no single common language that could be used to cross their internal divisions or to the world at large. Collectively they were also aware that a new global culture threatened to overtake their traditional values and worldview. So how did the elders, while staring at the abyss in which their respective cultures lay and confronting the dazzling force of global culture, produce a vision that could address the contradictions of their reality?

There is now a prevailing consensus that the emergence of the Papunya Tula painting movement began as a form of re-utilisation of the traditional designs for the purpose of communicating contemporary stories.[23] It is widely acknowledged that this provided a social platform upon which the youth could establish a connection with their own heritage while moving within their

contemporary reality. As Galarrwuy Yunupingu has claimed 'painting has paralleled our political struggles to maintain our culture and our rights to land…we paint to show the rest of the world that we own the country, and that the land owns us. Our painting is a political act.'[24] However, I want to extend the discussion on the politics of art beyond the discussion of cultural barriers that impair the flow of messages, by also facing the question that Derrida asks in his own meditation on translation: 'In what language does one write memoirs when there has been no authorised mother tongue?'[25] According to the curator of Indigenous art, Vivien Johnson, the story of the emergence of the Papunya Tula movement requires a perspective that notes both the traumatic force of a one-sided collision, and the radical leap from near cultural extinction.

> These men embarked upon the disclosure of their cultural traditions to the outside world as art in a sophisticated and radical response to the profound trauma their society was experiencing – precisely as a result of that 'coming in'. We do the founders of Papunya Tula Artists a disservice if we do not recognise the necessity that inspired their invention of a painting language based on those traditions and suitable in their own terms for an expanding encounter with that world.[26]

'The necessity that inspired their invention' was, in Johnson's terms, the struggle between going out to find a language, and the ruptures caused by the languages that were already 'coming in'. This dual struggle corresponds to the torsion that Derrida claimed underpinned translation and which he described as the need to overcome the 'surging wave of anamnesia that the double interdict has unleashed.'[27] Paul Carter also frames his account of the emergence of the Papunya Tula art movement by registering the turbulent upheaval that was bobbing up within and pulling down the edifices of their culture.[28] For instance, by noting the coincidence between Papunya Tula and

the establishment of the Aboriginal Tent Embassy in Canberra, Carter inserts a complex analogy between the political act of representation as an alien within one's own homeland, and the aesthetic form of articulating a previously unspoken mother tongue. In both instances, the request for reception within the institutions of their homeland stretches the link between hospitality and translation.

Let us pause to trace these political and cultural acts of self-representation and thereby consider the role of hospitality in what Derrida claims as the 'law of translation'. According to Derrida our relationship towards language is a perpetual process of translation. He asserts the relationship between speech and language as a double postulation that can only be bridged through translation: 'We only ever speak one language. We never only speak one language.'[29] These statements can only both be true if language can provide a dual sense of hospitality. Through one entrance language provides the feeling of being at home in the centre of the world, and the opening to other worlds. The Aboriginal emissaries faced a similar task – they needed a language that could hold their sense of homeland and would also be suitable 'for an expanding encounter with that world'. This double postulation of translation introduced a peculiar state of distanciation toward language. On the one hand, the act of invention is neither a process of alienation from a pre-existing state, nor a form of resurrection through reconfiguration. By combining Derrida's meditation on translation, with Hetti Perkins's claim that tradition and innovation are not mutually exclusive in Papunya Tula[30], it is possible to develop a new approach towards understanding the function of alienation and the void in cultural translation.

Alienation from 'one's own' culture is usually seen as a necessary stage in the dialectics of cultural renewal. For instance, in a recent essay by Rey Chow, a Chinese-American cultural theorist, there is a close reading of a scene in which a Chinese-American author reflects on the shifting status of symbols as

they move from their original source and then circulate as part of a diasporic culture within the dominant culture. Such a reflexive exercise obviously presupposes a capacity for cultural translation, and with great scrupulousness Chow notes how this bifocal translator is seeing 'one's own' culture from both the inside and the outside. Chow does not fail to point out that the act of seeing with the eyes of a stranger also involves a process of distortion and diminishment. However, her critique does not suggest that the translator's mourning for the loss of completeness and complicity with the objectification of 'one's own' culture is simply an act of betrayal. Cultural renewal and alienation are entangled in a nexus of disavowal and intercepting:

> In such reflexivity, it is 'one's own' culture, so to speak, rather than an exotic or little known other culture that becomes the occasion for disenchantment and estrangement; it is one's own culture that takes on the otherness of the obsolete, the irrational, the barbarous, and so forth. Often accompanied by the modernist aesthetics of defamiliarization (the extreme version of which presents one's own culture as inhuman and cannibalistic), such cultural reflexivity is symptomatic of an earlier moment of the global process of modernization.[31]

The cultural reflexivity in Papunya Tula did not begin with the artists standing slightly apart from their culture and seeing it as a minority culture moving within the dominant culture. Such a stance would presume that their culture was already visible and rebounding against the evaluative mechanisms of the dominant culture. The elders of Papunya Tula did not undergo this kind of reflexivity because their visual order had not yet been formed. By bringing forth a new visual language, there was no sense in which they were betraying their own culture. Similarly, there was no recoil from the negative gaze of the other, or alienation in the sense of experiencing fragmentation or loss of contact with the exquisite state of wholeness. For the Aboriginal artists

the journey through the antinomies of representations includes both a confrontation of what Derrida called the 'abyssal problem' and an ecstatic awakening of the cosmopolitan imaginary.[32] Or in the words of the Mangkaja artist Jakuna Mona Chuguna:

> There is a word we are thinking of now – *ngalkara*. It means spreading the word. That is what we want to do with this painting, to let people know…I have never lost the idea and feeling for my country, where I came from. It is all still in my brain, it is right there. We have that story all of the time. It is more than my memory, it is *mangi* (a spirit or essence) that I feel.[33]

If the task of cultural translation involves the articulation of something that is ever present but has no mother tongue, then its relationship to alienation is also beyond the melancholic logic of defacement. The lack does not signify an absence of a cultural repository. On the contrary, Perkins argues that Aboriginal people, irrespective of either the extent of their travels, or their access to technology, have preserved the capacity to imagine a form of overlap and interplay between different worlds. Aboriginal paintings are often read like maps that reveal the nexus between ceremony and country. However, Perkins also stresses that these paintings push us into the vortex that exists between the many worlds of the Australian landscape, a topology that she termed as 'parallel universes, other worlds'.[34] But let us take another step back, and ask the question: How does this process of negotiating antinomies proceed in a void?

Carter's account of this remarkable journey focuses on the role of a stranger who served as a kind of unwitting guide. As an art teacher, Geoffrey Bardon was motivated to come to Papunya as a way of gaining access to non-western graphic symbols and driven by the ambition of incorporating their symbols into his own visual language. However, upon arrival Bardon noted that the children had already achieved a dual level of visual dexterity.

Inside the classroom situation children could draw stories about 'cowboys and Indians' in the conventional western mode, but outside, when they played in the sand they drew stories using traditional symbols. Bardon had the perspicacity to recognise that the children were already moving in two worlds. He also noticed that his presence was never neutral and, with the aid of a translator, he invited the children and then collaborated with the elders to produce traditional designs on western media. Carter claims that the breakthrough occurred when Bardon began to mimic their gestures and improvise in the design of meaningless patterns. By engaging in play-acting with the children and the elders, the door was opened to a unique form of cultural crossover. It was after the collision, the rattle and rumble of signs and bodies, that 'the sparks really began to fly'.[35] As Bardon claimed: 'I was asking the children to understand my language in theirs, I was asking to be understood in their own language'.[36]

While Carter claimed that Bardon 'behaved like a conductor', it was a very peculiar form of direction that he offered. Bardon did not have a score sheet. There was no ideal in his mind. Carter saw Bardon as someone who literally and figuratively jumped into the art compositions. Humming, dancing, waving, prompting and calling forth something that he neither knew what it was, nor sensed where it would end. But just as suddenly he would command and gesture towards the completion of a work. By engaging the artists in what Bardon called 'talkings-out', the elements of the story would begin to assemble. They did not simply appear in either a random or predetermined order. It was neither an act of spontaneous creation nor a visualisation of traditional mythology. Something else emerged. Bardon explained this creative transformation as a process of putting the archetypes in flow and then punctuating the rhythm of association. This structure produced a near infinite variation of contextual meanings that Bardon defined under the category of hieroglyphs.[37]

For Bardon the mystery of creativity was always expressed in the paradoxes of spiritual incarnations and through an evocation of the capricious force of natural cataclysms. In his own recollections of the time spent at Papunya, Bardon compared his presence to the sight and sound of his Volkswagen kombi van.

> It seemed at the time my destiny to carry a swag as an itinerant artist-teacher, the van fitted out to meet a vagabond adventure with cameras, paints and canvas, books and dreams. My vehicle was just like the paintings: beautiful, breathing, functional, living entities. I saw both vehicle and paintings as indestructible; a permanent achievement of the mind, like the painter's achievement in recording poetic and epic thoughts of the continent they loved…In daylight my vehicle was perhaps a speck or dot of blue at Papunya.[38]

In order to grasp this strange morphing of specks in the horizon it is worth recalling Norman Bryson's description of the Japanese concept of sunyata – 'emptiness', 'radical impermanence', 'blankness'.[39] Bryson adopted the concept of sunyata to define a perspectival order that does not privilege the subject as an imperious centre. Sunyata is presented as a point against which the unity of self is opposed, or even as a zone through which it must pass in order to achieve a higher unity, but as an expanded field. According to the visual field of sunyata the I/eye is immersed in an indivisible field of 'radical impermanence'. Passing the act of interpretation through the conceptual frontiers of sunyata therefore suspends all questions of a central identity:

> The flinging of ink marks the surrender of the fixed form of the image to the global configuration of force that subtends its. Eidos is scattered to the four winds. The image is made to float on the forces that lie outside the frame; it is thrown, as one throws dice. What breaks into the image is the rest of the universe, everything outside of the frame.[40]

Carter's commentary on Bardon's practice and theory of creative transformation and his observations of the effect of Bardon's mediation are all framed by a broader theory that highlights the dynamic role of mobility in language and culture. The interaction between Bardon and the artists at Papunya Tula are an instance of the way in which cross-cultural collaboration can deepen, what Carter calls the 'grooves' of specific symbols.[41] Implicit in this theory of symbolic transformation is an acknowledgement of the productive force of the encounter with difference and the attendant experience of surrender to the other. Following from Carter's account of the collaboration between Bardon and the men at Papunya we could proceed with the assumption that the totality of meaning of an artwork is neither fixed in perpetuity within a sacred-secret covenant that precedes the arrival of others, nor freely available to all that are curious, but produced in the relatively open but also stubbornly opaque process of cultural translation.

Carter's attention to the subtle interplay between traditional and cultural codes, the use of different media, and the haptic force of mime and gesture, takes us closer to Ihab Hassan investigation into the relationship between kenosis and creative transformation. Harold Bloom, a fellow Gnostic, also adopted the concept of kenosis to explain the creative process.[42] Bloom argues that the artist must undergo an emptying out of the self in order to make way for his or her precursor. However, in the act of self-abnegation, Bloom claims that there is also a critical process of refilling. According to Bloom, as the precursor is admitted into his or her consciousness the poet undertakes a response that resembles a swerve. The initial force of the swerve serves to make space for the other but its ongoing trajectory also produces the counter effect of wiping away the trace of the other. Kenosis is thereby presented as a grounding of the artist's relation and a distanciation with precursors. Bloom is keen to stress that: 'This emptying is a liberating discontinuity'.[43]

Bloom's narrative of creative transformation relies on the dual process of kenosis and the swerve. This not only resembles the dynamic that Kurt Wolff captured in the phrase 'surrender and catch' but it also highlights the critical function of mediation. However, where Bloom uses the process of kenosis to acknowledge the need to empty the self, he then gives final stress to the concept of the swerve as the means by which the trace of the other is wiped away. Alain Badiou offers an even more radical interpretation of Saint Paul's concept of kenosis. Badiou does not see the process of emptying out as either horizontal approach towards truth or negotiated encounter with the other. Rather, it is an absolute vertical leap out of the void.

> With Paul, we notice a complete absence of the theme of mediation. Christ is not a mediator; he is not that through which we know God. Jesus is the pure event, and as such is not a function, even were it to be a function of knowledge or revelation.[44]

For Badiou, Paul's account of the act of giving oneself over to Christ is based neither on an intellectual exercise in interpreting the signs of salvation, nor on any inherited racial affiliation with divinity; rather, it is based on a subjective gesture. It is in this eruptive and singular event that Badiou also sees the grounding of the universal. The significance of Christ is thus not appreciated by following the story of his life, it is not gained by deducing the meaning of his lessons, and it is certainly not the provenance of his fellow tribe. Christ's sovereignty, as an expression of the universal, does not rely on any particular assemblage of evidence. It does not appear in the incremental process of passing from one stage to another, but rather possesses an authority that is grasped in the flash of its totality or else is missed entirely. There is no spectrum that links intellectual deduction and subjective apprehension. In Bloom's account of kenosis and swerve, translation proceeds as a form of negotiated settlement between different signs. By contrast, Badiou's kenotic

revelation liberates translation from being the sum of its parts. And so we can now ask, does the Aboriginal painting that left Hassan speechless find its awesome power through the function of reconfiguration, or does it arise from the sovereignty of the event? Is its meaning dependent on a secondary dialogue with the corpus of modern art? Does it provide a glimpse of mystic truths that defy language?

In my mind these questions are pointing in the wrong direction. There is no shortage of translators, polyglots and bilingual people, and success is not due to a primal source that is yet to be found – success lies in the ineffable desire to translate, co-existing with a will towards cosmopolitanism. Beyond the instrumental need to gain access to another realm, or the awareness of the limitations within one's own language, the motivation for translation also draws from a desire to be present and active in the world at large. Translation exists not because there can ever be a precise equivalence between different languages, but from the endless struggle to make a specific culture viable and extend its visibility amidst the global forces of dispersion. It thrives in the desire to bring this culture into the cosmopolitan dialogue. Carter makes a huge and pointed claim about the significance of this moment:

> Another space was opened in and around the painting room, another ground of exchange. To look at the paintings made there may be to celebrate a defining moment in the emergence of a post-invasion cultural consciousness, but it is also to ponder the terms of a non-assimilationist political future, a vision of co-existence to which the nation remains unreconciled.[45]

Conclusion

It is a commonplace prejudice to assume that the cosmopolitan eye at best skims the surface of other cultures, never seeing the

deeper truths or sensing the wrinkled textures of Indigenous cultures. The flipside of this prejudice is that the wisdom of Indigenous cultures is exclusively bound to production in time and place and that this perspective always lacks a worldly vision. It is my contention that both Carter's account of Bardon's collaboration with the artists at Papunya Tula, and Hetti Perkins's vision of the persistence of an Aboriginal cosmology, are parallel outlines of an Indigenous cosmopolitanism. Bardon could see how the universal nests in the particular or, to use Bryson's phrase, both are situated on 'a mobile continuum that cannot be cut anywhere'.[46] Through these examples I have tied the concept of the void to a cosmopolitan theory of cultural translation. It is easy to note how the concurrent 'loss of faith' in both modernist vanguardism and postmodernist critique, together with the resurgence of nationalist essentialism and transnational fundamentalism, makes the philosophical speculations and aesthetic meditations on cosmopolitanism appear rather puny and fanciful. However, I have also sought to demonstrate that a more robust vision of cosmopolitanism needs not only to serve as an antidote to essentialism, but also to engage in the practice of cultural translation – without which the point of globalising projects of democracy and the normative principles of equity would be missed.

The debates over the cultural consequences of globalisation have too often been confined to unhelpful binaries of homogenisation or heterogeneity. Just as it would be simplistic to believe that the prevalence of new uniform standards could control the myriad of ways in which ideas are interpreted, so too it would be ridiculous to gather the bubbling articulation of micro-variables as the human faces of globalisation. As a force for social change globalisation is not neatly marked in terms of domination or emancipation. However, if cultural translation is to enable a rethinking of cosmopolitanism beyond the boosterist and apocalyptic visions of globalisation, it will also need to develop a conceptual framework that is not solely

dependent on mechanical process of cultural production. We must rethink the relationship between cultural translation and cosmopolitanism beyond the mechanist paradigm of interacting entities and the belligerent 'clash of civilizations' thesis. These paradigms can neither explain the tangential energy with which a translation can touch but not follow the path of the original, nor demonstrate how meanings are formed out of the shards of a broken system.[47] Cultural translation is a form of creativity that is joined to the void. The void is not nothing but is, as Emily Dickinson said, the 'force that renovates the world'.[48]

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Cosmopolitanism Tensions

Anti-cosmopolitanism and 'ethnic cleansing' at Cronulla

Nicole Asquith and Scott Poynting

Introduction

Anti-cosmopolitanism was at the centre of Sydney's Cronulla beach riots in December 2005, and in this chapter we argue that a logic of 'ethnic cleansing' is at work in these processes. Contemporary cosmopolitanism involves a sense of commonality with other peoples, despite their diversity – a sense heightened by globalising processes that make more immediate, extensive and inevitable the contact with strangers, and also create more shared and more universal human problems. Cosmopolitanism also involves an ethics of hospitality, or at least of accepting the stranger without hostility.[1] We may define *anti-cosmopolitanism* as a reaction to these principles and practices. Anti-cosmopolitanism seeks to close off the openness to the other and to difference; it emphasises incompatibility, rejects a moral community with the other, and adopts hostility towards the other.

It has been widely remarked that some of the 5,000 crowd which rioted during anti-immigrant vigilante violence at

Cronulla on that summer Sunday afternoon wore t-shirts with the slogan 'ethnic cleansing unit'. If we do not dismiss this as mere hyperbole of bravado and misplaced humour, what might we learn by actually considering this declaration at its face value? By this we do not suggest that the rioters were engaged in genocide, any more than categorising the riot as a 'pogrom'[2] means that people were killed (though it was largely good fortune, as well as valuable intervention by police and paramedics, that none were). The point is that, as with much hate crime, the motivation was to 'purge' a given area of certain categories of people, by driving numbers of them away and forcing the rest to make themselves as invisible as possible. This objective was in fact clearly and repeatedly stated in the racist hate utterances, or malediction, of the 'white' Cronulla rioters, and the purpose of this chapter it to analyse that theme as paradigmatically anti-cosmopolitan.

Anti-cosmopolitanism lies on a continuum of xenophobia, one extreme of which is the exterminism for those identified by Ghassan Hage as the 'other of the will'.[3] Hage distinguishes this other from the 'other of the body', the expropriated and exploited colonised:

> …it was his or her supposed inferiority and lack of intelligence that made the lazy other of colonisation, the other that is all body, exploitable. The other of the mind, the cunning other, was by definition un-exploitable, for if anything, such an other had the potential to himself or herself exploit the European colonisers, manipulate them and use them against their will. By definition such an other could only be exterminated.[4]

The 'Arab Other' is often such an other, argues Hage, making parallels with the exterminism of Nazism.[5] Levey and Moses also compare contemporary anti-Arab or anti-Muslim racism, such as that which erupted at Cronulla, with European antisemitism, from the nineteenth century to the Nazi period.[6] It

is important, therefore, to see contemporary anti-Middle Eastern or anti-Muslim hate crime as not a mere individual offence, but one entrenched in particular social relations and fulfilling a certain function, as is clearly shown in the Cronulla case.

Barbara Perry characterises hate crime as a violent assertion of othering that reinforces an existing power relation:

> Hate crime involves acts of violence and intimidation, usually directed towards already stigmatised and marginalised groups. As such, it is a mechanism of power and oppression, intended to reaffirm the precarious hierarchies that characterise a given social order. It attempts to recreate simultaneously the threatened (real or imagined) hegemony of the perpetrator's group and the 'appropriate' subordinate identity of the victim's group.[7]

Hate crime is thus produced by the power relations in which it is committed, and it operates to reproduce these power relations. As Levin and McDevitt observe, 'hate crimes…target not only a primary victim, but everyone in the victim's group'.[8] Hate crime, therefore, is a 'message' crime: it sends a message to the entire group to which the victim belongs that they are 'different' and that they 'don't belong'.[9]

There is always necessarily a spatial dimension to the belonging, and to the message. The perpetrators arrogate to themselves both their own belonging and the prerogative to judge who belongs or not. A crucial question is, 'Belong *where*?' The answer must be in spatial terms, be it a beach, a local government area, a nation, or all of the above.

Within the space of belonging (or not), we can distinguish for analytical purposes two fundamental groups: those on behalf of whom (whether they like it or not) the hate-crime message is sent, and the intended recipients of the message; a category that goes well beyond the victims of the hate crime. This is an analytical distinction, since it is possible to belong to neither group, and some can 'belong' more than others. The recipients

of the hate-crime message are not targeted for anything they might have done; they are targeted for being who they are, or, rather, being who they are, where they are – where they do not belong. They transgress by being there. From the point of view of hate criminals, they must be expelled from 'our' space, or forced to keep such a low profile that they are not identifiable in it.

Reclaiming the sand

On the weekend prior to the Cronulla riot, three 'white' lifesavers, after finishing their shift on North Cronulla beach, entered into a verbal altercation with young men of Lebanese immigrant background. The verbal conflict between these two groups was not unusual on North Cronulla beach, where the privileged, cloistered white middle class of the 'insular peninsula' in the Shire of Sutherland came face-to-face with ethnic minorities of Sydney's paradigmatically working-class western suburbs. Cronulla is the only beachside suburb of Sydney with a direct train line from the inland western suburbs. As such, this beach has long been frequented by diverse populations who travel from the western suburbs, and this has long been resented by the local residents who regard the space as their own. In recent decades, this once very apparently class-based conflict has been racialised, in the context of moral panic over the Arab or Muslim Other[10], and the quite commonplace clashes between groups of young men on weekends has been much represented as a problem of 'Lebanese gangs'.

On that fateful day – a week before the riot – the white off-duty lifesavers were marking their territory, and making claims about who can use the beach and under what conditions. During the altercation, one lifesaver asserted the stereotype that 'Lebs can't swim',[11] implying that those not there for, nor dressed for, this proper use of the beach, did not belong there. [12] This

taunt was followed with the challenge, 'Piss off, you scum!'[13] These Anglo young men of Cronulla had drawn a 'line in the sand'[14] and the young men from the western suburbs who would not have their right to be on the beach, nor their masculinity, so easily trashed, readily stepped over it. One of them swung the first punch, and a fight ensued, in which some of the lifesavers were severely injured.[15]

By Monday morning, when right-wing talkback radio host Alan Jones began his eponymous breakfast program, the story of the assaults had become headline news. Over the next five days the media and public commentators ('led', as he would later claim, by Alan Jones), made the assaults and the 'cleaning up' of Cronulla beach the hot topic. By Tuesday, a person or persons unknown had created and forwarded an SMS call to arms – one that was clear in its appeal to those who belong and its intention towards those who do not:

> Aussies…this Sunday every fucking Aussie in the Shire get down to North Cronulla to help support Leb and wog bashing day… Bring your mates and let's show them that this is our beach and they are never welcome back.[16]

This now infamous text message was circulated widely in the lead-up to the Cronulla riots. On one single day (9 December), Alan Jones repeated the text message five times on his high-rating commercial radio program.[17] Its text was reprinted in the high-circulation Sydney tabloid, the *Daily Telegraph*, as well as in the broadsheet *Sydney Morning Herald*. The combination of the mass distribution of this text message, and the media's constant repetition of it led to the first anti-immigrant riot in Australia since 1934. On the Sunday of the riot, by 8 am crowds had begun to arrive at Cronulla, complete with Australian flags, and many bottles of alcohol.[18]

When the day was done, thirty-one people had been injured including six police officers and two ambulance officers

responsible for retrieving and aiding the relatively small number of non-Anglo beachgoers and bystanders – most presumably having been aware of what had been planned on that day from the media coverage.[19] Once the sand had settled, eighty people had been detained with over 200 charges; none of which related to the racist call to arms and incitement to violence, nor the threats of anti-immigrant violence used throughout that day.[20] The vigilante mob had been accorded by the media and a certain indulgence by the state what Barbara Perry terms 'permission to hate'.[21]

Driving 'them' out

In the *Daily Telegraph* article two days before the riot, beachside Maroubra local white hero and convicted criminal, the surfer Koby Atherton informed the Cronulla boys that Maroubra was not 'swamped' by 'Middle Eastern gangs' because 'we drove them out'.[22] The advice was taken and not only by the Cronulla boys – contrary to those who present the Cronulla riots as a 'clash of masculinities'. At the riots, nineteen-year-old Kayla told the *Telegraph* (on hand to appraise its handiwork): 'We are here to support the Shire and get these Lebs off our beaches. This is God's country, and it's time they left'.[23] A Cronulla local, sixteen-year-old Samantha, articulated unequivocally the hatred and the purpose of the violence in its ethnic cleansing: 'I hate the Lebs. Today I punched one fat girl in the face. We just want them off our beaches'.[24] The *Sydney Morning Herald* reported that the violence broke out on the Sunday afternoon 'when a Lebanese youth and his girlfriend were walking along the North Cronulla beachfront. According to their account, two girls turned around and screamed, 'Lebanese get off our f---ing beaches'. At that, related nineteen-year-old Mustafa, 'the whole street turned on us'. He was chased by a posse of sixty-odd, trapped against a door, and bashed until he was bruised all over.[25]

In order to be violently attacked that day, it was sufficient to be Lebanese, 'Middle Eastern-looking', Muslim or 'wog', or mistaken for one of these, and to be on or near one of the Cronulla beaches. A fifteen-year-old girl was chased down a sand dune by an angry mob, who tore the hijab from her head and waved it around as a trophy. A pair of Bangladeshi students was pursued to their car, which was pelted with bottles as they escaped.

Naming 'them'

'Hate speech' or malediction has traditionally been constructed primarily as an act of name-calling. The primary objective of such name-calling is the ranking of people in a hierarchy of otherness and belonging that confers rights and privileges on those who are deemed to belong and marginalises those who are named as other.[26] The 'Aussies' interpellated by the text message are in fact a particular category of Australian, valorised in contradistinction to 'Lebs and wogs' in the 'fantasy of White Supremacy'.[27] In this naming, the right to 'our' beach is asserted, and 'they' are presumed to be rejected as 'never welcome'. It is intended to be hurtful, and the cruelty inflicted functions to force out the named others from a given territory, or to militate against their rights within it, or to bully them into minimising their profile or visibility. Other actors, apart from the rioters, also applied such labels of exclusion, both before and after the riot. For example, Alan Jones claimed that 'this lot were Middle-Eastern grubs'[28], and Peter Debnam (leader of the New South Wales parliamentary opposition) spoke of 'Middle Eastern thugs'.[29] The act of turning a name into an abusive term derives its potency not only from the words themselves. Rather, the social context of the utterance predisposes the act of exclusion and the creation of secondary consequences.[30] When power speaks, the label takes on a certain reality; a social definition of those named.

A consistent linguistic partner to *naming* is *pathologising*.[31] In societies that are vigilant in containing the other, the process of defining them as dirty, unclean or untouchable is not just a matter of irrational individual impulses, it is institutionally bound. Forty years ago, Mary Douglas outlined the processes at work in defining bodies and things as dirt.[32] She suggested that eliminating dirt is an active process of organising the untidy nature of everyday life, and the process of 'separating, demarcating and punishing transgressions' assists individuals and societies in controlling the unsettling presence of things and people that disturb the sense of order'.[33] In contemporary Australia – where there has been for three decades an official policy of multiculturalism recognising and providing for cultural plurality – the strategy of labelling the ethnic other as dirty or impure harks back to the cultural politics of the White Australia Policy in place from the late nineteenth century to the late 1960s. It is a reassertion of the privilege of whiteness by those anti-cosmopolitans who have experienced marginalisation and insecurity in the process of globalisation, and who blame cosmopolitan elites for foisting multiculturalism upon them.

Notions of 'matter out-of-place' and 'this place is a mess' were central to the debates over the use of the beach at Cronulla. In particular, Muslim and Arab Australians were perceived to be in the wrong place because they wore too many clothes, and were held to be responsible for the garbage strewn across the beach.[34] Throughout Alan Jones's week of hatred he drew on allusions to dirt and infestation. For two days, he likened immigration to being invited into a family home, and he claimed that Lebanese-Australians were trashing the home into which they were invited, stating, '…but you're not going to sit down at the table and start spitting on my mother or putting your feet under [sic] the table, or bringing dog manure in with you'.[35] Alan Jones also conflated Lebanese-Australians with an infestation[36], and the far right was claiming that 'the gov needs to round up the leb vermin'.[37] In the hate utterances of the

Cronulla rioters, the cultures and religious practices of Muslim- and Lebanese-Australians were constantly conflated with disease and infection, as well as with dirtiness and, as we shall see below, with crime, sexualised predatoriness and violence. These were all tropes applied to the Asian other (especially Chinese and South Asians) from the nineteenth century onwards during the period of the White Australia Policy.[38]

Transgression

Both instigators and perpetrators of hate crime often rationalise their hatred and violence by supporting the notion that their victims (or their ilk) were deserving of punishment or, perhaps more correctly, banishment. In this ideology, their collective deviance leads to and justifies their targeting. We shall see that this ideological manoeuvre depends on the same categories of belonging, and the power to define them, that characterise the 'ethnic cleansing' function of hate crime. Teaching the transgressors a lesson through hate crime depends on the power to identify the deviance of those who do not belong, and to attribute it to the transgressive category. Those who have this power, those who belong, by definition, cannot be caught up in this type of collective punishment.

Let us consider for the moment the analogy of citizenship. When Prime Minister John Howard said, 'We shall determine who comes to this country, and the circumstances under which they come', he was not talking about the authors of this chapter, since we are citizens. Whether we like it or not, we are part of that 'we'. We have a right to come to Australia; that belonging is uncontested. It is not conditional on our good behaviour within the national space – or our civility or incivility within that space. Australian citizens who behave badly, however, cannot be banished from the national space. So we have one group whose belonging is categorical and unconditional; who have, as

it were, a licence to behave badly, within certain limits. Then we have a group whose entry to and occupation of the national space depends on their civility, their abiding by the rules, as judged by those who belong. They are 'visitors', who must be on their best behaviour. There are limits to which this metaphor of citizenship can be extended to belonging within the space of a shire or a beach, but it can elucidate a number of the postures towards 'outsiders' at Cronulla and how their deviance was labelled with the otherness.

The 'outsiders' in question were variously called 'visitors' to Cronulla beach or 'invaders'[39] as against 'locals' who rightfully belonged. 'We grew here, you flew here', was one of the slogans borne on surfsiders' bodies on the riot day. The supposed fly-ins were accused of a multitude of sins, all of them racialised, and many on face value not exceptionally unusual or unacceptable had they been committed by those who belonged. 'They are aggressive, loud, swear and pick fights,' was a common complaint, reported for example in the distant *West Australian*.[40] As a number of commentators pointed out, such behaviour is neither foreign nor new to Cronulla. One remark sent in the name of 'Deano' to the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s online forum said, 'There's nothing more Australian than a good blue on a hot summers [sic] day'. However, '[t]hey trash the beach'[41], '[t]hey flick their cigarettes everywhere'.[42] A year earlier, the mayor of Waverley had expressed concern that at any one time there were 700,000 cigarette butts on Bondi Beach, and there was no suggestion that most of them were smoked by Lebanese.[43] Indeed, many would hold the equally absurd opinion that this behaviour was quintessentially Australian. When Manly's council banned smoking on the beach in the same year because of cigarette butts, ABC reporter Emma Alberici observed, 'How things have changed since the 70s when movies like *Puberty Blues* were reflecting an Australian culture of sun, sand, surf and a ciggie'.[44] Then there was the accusation that 'they' kick footballs or soccer balls at or near people on the beach.[45] Ball

games on beaches were held to be so traditionally Australian that it was acceptable to close off a section of the sand on the iconic Bondi Beach in 2000 for the Olympics beach volleyball stadium. Even more bizarrely, a Castle Hill resident, Bradley, came to throw in his lot with the Cronulla locals protecting their way of life, telling a *Telegraph* reporter he was 'tired of the "unethical" approach to work and tax he had witnessed by men of Middle Eastern descent'.[46] This accusation sits weirdly within a national popular culture holding up the 'sickie' as an iconic national institution or unabashedly joking about tax-dodging as a national sport. As Senator Bartlett wryly remarked in another context:

> 'Some people suggest from time to time that tax dodging is an Australian tradition…If this is the case, one could argue that any migrants who engage in this are just adopting quickly to the Australian way of life, something opponents of multiculturalism usually call for'.[47]

We are not aiming here to highlight hypocrisy, though that would be easy enough if the point was polemic. The point here is rather to show that the characteristics labelled as deviant and other in targeting candidates for hate-crime ethnic cleansing can be ones which would otherwise be quite permissible, indulged or at least long-suffered in those who 'belong'.

Criminalisation

In contrast to *pathologising* (which focuses on the bio-medical ordering of dirt or disease), *criminalising* the other is informed by the socio-legal ordering of deviance.[48] Central to the hate speech used by rioters, the media (in particular, Alan Jones) and politicians in the days leading up to, during, and after the Cronulla riot, was the labelling of Muslim and Lebanese

Australians as criminals. According to Alan Jones: 'This is gang stuff mate…it's a gang problem'[49], and, 'All across Sydney there is a universal concern that there are gangs, the gangs are of one ethnic composition'.[50] Or, from others:

> …the locals do not use the picnic areas…because of the Middle Eastern visitors to the Shire, they are dangerous.[51]

> …every night we witness gang violence, including stabbing, ram raids, drive-by shootings…let's identify who these people are… they're Lebanese gangs.[52]

Constructing young Muslim- and/or Lebanese-Australian men as criminals gains its efficacy from the preliminary pathologisation and demonisation of not only 'ethnic' bodies, but just as importantly, 'ethnic' cultures. Incrementally, the named other shifts from being just different, to being diseased, immoral, criminal and, as such, requiring physical containment.[53] With each layer of malediction, the perpetrator is given more reason, more justification for 'getting tough'. While these may be 'mere words', they are also tied to institutional actions. Naming, pathologising and demonising the other leads to institutional surveillance and control of the other. While health professionals and moral leaders play central roles in the containment of pathology and 'folk devils', criminalising the other can lead to authorised and unauthorised policing of the other.[54] Both responses were strongly advocated by Jones and his callers in the week prior to the riot:

> …now the police can't do the job, even though we've put faith in them and we want them to do the job, that means to me the next step is vigilantes and personal protection by ourselves.[55]

> J: if the police can't do the job the next tier is us.
> AJ: Yeah, good on you.[56]

> …now, these people have got to know that we're not going to cop this stuff anymore.[57]

Misogyny and the sexualised other

The major purported deviance of Lebanese/Middle Easterners/Muslims at Cronulla – that which was held to justify the attacks on them – was their lack of respect for 'our' women. 'They look down on our women…They don't really assimilate to our way of life'.[58] A Cronulla beachgoer, exculpating the vigilantism there, told an ABC radio reporter during the 2005 riots: 'We come here, we just get run over by Lebanese and wogs and shit. It's not cool. They come here, they disrespect the women, they disrespect the beach.'[59] A group of friends from Cronulla who turned up for the 'Leb and wog bashing day' recounted a similar story to journalist Liz Jackson:

> MICK: Um…I think it's got to do a lot with respect for women.
>
> SARAH: I can't go to the beach, normally, and wear what I'd usually wear. Because when I do, I feel as though I'm getting targeted. Like, people saying to me, like, just names and stuff, that I'm being called for wearing a bikini in my own shire. Like, I've grown up here. And I'm a local at the beach.[60]

These comments underline the point that it was respect only for 'our' women that was the issue, given that the self-appointed avengers against 'Leb' misogyny at Cronulla had chased a frightened fifteen-year old girl down a sand dune, ripped the hijab from her head, and waved it triumphantly as a souvenir.[61] 'Our girls can't get from the water to their towels without being threatened by these maggots,' explained one local to tabloid reporters: the 'maggots' had it coming to them. 'Two girls of Middle Eastern descent were also pushed to the ground and

pelted with beer bottles, as police tried to rescue them.'[62] Another young Muslim girl, also wearing hijab, was chased along with a terrified policeman by a mob of youths. Isolated from his command post, the police officer tried to fend off the youths as he pushed the young woman into a kiosk for safety, while the youths shouted, 'There's a Leb in there!' and 'Kill the Leb!'[63]

One of the Cronulla 'combatants', Brad, told a journalist from *The Age* that, as the reporter put it: 'the Lebanese frequenting the beach are ogling and mistreating local women, making them feel unsafe'. Brad and his three mates had just 'ogled' two passing girls wearing bikinis as he told the reporter that the Lebanese youths have 'got no respect, they hate women and they are gutless'.[64] This same accusation has been levelled since the nineteenth century against less 'respectable' millieux of working-class male youth. Decent young female flâneurs could not promenade by the seaside without filthy invective insulting their womanhood issuing from idly lounging larrikins looking for trouble.[65] What is actually an attribute of working-class masculinity among certain youth subcultures becomes represented in racist ideology as foreign, and as if the foreignness were the cause of the deviance.[66]

Terrorising

Terrorising through threats of bodily harm is the final theme of malediction considered here. When a reference to bodily harm is made, speakers do more than voice a desire, they act; they create an instantaneous threat and a set of consequences tied up in the threat (such as physical or emotional dysfunction).[67] The threat or reminder of death is the perpetrator's most effective tool in silencing the other. Further, when a threat has an historical precedent of real violence, it becomes more than just a threat: it becomes an embodied experience. It is, as Iganski suggests, *in terrorem*.[68]

Before and during the Cronulla riots, both the media and rioters drew upon threats of elimination as a central technique for determining who can use public spaces such as the beach. In particular, in the days leading up to the riots, Alan Jones repeated the SMS call to arms on many occasions. Interspersed with these repetitions were calls for protestors to leave it up to the police. However, he also clearly stated, or supported the statements of callers, that if the police were unable to act, then it was 'our' duty to defend 'our' land.[69] On one occasion, he recommended that Australia's biker gangs should be invited to defend the beach against the 'Lebanese thugs', and that 'it would be worth the price of admission to watch these cowards scurry back onto the train for the return trip to their lairs'.[70] In other circumstances, Alan Jones and others stated:

> …you gotta scare, there's got to be an element of fear in this.[71]

> …shoot one, the rest will run.[72]

> … we will destroy the mosques and any Leb that gets in our way.[73]

> …in this point in time [sic], 1 enemy at a time: Lebs first, Jews second.[74]

Terrorising is the ultimate weapon in maledictive hate. Speech acts that threaten elimination seek to terrorise an individual into not being (in a place), or not being visible there, or to be somewhere else. There are few active responses available that do not exacerbate the chance of the threat becoming a reality. Terrorising is a dual process: a warning of what may come, but equally, a justification for acting on the threat when the threat is ignored or challenged.

'Lebs out'

What are the consequences for those othered in this anti-cosmopolitan offensive, and for intercommunal relations? Australian-born Josh Massoud comments in the *Telegraph* about the effects of seeing a picture in the previous day's paper of 'an innocent couple clutching a bag of fish and chips [being] pelted with bottles and hatred'.[75] The man and woman, 'of Middle Eastern descent', were escorted from the beach by police for their safety, as shown in the photograph by Craig Greenhill.[76] Writes Massoud: 'It will probably be their last alfresco dining experience Sutherland-Shire style for some time. Suffice to say, I'll be joining them in Mediterranean exile…Isn't that what Sunday was all about? Ridding their Eden of hooked noses, beady eyes and monobrows. I'm just one last Arabic blight on the pristine landscape'.[77] One Lebanese-born reader who contacted the *Australian* had a similar response: 'OK, fine, we'll stay away. If they are going to talk about me and my friends like that, I'll go somewhere else for my milkshake'.[78] Even before the riot, after the preceding week of vilification, Islamic youth leader Fadi Rahman said 'Cronulla had been popular with Muslim families for many years, but many of them were too frightened to visit the beach now because of the threat of abuse'.[79]

A young Lebanese restaurant worker told the *Australian* that she had been racially taunted all day at her Cronulla beach workplace on the day of the riots and that the grille of her car had been kicked in: 'I work here and I don't even want to be here'.[80] A week after the riots, the *Age* could report, 'There's been no sign of any Lebanese beach-goers'.[81] A first-generation Lebanese immigrant in his fifties told one of the authors in the days following the riots that he would not feel comfortable about going there, not necessarily because of danger but because of the sense of hostility. A Lebanese-background young woman of the second generation reported (in an email interview in 2007) that, 'after the incident occurred, I was uneasy about visiting

the area of Cronulla only because I didn't know what to expect after the publications and media coverage of the disgraceful and humiliating confrontation.' She said, 'I felt I was being personally attacked without physically being there'. She added, 'My friends' parents were also quite hesitant in allowing their children to "hang out" in Cronulla…the memories are engraved and will always have an effect on us.' Younger generation Muslim community leader, Kuranda Seyit reflected, 'I've just been thrown totally out of whack in terms of where I am here in Australian history'.[82] Lebanese youth leader Fadi Rahman had a historical reference point: 'This is early Nazi Germany'.[83]

From the other side, Cronulla dweller Amy Taylor, who had come to the gathering at the beach out of 'respect' for the lifesavers injured in the fight with Lebanese-background youths the previous weekend, said 'the Lebanese guys are going to think twice about coming to Cronulla now.' If the violence was not a good thing, that clearly was.[84] Erin who, for fear of the Lebanese, previously would not come to Cronulla beach unless her husband was with her, was there with her husband and four-year-old daughter metres from 'where a Middle Eastern man was bashed by a mob'. She said she 'felt "100 per cent" safe'.[85]

As far as those who live there are concerned, they have found themselves living with fewer Muslims, non-English-speaking background immigrants and Arabic-speakers. Cronulla was already one of the 'whitest', most Christian and most Anglo areas in multi-ethnic and multi-faith Sydney. In the year following the riots, it became even whiter.

The 2001 census results for Cronulla show that less than a third as many Cronulla residents were born in a non-English-speaking country than for the Sydney Statistical Division overall (7.4 per cent compared to 23.0 per cent). By the 2006 census, this was 7.3 per cent compared to 24.0 per cent. There were 2 per cent recording non-Christian religion compared to Sydney's 9.5 per cent, with, for example, 0.5 per cent Muslims compared to 3.4 per cent for Sydney. By 2006, it was recorded that 1.9 per cent

	CRONULLA		SYDNEY	
	2001	2006	2001	2006
Born in a non-English speaking country	7.4	7.3	23.0	24.0
Identified with a non-Christian religion	2.0	1.9	9.5	10.9
Identified as Muslim	0.5	0.4	3.4	3.9
Speaks a language other than English at home	7.4	6.8	26.5	29.3
Speaks Arabic at home	0.3	0.2	3.6	3.9

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Census*, Australian Federal Government, Canberra, 2001, 2006

of Cronulla's population were affiliated with a non-Christian religion compared to Sydney's 10.9 per cent, with 0.4 per cent Muslims compared to 3.9 per cent for Sydney. The proportion who speak a language other than English at home was 7.4 per cent for Cronulla; 26.5 per cent for Sydney in 2001. Five years later, and a year after the riots, the proportion was 6.8 per cent for Cronulla; 29.3 per cent for Sydney. Those who speak Arabic (the most spoken language in Sydney apart from English and the Chinese languages) at home comprised in 2001 some 0.3 per cent of the population of Cronulla, contrasting notably with the twelve times that percentage, 3.6 per cent for the Sydney Statistical Division. By 2006, they were 0.2 per cent of the population of Cronulla, contrasting with 3.9 per cent, for the Sydney Statistical Division – 19.5 times the Cronulla percentage.

There is no proof that this further ethnic bleaching was a result of the Cronulla riots. Yet there is no doubt that 'Lebs out' was a key slogan and objective of many of the rioters. The cultural politics of the anti-cosmopolitanism had their day, and prevailed in the aftermath of Cronulla. Nevertheless,

there was widespread revulsion at the violence, and the racism. Liberal–National Party Coalition Prime Minister John Howard's denial that racism was involved did not ring true for a growing number of people, sceptical of his government's populism after the 'children overboard' scandal and shamed by the politics of xenophobia and narrow nationalism. The fact that a decidedly cosmopolitan Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd succeeded him may have little to do with the Cronulla riot, but such an event is less likely to occur without the political leaders exploiting Islamophobic moral panic in the way that led to it. The Haneef affair was the last such attempt in the dying days of the Howard government, and Australian popular sympathy was overwhelming with the wrongfully accused Indian doctor.[86] However, at the same time, the 2007 campaign against a proposed Muslim school in semi-rural Camden, another 'white' enclave on Sydney's outskirts[87], garnered several thousand supporters and much media attention, and attracted some dog-whistling sympathy from Labor Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd during the federal election campaign of that year. The eventual Rudd Labor government was cautious, circumspect and pragmatic over the Haneef issue after taking office in 2007. It was also calmer and slightly more humane over 'boat people' crises – in great contrast to the Howard regime. Though under Julia Gillard's prime ministership, since 2010 the Labor government has regressed to strongarm populism over asylum seekers. It remains to be seen what future official multiculturalism will have in Australia, but the politics of militant anti-cosmopolitanism for the while appear muted.

Conclusion

Might we still find some lessons about a 'way forward' for cosmopolitanism in Australia, from the events around Cronulla in 2005? Whether those victimised were targeted as Muslim,

Middle Eastern, Lebanese or 'wog', it is clear that the racist wing of anti-cosmopolitanism in Australia believed that multiculturalism had allowed these others to 'cross the line' and not keep to 'their place'. A key right-wing populist complaint since the 'Blainey debate' of the early 80s – but obtaining some hegemonic purchase after the advent of Hansonism and One Nation in 1996 and throughout the years of the Howard government – was that multiculturalism had been imposed undemocratically by 'politically correct' cosmopolitan elites upon those (unlike them) who most suffered from its ill effects. There is a strong class dimension to this ideology, and we should note that the presence of (white, Anglo) unemployed and petite bourgeoisie was disproportionate in the Cronulla riot and the incitement of racist violence that led to it.

By contrast, the ideal-typical cosmopolitan since the transition to capitalism has been bourgeois. What other social forces might be mobilised to counter narrow, parochial, nationalist agendas? The likely candidates are to be found in working-class movements and their allies, to the extent that sectors pursuing internationalist rather than nationalist interests can be mobilised. That would mean, crudely put, that a revival of working-class internationalism could extend the progressive aspects of the contemporary cosmopolitan project beyond its bourgeois origins and current limits. This could also help rehabilitate Australian multiculturalism by reviving the egalitarian moments of its origins, in place of the beholden 'ethnic-leader' and resource-competing 'ethnic communities' form of multiculturalism which right-wing anti-multiculturalists have, with some elements of good sense, so effectively excoriated. Whether the Australian labour movement is up to this, however, remains to be seen. Without them, there is little left but traditional intellectuals, and the cosmopolitanism of finance capital, transnational corporations and the intellectuals organic to them.

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On the beach: between the cosmopolitan and the parochial

Linn Miller and Jeff Malpas

Introduction: from the beach to the world

In December 2005 a series of events took place on the northern beaches of Cronulla in Sutherland Shire and in connected suburbs of Sydney, which reverberated through local and national Australian communities. These events, which came to be known as the 'Cronulla race riots', consisted in a very public campaign of rage, hate vilification and violence between young 'White' Australians and counterparts of 'Middle Eastern' descent. During the course of events more than 5,000 people were involved, property damage was significant, a wide array of weapons were confiscated and dozens of people were injured.

While the events of Cronulla have not been repeated, many of the concerns that came to the surface at Cronulla have continued to simmer, often in connection with more general issues concerned with immigration, the fear of terrorism and the potential loss of cultural identity, not only on the part of the Anglo-Australian majority, but also of a range of other groups.

For many, what happened at Cronulla has become a symbol of the dangers associated with notions of cultural identity and community affiliation, especially when those notions are articulated in relation to particular places and regions. In this respect, the issues that emerged from the Cronulla riots connect with a set of deep-seated existential questions concerning human belonging – the way we situate ourselves in relation to the places and communities in which we live – that also form a recurring theme in popular and academic discourse.

For most reasonably well-educated citizens, living fairly free and affluent twenty-first century lives, senses of place and community (as well as personal identity) are taken to be relatively negotiable and fluid[1], and so as open to change, but this existential liberty can also come at a price. Features of modern life such as mass media and instant telecommunication make it increasingly difficult to locate ourselves or our engagements in any one place, and internationalisation, globalisation, transnationalism and migration diasporas challenge, and even conflict with, more orthodox and established understandings of community, nationality and citizenship. In such a world, where time and space are seemingly compressed and political, economic and social networks are ostensibly deterritorialised, it is easy to understand why the nature and quality of our most fundamental attachments and affiliations come under a degree of scrutiny. It may be tempting (albeit ineffectual) in such circumstances to look back longingly to a time when identity and belonging were apparently received rather than constructed – constrained by where and when we were born, our biological, social and cultural heritage and stabilised by the sedentary, self-contained nature of particular communities.

On the face of it, this climate should provide fertile ground for cosmopolitanism. By unshackling social arrangements from their geographical and cultural source and proffering a global despatialised neo-community attuned to modern life and based upon universal principles of human engagement,

cosmopolitanism offers an alternative way of being worthy of keen consideration, if not vociferous support. However, a number of factors stand in the way of such radical shifts in consciousness and conduct. In Australia for example, as in most colonised lands, contested politics of identity, culture and geography have long conspired against 'settled' or collective senses of community and home. This tension has erupted from time to time in heated debate over public policy as well as in more strident or violent forms of expression. Furthermore, as the events at Cronulla demonstrate, individual and group anxieties relating to the threat of *disconnection* and *displacement* – social, cultural, economic or physical, real or imagined – are still keenly felt and highly motivating.

Many would argue, of course, that this contentious state of affairs merely confirms the need for the restorative power of a more cosmopolitan politic or ethic, and then rest their case. Yet this completely ignores a second factor of more fundamental ontological significance – the evident power that remains attached to senses of place and belonging, even in the globalised world of today. Inasmuch as cosmopolitanism often seems to take for granted a conception of human identity that is essentially abstracted from the concrete circumstances of human existence, so it can be argued that it fails to take adequate account of the continuing role of place and belonging in human lives. That we need to be able to make sense of notions of humanity and community in ways that are adequate to the contemporary globalised world in which we find ourselves may be an obvious and simple point, however we also need to do this in ways that are adequate to the underlying character of the notions themselves – to sense what is at stake for persons and communities in their globalised instantiations. What is surely required, then, even prior to any division between the cosmopolitan and the anti-cosmopolitan, is a closer examination of the underlying structures that determine human identity, and the role that notions of place and belonging may play in those structures.

In what follows, we attempt the beginnings of such an examination. By first considering how perceptions of identity, place and belonging have operated in the distinctly Australian context over time, the logic of the Cronulla riot may be brought into sharper relief. This serves not only to show how history militates against concepts of a deterritorialised civil society, but also brings to light certain additional problems regarding the way we think of and understand our 'placedness' both in a conceptual sense, and as a real-world, 'lived', human experience. Interspersed into our discussion are words and voices of some of those present at Cronulla or witness to it as reported in the news media.[2] Rather than integrate those words and voices directly into our text, even though our own discussion will make reference to the issues, events and descriptions that appear there, we have chosen to let them stand apart. Not only may this serve to retain some sense of the challenging character of those words and voices, but it may also provide a more concrete sense of what may actually be involved in thinking through and responding to the complexity and multiplicity of identity, community, and belonging, and lead us to a fuller understanding of the existential implications of our 'placedness'.

Exploring Cronulla

Global politics have a profound effect on the way that communities and individual citizens perceive themselves and their relation to each other and the nation-state. Anti-Islamic fears and phobias certainly contributed to social perceptions and social relations at the local level in Cronulla. The events that took place could be, and have been, analysed against the background of 9/11 and the subsequent war on terror, and certainly Sydneysiders, as elsewhere across the nation, were not immune to the rhetoric of Muslim/Middle Eastern threat strongly evident in global western politics – then or now.

MARK: They [Lebanese immigrants] forgot that they moved here and they brought their culture with them. And they've got to adapt to our culture.

LUKE: I want this government to stop the growing threat. And I want them to stop appeasing Islam. And to stop appeasing people who follow Islam.

MARK: They will probably, like, possibly out-breed us. And once they get the numbers, they can vote their members into parliament. And once their members are in parliament, they can pass laws, like, they've already tried to get the Islamic law into Australia a few times.

MICK: The religious side of it is definitely a big part. The way they're brought up and the way we're brought up…just the morals our parents teach us and the morals their parents teach is completely different.

The global political context in which the Cronulla riots arose cannot be overlooked, but localised factors relating to cultural and geographical politics are equally important. A turf-war had been brewing for some time between Anglo-Australian locals, asserting proprietorial interests over key sites in the shire, and members of the Lebanese community for whom the beach was handy by train and provided welcome relief from the suburbs sprawling to the south-west. The riots are reported to have been sparked by an incident the preceding weekend in which three off-duty volunteer lifesavers leaving Cronulla Beach were allegedly bashed by a group of youths of 'Middle-Eastern appearance'. This, however, wasn't the first sign of identity politics or racial tension on the beach and its environs. Persistent reports by Anglo-Australian girls that they no longer felt comfortable, and were often the subject of abuse from Lebanese youths, when bathing in bikinis, were matched with rumours that white Australian

life-guards inappropriately handled (read fondled) young Muslim women when assisting them in the surf.

An alleged intractable culture clash had fuelled displays of territorialism along that part of the Australian coast for some time. The beach is an iconic location for the articulation of Australian identity and culture. A proportion, at least, of 'locals' were concerned that the cultural amenity of the shire was being despoiled by 'outsiders'. The events that took place at Cronulla bring into sharp relief a complex web of relations between identity, community and place, the strength of those bonds and the extent to which we will defend their integrity against perceptions of threat. The level of threat perceived by some younger Cronulla residents was sufficient to marshal a very public display of solidarity and force in defence of the beach and the Anglo-Australian identity and cultural space it represented to them. Furthermore, in doing so, they drew upon, and were inspired by, images of heroism and courage, combat and sacrifice that go back to the origin of Australia as a nation.

Pioneers and bushmen

Colonising peoples, such as settler Australians, generate their own myths and memories in order to establish identity and belonging. Indeed, the invention of traditions concerning authentic Australian-ness might plausibly be described as a national obsession. One of the functions of such constructions – maybe the primary one – is to satisfy the desire of settler peoples to establish a meaningful connection between themselves and the land they occupy. In the context of colonisation, it has been argued that the psychological settling of a country is far more difficult than the physical inhabiting of it.[3] It is only when individual experiences of places are shared that places are defined, and it is only through concrete human engagement with places that in time those places become meaningful.

The continent's first European immigrant population needed to make two transitions: firstly, the development of an identity that reconciled them with the land in which they had arrived and, secondly, a sense of identity and belonging that distinguished them from those Aboriginal peoples from whom the land was taken. They subverted alienation and affirmed themselves by attempting to tame and civilise the land and its people, domesticating the social, physical and intellectual antipodal environment – employing familiar archetypes in the process.

The emergence and triumph of a quintessentially Australian character[4] was embodied in that quest, and in the character of the pioneer and the bushman. It is this character, this 'Australian spirit', that emerged as a nationalist symbol when the nature of a pan-Australianness was first thematised in the lead up to Federation. Both the pioneer and the bushman were celebrated and promulgated by the same means – through the radical-nationalist narratives of balladeers[5] as well as through the visual images of Australian artists[6]. These authors and artists, now renowned as national heroes, set about re-enchanting a sense of belonging to the Australian landscape by producing images intended to be seen and appreciated 'through Australian eyes'. The need to create a national identity that drew upon stereotypical and heroic images did not subside after Federation, but continued well into the first half of the twentieth century. Ironically, however, by that time, Australia was one of the most urbanised nations in the world and once World War II broke out such images were not only increasingly untenable, but also increasingly unproductive, both politically and economically.

Anzacs and lifesavers

Luckily for those sceptics and pundits who found it difficult to relate to the bush, a more homegrown, recognisable and colloquial incarnation of the national character soon became

available. Characteristics that inhered in the bushmen and pioneer legends belonging to the radical nationalism of the turn of the century were re-enchanted and reinforced by their embodiment in the heroic Anzac (Australian soldier or 'digger') on the international stage and, more domestically, by the bronzed Aussie lifesaver. Both these characters are selfless warriors, willing to battle adversity and risk their lives to save the lives of others, and to whom the same qualities of egalitarianism and mateship apply – as does the emphasis on overcoming hardship and suffering. They are also characters accessible to common folk: they can be seen at the suburban swimming pool or the local beach; during times of war, they are someone's brother, father, cousin or friend. These images were also prominent at Cronulla.

> NEWSREADER: A major police hunt is underway for a cowardly group of up to 20 men who attacked two surf lifesavers at Cronulla. Both young men had to be treated in hospital for severe cuts and bruising.
>
> REPORTER: For many, this was not just a brutal crime but an act of sacrilege. Young volunteer surf lifesavers bashed while giving up their weekend to help others.

As a number of other commentators observe,[7] the Bali bombings of 2002 had acted not only to compound this 'culture of fear', but to re-establish 'the beach' as a proper site of national sacrifice. As portrayed in the media, it was surf- and sun-loving Aussies who had been the primary targets, and the predominant victims, of the bombs in Bali. Their deaths were marked, in Gallipoli-style fashion, with televised 'mourning ceremonies' on Australian beaches across the continent. In this fashion these young Australians, with their love of the beach, were absorbed into the Anzac legend and its concomitant breed of martyrdom.

Immigrants and refugees 'wogs and terrorists'

Unlike the heroes of Anzac, immigrants and refugees are rarely perceived as altruistic or patriotic. Indeed, they are increasingly characterised as self-interested and disloyal, eager to abandon their own homelands and countrymen in times of economic depression, political instability or civil unrest. Even those who flee from war and terror have not escaped pejorative appraisal. Dubbed as 'illegals' and 'queue jumpers', over past decades asylum seekers on vessels entering Australian waters (if lucky enough to make it to shore) have been subject to draconian control and mandatory detention in remote and secure facilities, sometimes for years on end – victims of terrorism, redefined as terrorists.

Australians have always been suspicious of the motives of foreigners, and governments have always been quick to respond. One of the first Acts passed by the new Federal Government was the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901* – an Act designed 'to place certain restrictions on immigration and to provide for the removal from the Commonwealth of prohibited immigrants'. Although this Act was the first of many which over time would constitute the infamous White Australia Policy, its aims were not significantly different from that of previous colonial legislation. Policies endorsing the eviction and alienation of the ethnic 'Other' had also been deemed popular in much of Australia's written history up until that time.[8] These policies were all designed to promote and protect white homogeneity and the sense of fraternity and belonging such a collective identity was seen to secure.[9]

Although the expression 'White Australia Policy' was not in official use, from the 1890s to the 1950s an ethos of racially restrictive immigration was enshrined in Australian public policy and retained almost unanimous public support – much as was also the case in the United States, Canada and New Zealand. Government policy effectively excluded non-British

immigration until the 1940s when Australia finally accepted the moral imperative to welcome European refugees of World War II. It took until the early 1970s for non-European immigrants to be accepted and for the 'racist' White Australia Policy to be officially replaced by the allegedly 'non-racist' agenda of multiculturalism – a policy that promised much in terms of reversing the xenophobic trend and promoting diversity as integral to Australian national identity.

The failure of multiculturalism

But how far did 'multiculturalism' succeed in achieving these objectives? For many Australians, contrary to political rhetoric, and despite colourful ceremonial attempts at positive self-promotion such as those witnessed at the 2000 Sydney Olympics, multiculturalism is no longer perceived as the 'magic bullet' it once was – a point supported by an increasing number of academic and popular commentaries.[10] What is implied in many of these works is that, although the packaging is different, 'multiculturalism' is no less racist in its perception of the 'ethnic other' than its predecessor, the White Australia Policy. Indeed, according to Ghassan Hage's thesis racism and multiculturalism are both devices employed by Australia's dominant White culture in its attempt to maintain control over national space.[11] As such, both policies seek to control who has the right to enter and who has the right to remain in Australia – who deserves to be at home in Australia and who does not.[12] Hage understands this desire for control as the necessary consequence of what he calls 'White Nation Fantasy' – 'a fantasy of a nation governed by White people, a fantasy of White supremacy.'[13]

Even if we believe that Hage's 'White Nation Fantasy' is just too fantastic to be taken seriously, it remains relatively easy to understand how such a thesis might be arrived at. At the most general level, one could point to the dubious ethics and

legality of British occupation and the xenophobic nature of founding legislation, but the history of the nation is littered with many more specific examples, none more obvious than the radical nationalist 'One Nation' movement[14] of the late 1990s and subsequent governments' policies concerning refugees and asylum seekers.[15]

In regard to Cronulla, far-right organisations such as the 'Australia First Party', 'Patriotic Youth League' and 'Blood and Honour' were reportedly in attendance and handed out propaganda pamphlets to the mob that gathered on Cronulla Beach.[16] Slogans such as 'We grew here, you flew here', 'No Lebs', 'Go home',[17] and, even more disturbing, 'Ethnic Cleansing Unit'[18], adorned clothing and banners. Both the mass media and mobile-communication technologies also played important roles in organising and coordinating activities. In the week leading up to events, commercial radio and television, broadcasting to a national audience, featured a previously circulated SMS text message along the lines of 'This Sunday every f…ing Aussie in the Shire, get down to North Cronulla to support Leb and wog bashing day. Bring your mates down and let's show them this is our beach and their [sic] never welcome back.'[19] This invitation was subsequently taken up by an estimated 5000 young white Australians.

The large crowd began to assemble and to consume alcohol from early in the morning. By midday, with no 'Lebs' or 'Wogs' in sight as targets, they had become frustrated and restless. It was then that a lone young man of Middle Eastern appearance was spotted near the beach. The mob engaged, but was quickly thwarted by police. It wasn't long before another opportunity arose. Around 2 pm, another two targets were spotted in the park.

> SARAH: It did shock me, in the park, when, um…them two boys got attacked. But…on the TV, it made out as if they were… poor innocent little kids. Like, they were, but they were being smart-arses, and…I know, like…like, everyone was being, like,

not racist, but everyone was saying, like, 'Aussie, Aussie, Aussie,' making them say it. And then someone screamed out, 'Oh, all you wogs go back to where you came from.' And then one them turned around and said, 'Oh, hey, I'm wog, but I'm down here supporting Australia…hey, bud, that's my flag too, mate. That's my flag too, I was born here.'

MAN: That's not your f…in' flag!

MAN: I was born here, too.

MAN: Get the f… outta here, mate!

SARAH: And then, you know, you're around a massive bunch of drunk people who are willing a fight…

MAN: You're gonna get killed, you f…ers!

SARAH: And then basically a lot of people just smashed them.

Many young shire residents who were interviewed later justified their attendance in terms of a celebration of Australian culture and a mass display of Aussie pride. What was initially presented as an event directed *against* those seen as outsiders ('Lebs' and 'Wogs') was thus re-described as an event *in support of* the ('Australian') identity and values of those taking part. Lebanese youths also reported their initial response as shock, engendered, not only by the violence of what occurred or the explicit nature of the racism and bigotry, but also by the manner of the exclusion that was enacted – an exclusion in which their own identity as Australians, their own belonging to the Australian community, was itself denied.

EIAD DIYAB: After we watched the news at five o'clock and throughout the day and throughout the evening, we saw the

images of what happened in Cronulla, everyone was shattered. I mean, like, people were like almost in tears. They was angry or horrified by the whole situation.

SAID KANAWATI: A lot of the youth were saying that, 'Well, is this, this is what they, is this what people think about us? Is this how they've thought about us?'

EIAD DIYAB: We knew always there was racism, but we never knew it was to this extent. I mean, all your life you've been – you've been raised to be Australian. I mean, you carry the Australian flag. When you go to sports events and all that, you're happy to be Australian and all that. And all of sudden people reject you. 'Go home!' They shout your names. Like, 'Go home, you Middle Eastern Lebs,' or whatever. 'Go home.' I mean, that's a shock to us. 'Go home.' I mean, like, you get cut inside your heart, you know. Like you feel like you're not part of society no more.

The post-facto characterisation of the Cronulla gatherings as *celebratory* was thus directly connected with their character as also *exclusionary*. What was 'celebrated' – the celebration itself taking the form of an assertion and defence – was indeed an Australian identity in which those 'others' were seen to have no part. The 'celebration' thus took the form of an active assertion and a violent defence.

The cosmopolitan response

During the past several decades, critical inquiry has been lavished upon theories of nationalism and multiculturalism as well as the effects of globalisation on culture, race and identity politics, especially in the context of colonised countries. There has been a fashionable postmodern infatuation with notions

of difference – of an otherness, and of Other – which frame many of these new discourses. Postcolonial theory, itself a part of the cultural and intellectual legacy of colonialism (the oldest form of globalisation), has aimed to destabilise modern western thinking, its territorially based notions of identity and politics and its homogenising discourse. Much effort has been put into demonstrating the heterogeneity of colonised peoples and places, providing a means for the subordinated subject to break free from the strangulating grasp of national identity. By drawing attention to the specificity of places and peoples, postcolonial theorists in the wake of Said, Babha and Chakrabarty aim to deconstruct and subvert established frames of reference to create conditions in which the disenfranchised can speak back to the dominant nationalist discourse, rehabilitating their sense of self and community within (and without) the structure of the nation state.

For such theorists, the Cronulla riot presents interesting, if not especially appetising, fodder. As has been demonstrated, geographical and political nationalism and the consumption of national identity stereotypes are, in this case, exceptionally clear, even if who is properly to be characterised as the Other (the disenfranchised, the minority) remains obscure. Indeed, what was enacted at Cronulla appears to have been an assertion of identity carried out precisely through a refusal of the 'Other' (in whatever fashion that notion is to be filled out). The Cronulla riots might thus be viewed as showing the way in which interplay between the impulse *toward* homogenisation and resistance *against* it are still very much a part of national social and political dynamics. Moreover, they also demonstrate the difficulty in disentangling these impulses from one another, as well as the manner in which those impulses play out, and are embedded, in particular territories, spaces and topographies. In addition, the riots show the contested character of the notions of place and home, identity and community, that seem to be inevitably bound up with what occurred.

Yet if the postmodern and the postcolonial turn is one way of responding to the issues at stake here, the cosmopolitan turn is another. Cosmopolitanism has often appeared as both a descriptive label to characterise certain forms of society – typically those characterised by a juxtaposition, within a common spatial frame or territory, of a variety of ethnicities and cultures (a juxtaposition that can often appear indistinguishable from that of multiculturalism) – and as a prescriptive framework that looks to address potential conflict between different ethnicities and cultures by moving to a broader and often de-territorialised perspective. In its latter form, cosmopolitanism aims to overcome supposedly parochial sentiment, attachment and loyalty by reconfiguring our sense of moral obligation and commitment in a way that gives priority to our global commonality over our local separation.

While the cosmopolitan project, and its impulses, might be judged at odds with that of postmodern thinkers (especially many postcolonial theorists), they nevertheless share a commitment (if differently articulated) to considerations of justice, equality and self-determination,[20] an opposition to violent and exclusionary forms of politics, and a recognition of the importance of finding ways to address considerations of difference. In addition, each adopts a critical stance in regard to notions of place and belonging, viewing such notions as containing a potentially conservative and reactionary tendency. While *cosmopolitanism* articulates this overall stance through an assertion of a universal community embracing all human beings, regardless of their individual moral, social or political affiliations, thereby promoting the idea of a neutral realm in which all human beings can belong as free and equal citizens, *postmodern politics* privileges diversity and multiplicity, questioning the extent to which any assertion of universality can avoid reinscribing existing structures of inequality and injustice. It is possible, however, that both modes of inquiry overlook, and potentially misjudge, how universality (our 'sameness') and particularity (our 'difference') operate as fundamental and mutually defining elements in shaping human

identity and comportment, as well as the way in which these are articulated through ideas of place and belonging.

It is commonly considered that the promulgation and promotion of nationalist and parochial conceptions of community and identity privileging moral and social characteristics particular to specific nations and places unnecessarily lock people into narrow fields of reference and engagement, creating divisions and exclusions among and between citizens of the world. The cosmopolitan response is thus to argue that it is precisely that sense of place and of belonging that needs to be overcome. One of the difficulties of that approach in its conventional forms, however, is that the very attempt to articulate the cosmopolitan ideal will either take the form of a set of principles that remain divorced from the concrete circumstances of their articulation and application, or, as is more realistically the case, retain a facade of such neutrality, while actually taking on the more particular forms of the localities out of which their articulation comes. Cosmopolitanism thus carries its own 'parochialism' within it. The 'universals' of the cosmopolitan ideal can all too easily turn out to be merely the 'universals' that belong to the community that formulates them, each specific to its member cohort and bounded by their geographical reach. Each set of 'universals' is thus potentially, if not in fact, at variance with that of other peoples, other places. The 'universals' themselves turn out to be 'particulars'.

In an attempt to circumvent some of the problems in managing difference and diversity, as well as the potential of attendant social conflicts, cosmopolitanism thereby appears, much as its postmodern critics allege, as merely another genre of oppressive and homogenising discourse. One that, instead of subverting nationalism, overcomes the myths concerning national identity, including those we have just explored in the Australian context, with its own myth – the world citizen – a myth that can itself be seen as geographically and historically specific, to be the assertion of a certain form of Europeanised

modernity. Yet the postmodern response also presents difficulties. If cosmopolitanism moves too far in the direction of the universal, the postmodern often seems to move too far in the direction of the prioritisation of difference – so much so that it can sometimes appear impossible to see how any negotiation can be possible within the common spaces and places in which difference itself emerges. While many forms of postmodern politics are highly attentive to the need not to capitulate to simple forms of relativism and the social fragmentation they bring, the difficulty is in finding an appropriate way in which an alternative can be framed.

Cronulla represents a challenge to both cosmopolitan and postmodern forms of politics, since what is evident at Cronulla is the way in which commonality and difference themselves become evident only within the concrete and specific places of human habitation and engagement. Moreover, in such places, it is never a matter of a simple choice between the universal and the particular, between sameness and difference, but precisely of negotiating between them. Those concrete places are thus the places in which commonality and difference emerge, but also places that stand, as it were, between the universal and the particular. It is, indeed, only within such places, and as a result of our being already given over ('belonging') to them, that such negotiation arises as an urgent demand. What Cronulla shows is not only the way in which the connection between identity and place, between our sense of community and the emplaced character of such community, can give rise to conflict and violence, but also the necessity of negotiating the issues at stake here through a negotiation that is itself spatial and topographic. While Cronulla can be seen to represent the collapse of a mode of politics into violence as that occurs through a contestation that is spatially and topographically articulated, it also demonstrates the need to maintain a sense of the spatial and topographical character of the political. Cronulla is not about the intrusion of the spatial and the topographic, through their alignment with

problematic modes of belonging, into the political, but rather the breakdown of the political through the failure to keep open the commonality of engagement as that occurs in the spaces and places to which we inevitably belong.

Rethinking the place of selfhood and belonging

If cosmopolitanism is to mean anything at all, it must have a meaning that, in the Australian context, is played out not in some neutral space beyond, but on Cronulla beach as well as in the suburbs of Sydney's west, in the Gold Coast highrise and in the Northern Territorian township. Moreover, if the postmodern and postcolonial emphasis on difference is not to remain merely reactive, merely a form of resistance, then it must also engage with the need to negotiate difference, as well as to negotiate modes of belonging, within the common space of the places in which difference and identity both appear. On the beach in Cronulla, then, we see the way in which the political is itself essentially placed, the way in which commonality is first and foremost a commonality to be found in our common engagement in place, and not in our removal from it, and how difference is itself mediated and shaped, and also made evident, through our differing modes of engagement – of finding ourselves at home and not at home – in place.

The political philosopher Hannah Arendt provides an especially illuminating account of the way in which the concrete particulars of human action and interaction precede all other conditions of being, including human selfhood and belonging, freedom or equality. Social intercourse is privileged on Arendt's account because it is only through action and speech, in its public character, that the human world has reality – in Arendt's words, and with echoes of Martin Heidegger, that humankind is given 'the space of appearance' – a space that might also be understood as indeed one of *engagement*:

> It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the world, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly…To men the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others.[21]

Human plurality is the basic condition of both action and speech and all that is real in terms of human existence is predicated on plurality. Neither abstract 'plurality' nor concrete 'human community', properly speaking, are, or can be, defined by encircling a multitude of people within a geographical locality. Rather plurality and community arise in the space created by people acting and speaking together, wherever or whenever that occurs.[22] And whenever and wherever that occurs a public space is disclosed, a common human world is created and the possibility of belonging is actualised. According to Arendt then, the obligation to belong is an obligation to share a common human world with others. On this account belonging is not something which one is assigned (as it is suggested one is assigned a social identity), but rather, belonging is the acting out of who and what we are as inhabitants of a common world.

Arendt also tells us something more about the nature of plurality and this common world – that it has a twofold character of equity and distinction. She explains:

> If men were not equal, they could neither understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and foresee the needs of those who will come after them. If men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or ever will be, they would need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood.[23]

The 'obligation' to belong is therefore not a commitment to equality as sameness or homogeneity, but an obligation 'to disclose oneself publicly and in doing so to make oneself

understood as distinct.' According to the ontology of plurality, the world relates and separates people at the same time. 'Only the experience of sharing a common human world with others who look at it from *different perspectives* can enable us to see reality in the round and to develop a shared common sense.' [24]

We often attribute our identities – the distinctive characteristics that make us who and what we are – to the influence of the group with which we share common traits. This is clearly evident in relation to the national, racial or cultural identities we assume, and also applies to identities relating to occupation, gender and religion. What Arendt has drawn to our attention, however, is that alongside shared interests and commitments, difference and exchange is equally significant, if not foundational, in enabling our sense of self and community. It is well recognised that the natures of individual places are shaped by the concrete particulars of human action and interaction and that the thought and activity of human beings is influenced by the nature of the places in which they find themselves. As it turns out, our being in particular places is not a part of our being that can be separated from who and what we are – our commitments and interests. According to this way of thinking, place not only provides the context for who and what we are as human beings, it is our concrete placedness that offers the conditions that enable the very possibility of our personhood and in connection, our belonging.

In this sense, belonging, which is to have a sense of place, and so also of home and of self, is an indispensible element in the possibility of human life, and especially of the form of political life that is essential to the human. Yet the sense of place, home and of self at issue here cannot be that caricature of these concepts that is so often erected as a straw man, namely, that idea of place, home or self as a fixed and determinate entity that does not allow of uncertainty, of self-doubt, or of difference. Instead, home and self are always to be understood as what might one think of as 'works in progress'. One's home is what

one is in the constant process of making as one's home, just as one's self is that which one is always in the process of becoming. There is then an important sense in which the freeing from place, that is often seen as promoted by cosmopolitanism, is itself illusory. Moreover, if it is an illusion, it is also a dangerous one, since what it does is to promote a mistaken sense of the nature of our own being. It promotes a form of self-deception that may well obscure the real conditions that shape our thought and behaviour and so make us less able to understand ourselves or to respond to those around us.

If the cosmopolitanism neglect of place is itself evident in the cosmopolitan inability to recognise its own inevitably placed character, the postmodern assertion of the ineradicable character of difference can also be said often to overlook or even to efface the commonality in which such difference is itself founded. Cronulla is not just a manifestation of the manner in which a universalising mythology of national identity seeks to exclude those whom it also 'others', or of the manner in which that mythology is invariably asserted in spatial and territorialised form. Cronulla is also a demonstration of the way in which the appearance of difference always occurs in terms of a space of commonality in which difference is rendered either problematic or productive through the manner of the spatial and territorial negotiation in which it is also shaped and articulated. Difference is never something that occurs merely in an internal, 'private' space. Difference always occurs in direct relation to self-formation – it is itself a part of the constitution of self-identity that understands itself through its character as both the same and so also as different (a difference plays out within the sameness of the self, so that the formation of self is a working out of one's own differences, while sameness plays out in the difference presented by the other, so that the formation of the other is also a working through of the other's sameness).[25] The working through of such sameness and difference, self and other, is what is both brought to light in the concrete placedness of human

self and belonging, and also required by it. It is because we find ourselves already standing in an essential relation to place – a relation that in the Australian context is given particular, though not unique, expression in the myths of place and belonging that are evident in the images of the beach and of the bush – that our own sense of self remains always entangled with our sense of place. It is because we find ourselves standing in an essential relation to place that the places in which our sense of self is articulated are also potential sites for conflict and reconciliation – sites that, because they encompass commonality and difference, always remain sites of negotiation and renegotiation.

The problematic character of the denial of our essential placedness may go some way towards explaining the vexed identity politics that manifests as part of the colonial legacy. For both coloniser and colonised, displacement is often a literal removal from home places but it is also frequently a cultural and political displacement or uncoupling. The colonial and postcolonial experience gives rise to problematic modes of placement and displacement – identities are shaped and reshaped through removal from place, and through alienation, dispossession, and repossession, but also in ways that remain tied to place, territory, and community.

Conclusion: rethinking the cosmopolitan and the parochial

The parochialism that is so often contrasted with cosmopolitanism – and is seen by many theorists as no less problematic – is typically viewed in largely negative terms as signifying a narrowness of interests or concerns. In fact, the word parochial is derived from the Greek *paroikía*, combining *para* (near) and *oîkos* (a dwelling), and in its original English sense relates to a parish – a district with its own church and clergyman. To be parochial then is to be part of a particular parish community, or more generally to

live in, and belong to, a particular district. Parochialism implies a special regard for the locality in which one dwells, the matters and concerns of one's particular homeplace. Understood thus, parochialism is neither negative nor narrow-minded. Instead it encompasses the shared understandings, attachments and deep affection that locals have for a particular place, district or town. Parochialism, in this sense, signifies a reverence for and commitment to a locality. As such, parochialism represents a force that is not only positive, but vital if a place and its people are to survive and thrive. Parochialism is, one might say, what has enabled marginal communities, languages, and cultures to maintain their otherwise tenuous place in the world. A denial of the significance of the parochial may well be to condemn such communities to extinction, but it may also be to deny the character of our own parochiality – our own inevitable connectedness to the place and places in which we dwell, and by means of which we are, in fact, brought into engagement with the world as it goes beyond any such place or places.

While at first glance it might look as if cosmopolitanism and parochialism exhibit tendencies at odds with one another, the former emphasising 'homogeneity and uniformity', the latter 'heterogeneity and difference',[26] it also seems possible to view both as brought together within a single, perhaps re-conceptualised, cosmopolitan project.[27] While cosmopolitanism tends to lose itself in the world, and so also to lose any sense of direction or orientation, the parochial can become inwardly and narrowly directed toward its own locality. Redressing this requires the development of an expanded sense of the parochial as well as a more grounded sense of the cosmopolitan. To be in the world is never a matter of being nowhere at all, but is indeed always a matter of our concrete placement here, now. Any real sense of our placedness, and so of self and belonging, requires that we have a sense of the infolded and outfolded character of place. Part of what might be thought to give rise to the sort of problematic manifestations of parochialism, such as could be seen at Cronulla,

is thus not the mere fact of connectedness to place or to community, but rather the manner in which such connectedness may appear to be threatened by that equally problematic form of cosmopolitanism that refuses to acknowledge our rootedness in place and community and that looks to efface identity (although often in a way that would replace it with an identity of its own), and, in so doing, effectively to deny difference in the name of the protection of difference. Rather than take Cronulla to demonstrate the need to escape from the parochial, it may be that it provides a striking exemplification of the need to rethink the parochial, as well as to rethink the cosmopolitan, and to find new ways to negotiate the complexities of our common placedness – our multiple modes of belonging – not only as played out on the beach at Cronulla, but in all the many spaces and places of our contemporary habitation and engagement.

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Notes

1 Zymaunt Bauman argues in Bauman, *Liquid Life*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005, that such fluidity is characteristic of modern social forms.

2 The transcribed material used here is taken from Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Riot and revenge', *Four Corners*, 13 March 2006. The journalist and interviewer was Liz Jackson.

3 J. Carroll (ed), *Intruders in the Bush: The Australian Quest for Identity*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1992, p. vii.

4 This term is used in reference to pioneers in colonial balladeer Henry Lawson's famous poem 'How the land was won' (1899). The same themes are used by A. B. Paterson in 'Song of the future' (1889) and in many others of the same period and, for that matter, ever since.

5 Such as Henry Lawson, 'Banjo' Paterson, Adam Lindsay Gordon and others.

6 Tom Robert's *Shearing the Rams* (1890), Arthur Streeton's *The Selector's Hut: Whelan on the Log* (1890) and Frederick McCubbin's *The Pioneers* (1904) – nineteenth-century Australian works from the 'Heidelberg School' – are fine examples of this genre of work.

7 See particularly, articles by A. Redmond & G. Cowlishaw in the *Australian Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 18, no. 3, 2007 – special edition on the Cronulla riots.

8 The removal of non-white immigrants began in the mid-nineteenth century when the Chinese were evicted from the goldfields. Later, the diligence of the kanakas was rewarded by their deportation from the far-northern cane fields.

9 See also M. Dixson, *The Imaginary Australian: Anglo-Celts and Identity – 1788 to the Present*, UNSW Press, Sydney, 1999.

10 See , for example, I. Ang, *On Not Speaking Chinese*, Routledge, London, 2001. G. Hage, *White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in Multicultural Society*, Pluto Press, Annandale, 1998. G. Hage & R. Couch (eds.), *The Future of Australian Multiculturalism: Reflections on the Twentieth Anniversary of Jean Martin's The Migrant Presence*, Research Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1999.

11 Hage, *White Nation*, p. 18.

12 The sentiment behind Prime Minister John Howard's comment that 'I certainly don't want people of that type in Australia' when questioned concerning the (now falsified) claim that Iraqi asylum seekers had thrown their children overboard from a sinking vessel was supported by a significant proportion of Australians. For a transcript of the Howard interview see Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Gov't wrong on asylum seeker allegations', *The 7.30 Report* 13 February 2002.

13 Hage, *White Nation*, p. 18.

14 One Nation had its genesis in 1997 and rose quickly to popularity with Australians who felt disenfranchised by what they perceived as a movement away from traditional Australian values and an increasing partition in Australian society caused by institutional policies that privileged ethnic minorities and Aborigines. At the 1998 federal election One Nation's candidates attracted a staggering amount of votes – over one million.

15 Over the past few decades immigration to Australia has increased significantly and became far more politicised. While multiculturalism remained official policy, in the late 1990s anti-immigration sentiments surged. Since the turn of the century successive governments have focused strongly on border control and the controversial measure of mandatory detention of asylum seekers and refugees who enter Australian territory.

16 C. R. Pearson, 'Alienated neighbours: interpreting the cronulla race riots for Christ's sake', *Oxford Forum on Public Policy Online*, Vol. 2, 2008, <www.forumonpublicpolicy.com/>, viewed 22 November 2009.

17 C. Due & D. W. Riggs, '"We grew here. You flew here: claims to "home" in the Cronulla riots', *COLLOQUY text theory critique*, Issue 16, 2008, p. 221.

18 S. Poynting, 'What caused the Cronulla riots?', *Race and Class*, vol. 48, 2006, p. 88.

19 N. Wilson, 'Cronulla riot in the making', *Herald Sun*, 13 December 2005. See also C. Due & D. W. Riggs, '"We grew here. You flew here": claims to "home" in the Cronulla riots', pp. 210–28.

20 See particularly the work of political and social theorist Ulrich Beck in U. Beck, *The Cosmopolitan Vision*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005.

21 H. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998, pp. 198–99.

22 ibid, p. 199.

23 ibid, p.175.

24 Margaret Canovan in 'Introduction', ibid, p. xiii (our emphasis).
25 Here we can be seen to take issue with the Levinasian logic that posits the different and the same, and so also self and other, as standing in absolute opposition to one another.
26 J. Malpas, 'Cosmopolitanism, branding and the public realm', in Stephanie Donald, Catherine Kevin & Eleonore Kofman (eds), *Branding Cities: Cosmopolitanism, Parochialism, and Social Change*, Routledge, London, 2009, p. 193.
27 ibid.

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Belonging in Bennelong: ironic inclusion and cosmopolitan joy in John Howard's (former) electorate

Greg Noble

Introduction

Belonging is serious business. It is especially serious when we are talking about national identity and social cohesion. This seriousness was very much in evidence during the years of the Howard federal government, when international crises around Islamic terrorism and national concerns about the consequences of large-scale immigration and policies of multiculturalism produced intense debates about 'Australian values', the demise of social integration, the clash of civilisations, citizenship tests, race riots and the threat to national borders posed by asylum seekers. Other chapters in this book have grappled with these weighty issues, so I don't wish to go over that same ground. But I do wish to problematise both the seriousness of belonging, and the very nature of belonging itself. And I want to do it in the context of John Howard's own electorate of Bennelong in north-western Sydney, the seat he held from 1974 but then famously lost in the federal election of 2007 to the political novice and ex-journalist

Maxine McKew. Through an examination of a specific moment in a musical performance in a school in Howard's electorate in the lead-up to the election, I want to suggest that Howard's serious agenda of national belonging was increasingly out of kilter with what I will call the 'everyday cosmopolitanism' of his own voters. This paper will argue that cosmopolitan belonging can be just as powerful as national belonging, and that questions of affect – and specifically joy – are crucial to understanding the forms of attachment that might emerge in culturally diverse suburbs. It will also argue that the ironic distance often associated with 'elite' cosmopolitanism needs to be augmented by an understanding of forms of 'ironic inclusion' in everyday cosmopolitanism.

Was John Howard taking the piss?

In early 2006, in the wake of the Cronulla riots of December 2005, Howard delivered an Australia Day speech about national identity, racial tolerance and cultural diversity, anguishing over the demise of shared social values.[1] As he had also stated immediately after the riots, Howard insisted that the problem was not the racism of Australian society, but argued instead that the issue was getting the balance right between 'maintaining the Australian way of life and accepting different cultures'.[2] 'Ethnic diversity', he argued, 'must not be at the expense of the common values that bind us together as one people'. The issue, as Howard saw it, was that migrants needed to make 'an overriding commitment to Australia, its laws and its democratic values'. The celebration of diversity, he continued, should not be 'at the expense of ongoing pride in what are commonly regarded as the values, traditions and accomplishments of the old Australia. A sense of shared values is our social cement. Without it we risk becoming a society governed by coercion rather than consent. That is not an Australia any of us would want to live in.'[3]

Australia Day, he claimed, 'embodies a profound truth and a simple irony. The truth is that people come to this country because they want to be Australians. The irony is that no institution or code lays down a test of Australianness. Such is the nature of our free society.'

He was wrong on both counts: people migrate for many reasons, but primarily it is to improve their economic, political and social opportunities, not to adopt a particular nationality per se. And the real irony lies in the Howard government's attempts to introduce a citizenship test that did exactly what he said was not done. And in his encouragement of the renewal of the teaching of Australian history that focuses on its achievements rather than a 'postmodern culture of relativism', Howard was clearly hoping to disseminate a vision of Australianness amongst schoolchildren that matched the vision of the citizenship tests. Such is the nature of his Australia. Such is his understanding of irony.

Towards the end of his address, however, Howard also noted:

> Our ability to poke fun at those in positions of power is undiminished. We cannot abide pretentiousness in our public officials and we laugh at those who take themselves too seriously.

Howard's view is, despite this, a deeply serious one – being Australian involves a hand-on-heart demonstration of a deep adherence to 'national values' and love of a shared cultural heritage that will protect us from the ravages of global terrorism, cultural conflict and social fragmentation. He may not condone the rioters at Cronulla beach, but his sense of patriotism shares the same cultural forms – flag waving, anthem singing, love of national sporting teams and the evocation of mateship.[4] Howard's reference to humour is more a rhetorical gesture that invokes the famed 'Australian character' rather than an honest assessment of his own character. 'Taking the piss', indeed poking fun at anyone let alone the powerful, has never been a feature

of his public demeanour (unlike, for example, the previous Prime Minister Paul Keating). In fact, when left-wing social commentator Richard Neville posted a spoof speech on his satirical website under John Howard's name, the website was shut down within thirty-six hours, following complaints from both the prime minister's office and the federal police.[5]

This is somewhat at odds, perhaps, with the Australian government's own 'culture portal' for overseas visitors which has a special entry on our 'unique sense of humour'. It claims that our 'distinctly Australian…humour is dry, full of extremes, anti-authoritarian, self-mocking and ironic'.[6] This view of the centrality of humour to the national character is found on a number of popular websites dedicated to a discussion of Australian culture.[7]

My point here is not an exploration of the role of humour in defining the national character, nor the ways our political leaders use claims about humour ideologically. Rather, I want to examine a specific use of humour to elaborate a different understanding of the nature of belonging that articulates to the everyday cosmopolitanism of suburban life rather than evocations of national community which most typically frame our thinking about identity and diversity.

An Australian idyll?

Bennelong covers an area of almost sixty square kilometres in the largely middle-class suburbs of the inner north-west of Sydney. It extends from Roselea in the west, and is bounded by the Parramatta River in the south, the Hills Motorway to the north and the Lane Cove River in the east. Suburbs include Eastwood, Macquarie Park, Putney, Ryde and Gladesville, as well as Epping, where I live. Only two members – both from the Liberal Party – had held the seat from its proclamation in 1949 until the shock loss in 2007.[8]

During the 2007 federal election campaign, Bennelong, a normally quiet and unremarkable area, became the centre of public attention because of the remarkable battle that went on there. The suburb of Eastwood, adjoining Epping, in particular became subject to nightly media coverage because it was the location of the main campaign offices of Howard and Maxine McKew, the Labor representative. The shifting allegiances of a growing Asian population were offered as a cause of a change in electoral fortunes that lead to the McKew victory.[9] Both Epping and Eastwood are old suburbs seen to represent the 'respectable plainness' of suburban life, settled soon after European colonisation, and have historically been very 'Anglo'.[10] Both Epping and Eastwood have undergone, however, a rapid influx of migrants from east and south Asia. Almost half of the local population were born overseas, with the top sources being China, Hong Kong, Korea and India – all higher than the Sydney figures.[11]

Epping and Eastwood sit between the well-to-do areas of the North Shore, the more industrial suburbs along the Parramatta River and the 'whitebread' areas of the north-west. While it is a relatively 'comfortable' area with an above-average proportion of residents with professional qualifications, it is not 'ritzy'.[12] The suburbs have large shopping areas, but no major department stores. Over the past fifteen years they have seen the introduction of many Chinese and Korean businesses, and have become more 'cosmopolitan' with a strong restaurant scene and an emerging cafe life. Despite the dramatic influx of (largely east and south Asian) migrants, there has been little evidence of the kind of conflict and social disintegration that critics of multiculturalism and 'Asianisation' have often warned that such change would produce.[13] Some Anglo locals refer sarcastically to E'woo and E'ping, but these suburbs have not become the centre of 'panic' concerning cultural differences as witnessed in places such as Cabramatta and Bankstown. Despite some media coverage around non-English signage, the 'decline' of the

shopping centre and 'white flight', Eastwood and Epping remain a quiet place on Sydney's map of diversity, a case of 'unpanicked multiculturalism'.[14] This is not to suggest that they are a utopian space free of racism; rather, it's the ways those that live and work here negotiate and 'manage' cultural differences – or not – which is significant here.

In 2006, I attended a musical presentation night for my son's primary school in Epping. The evening proceeded, much as these events do, with students putting on various types of performances. During the evening, one particular performance took place which altered the benign atmosphere in the school hall. It was a spoof on the global franchise known locally as *Australian Idol*, a national competition which aims to uncover the next young pop star in front of a judging panel and through public voting. The performance, which involved all the Year Six students, began with the distinctive *Idol* theme music, while the host and judges ran onto the stage.

The male hosts are played by two young girls, who welcome the audience to 'Old Australian Idol'. In this school take-off, the judges – the former pop stars Mark Holden and Marcia Hines together with Ian 'Dicko' Dickson, a successful player in the entertainment business – are played by three young students of Kenyan, Chinese-Malay and Indian background. A series of acts are introduced, performed by groups of students who mime and dance to well-known Australian pop songs. In this first twist on the *Idol* format, the students pretend to be already famous stars – truly Australian idols: Olivia Newton-John, Johnny Farnham. The judges give their verdicts, mimicking the real judges signature comments.

To this point, the performances are cute and quirky, humorous but not particularly distinguishable from the other items on the evening's bill. There are some nice twists and inversions – girls playing boys, the mixing up of the ethnicities and the fact that most acts were collective rather than individual performances – indeed, sometimes it was even hard to tell which

of the students was meant to be the 'star'. And there are some nice jokes – John Farnham insists on being called Johnny, and he is later dismissed by two of the judges as 'too straight', the mimicry of the judges' typical comments is acute. Then, while the hosts are in the middle of announcing the next act, the contestant bursts in, disrupting the sequencing of the show. The contestant is named as Peter Allen, the internationally renowned singer and songwriter who became famous in the United States. Peter Allen died in 1992, but his life and music was celebrated in the musical *The Boy from Oz*, the first Australian musical to triumph on Broadway.

On this night, however, the 'boy from Oz' is played by Len, a tall, lithe boy from Nigeria, who dominates the stage from the moment he interrupts the Anglo hosts and starts performing 'Rio'. There is something different about this performance, and it is not just the quality of the performance, the energy or the colourful costuming. At the end of the music Len keeps dancing: the audience is entranced. The hosts return and one asks whether they should stop him – the other calls out, 'Security!' A small white boy runs onto the stage, chasing Len and forcing him off – except that Len sticks his head out from behind the curtain, and then returns to hear the judge's verdict. One judge announces it a 'touchdown' at which Len goes down on his knees and throws his arms in the air. Another judge says there is not enough hip-shaking, so Len comes down off the stage and gives him a roll and thrust of the hips. The hosts sign off and the audience bursts into sustained applause and cheers. The entire Year Six return for an encore number, but most eyes seem to be on Len. There is something in the mood of the audience which has changed, a buzz far beyond the proud parents and cute children response typical at such events. I think this moment suggests we need to reconceptualise the nature of 'everyday' belonging in ways that diverge from conventional approaches.

Cosmopolitan belonging

It seems useful to characterise certain forms of solidarity felt within the culturally diverse spaces of everyday life as 'cosmopolitan', not simply because of the fact of diversity itself, but because of the investment people put into fostering a variety of intercultural relations and practices. While a common element of theorisations of cosmopolitanism is the emphasis on 'openness to others', there has been a tendency in the past to identify this as a characteristic of particular elites, in contrast to less worldly 'locals'.[15] Since then there has been an increasing interest in the extent to which this concept can be used to describe aspects of the everyday lives of people, as a 'vernacular', 'banal' or 'ordinary' cosmopolitanism.[16] Despite this shift, there is still a tendency to see cosmopolitanism in terms of a social type, characterised by particular attributes. Turner and Rojek, for example, talk of 'cosmopolitan virtue' as a mix of irony, reflexivity, scepticism, nomadism, care for other cultures and an ecumenical commitment to dialogue, but these are primarily seen as a series of personal capacities.[17]

Urry rejects the idea of the cosmopolitan as a type, preferring to see cosmopolitanism as a cultural disposition involving an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness to people, places and experiences, which involves mobility, curiosity, critical self-reflexivity, and diverse cultural literacies.[18] This idea of a cosmopolitan disposition is productive because it helps to conceptualise an individual's orientation to interact – or not – with 'strangers', but I would argue that these dispositions need to be seen as the *outcomes* of particular social practices (cosmopolitanism as process), not just the attributes themselves (cosmopolitanism as product). I would also argue that an emphasis on personal attributes tends to, implicitly or otherwise, imply an opposition between cosmopolitans and racists as social types, whereas I would argue that these things are practices we engage in collectively, and that people are capable of acting

in both cosmopolitan and racist ways at different moments, in different contexts. Examining these practices and relations allows us to explore the ways in which cultural complexity gets negotiated, the ways difference and sameness are transacted and help produce this 'openness to others' through a 'being-together'. This emphasis on the shared context of time and place recalls Gilroy's argument that the 'conviviality' in local solidarities born of habitual interaction in working-class localities produces cosmopolitan spaces. Similarly, Anderson claims that the routinised dynamics of the culturally diverse marketplace is by its nature a 'cosmopolitan canopy'.[19]

This conviviality is neither automatic nor guaranteed – spaces of cultural diversity can also be marked by conflict and racism, and Bennelong itself is no utopian space free of conflict – so we need to examine those moments as *produced* through shared practices. Moreover, this sense of cosmopolitanism seems at odds with the ways it is often cast as a form of ironic detachment in contrast to the 'hot emotions' of nationalism. Turner and Rojek, for example, describe the 'cosmopolitan mentality' as defined by 'cool loyalties' and 'thin patterns of solidarity'.[20] As Nash has shown, the simplistic opposition between hot nationalism and cool cosmopolitanism reifies the former and idealises the latter.[21] Similarly, Dobson contrasts the 'thin' sense of cosmopolitanism (which emphasises rational and cognitive dimensions) with a 'thick' definition of cosmopolitanism that foregrounds emotion.[22] I want to suggest, therefore, that those moments of conviviality in intercultural relations can also be marked by a keen sense of irony and self-reflexivity, but that this may have an inclusive function which entails a profound, affective investment.

Ironic inclusion

The significance of this moment in a typical school production is immense, especially in the context of Howard's Australia:

it comes at the end of sustained promulgation of a climate of fear, based on moral panic regarding boat people and the threat they pose to border security, panic around Islamic terrorism and Lebanese gangs, and to a lesser extent on the presence of African refugees.[23] In this sense, the cultural inversions are more than mere play: the site of a small, fair-haired security guard of European ancestry trying – in vain – to remove the uncontrollable black man resonates strongly with a political context. The size of the European – small in stature – echoes the 'small man' syndrome some have identified in Howard.[24] But it also echoes a larger theme in Australian politics that goes back to Billy Hughes, in which Australia's enlarged sense of itself on the world stage is out of proportion to its real significance *because* of its western heritage. There is also a sense in which the failure of 'old' Australia to contain its irrepressible Other is deeply comic and yet a moment of clear self-reflection – in this the joke is on 'us' because it puts into proportion our national anxieties about race, intercultural relations and international significance.

Self-deprecation is often paraded as a characteristic of 'Australian humour', but this is usually seen in terms of a white heritage; or it is seen in terms of 'ethnic' humour which makes fun of its stereotypes – but here the humour works *across* those boundaries.[25] It marks our sense of national identity as problematic – particularly of consequence in the midst of a debate about shared national values – since two of the acts were significant because they made it overseas, and two of the judges were migrants themselves. All the assumptions being made at this conjuncture about a shared historical experience and national culture are unsettled in this skit, but lightly. It is not a bitter act of sarcasm or cruel humour at the expense of another, but a self-deprecating recognition that our idea of the nation is an instable one. It is the recognition that there is no (white) centre to our national existence, only the puffed-up illusion of such a centre, and it is a moment of recognition that our categories of culture and ethnicity are open to contestation. It is a moment of

self-irony, in which the gap between expectation and reality is opened wide, when our anxieties about 'invasion' are mocked, when the certainties of ethnic boundaries are laughed away.

Irony, of course, is frequently touted as one of the hallmarks of our postmodern age, an awareness of the collision of competing meanings. As Hutcheon argues, irony is often seen as the creation of a distance which allows us to escape complicity with the condition in which we find ourselves, yet it also opens up a space for agency and reflexivity which allows for connection between people.[26] Belonging, I would argue, can be deeply ironic and self-aware of its own limitations. Too often our thinking about belonging rests heavily on the positing of the radical difference of others, on their exclusion, and on the simplistic construction of a singular 'us' and reductive 'them'. In the moment of the school performance, however, there is a powerful if somewhat ambivalent sense that 'we're all in this mess together', an ironic inclusiveness. Bauman has characterised our age as the postmodern reconciliation with ambivalence, when we give up trying to contain our anxieties about ambiguity, contingency and flux.[27] But his view is one of resignation; what marks the school performance of the cultural inversions of *Australian Idol* is the exuberance of Len, met by tumultuous celebration in which the audience delighted in such ambiguity. It is tempting to cast this as carnivalesque, emphasising the riotous inversion of the social order, as cultural studies too readily does.[28] Rather, I see this episode as more exemplifying Victor Turner's concept of *communitas*, emphasising the spontaneous, intense feelings of social togetherness produced in certain circumstances.[29] Such a moment of *communitas* is not unaware of its liminality; indeed, it joyously embraces its ambiguity and indeterminacy. Skribis and Woodward note the ambivalence of ordinary cosmopolitanism, but for them it is the way in which the pleasure in the interconnectedness of the world is felt at the same time as a dilution of a national culture, producing a fragile commitment to cosmopolitan ideals.[30] Here, I am less interested

in the views articulated in focus groups than in trying to explain the enthusiasm of a moment in a culturally diverse setting in which such ambiguity is embraced. In other words, ambivalent, critical 'distance' need not prevent affective intimacy; such irony is, indeed, inclusive.

Cosmopolitan joy

We quite readily acknowledge the affective dimensions of national belonging – such as pride in the rituals of public commemoration and sporting contests – and the negative effects of racism – of fear and hate, for example. As Ahmed argues, such emotions help bind us to the nation.[31] Yet we rarely engage with the positive, affective nature of intercultural life. I have elsewhere explored the role of affect in regulating the movement and social participation of Australians of migrant backgrounds[32], but here I am interested in the role affect plays in the fostering of intercultural capacities and a 'warm' cosmopolitanism.[33]

This response to the school performance is a moment of 'cosmopolitan joy', because the delight it produces is defined largely in terms of fellow-feeling which does not simply *cross* ethnic boundaries but revels in the ambiguity around such categories. Now, I don't want to burden this brief moment with too great a sense of consequence, yet it carried a mood which was laden with all sorts of possibilities. Moreover, I want to stress that I am not indulging in the romantic evocation of intercultural harmony but trying to make sense of the intense feelings of togetherness, of belonging that seemed to mark this point in time.

Ahmed, in a work that focuses on the negative effects of hate, fear, disgust and shame, also develops keen insights into what she calls 'multicultural love' which, at first glance, seems to share a joy in the ideal of intercultural togetherness. She argues that love is more than a 'sticky' emotion that binds people

through discourses such as patriotism, especially when we apply it to the analysis of the positive emotions we feel towards those who aren't of 'one's own kind'.[34] Drawing on Salecl, Ahmed points out that a part of the pleasure in identifying with the multicultural nation is that we get to see ourselves as good, tolerant subjects; in other words, the pleasure lies in a reflected sense of our moral worth, not in the joy of an intercultural moment. Moreover, Ahmed is primarily interested in showing how multicultural love requires both the migrant's assimilation to the national ideal and the gift of their difference to the nation, which reciprocates with 'love'. So the process she describes relates more to the ideological construction of the multicultural nation, in which 'acting in the name of love' functions as a form of assimilation, than to forms of intercultural affect experienced in daily life. She concludes that 'the idea of a world where we all love each other is a humanist fantasy that informs much of the multicultural discourse of love'. This is no doubt true, and is a productive way of thinking about much multicultural discourse, but it leads her to seemingly discount the benevolence of 'good feelings' *tout court*; it is only at the end of her discussion that, referring to Dean, she gestures towards the possibility of the kind of 'affectionate', 'reflective solidarity' in intercultural lives.[35] It is significant of course that critical scholars largely shy away from engaging with such 'good feelings', preferring to catalogue yet another example of what Collini provocatively, but with some justification, refers to as 'grievance studies'.[36]

In a similarly engaging piece, Fortier explores what she calls 'multicultural intimacy', but while there are some tantalising insights into the ambivalences of racial proximity, affect and people mixing, her focus is ultimately on 'neighbourly love' as 'a technology of governance aimed at engineering affect through the management of multicultural intimacy'. She argues that through a 'rhetoric of mutual understanding and respect, the fantasy of multicultural intimacy is integral to the emergence of a British national formation of toleration'.[37] It seems it is hard

to ask serious questions about 'good feelings' without appearing hopelessly utopian or, worse, politically naive! But the study of any form of solidarity, however ambivalent, must grapple with the ways in which 'good feelings' form and help 'stick' social relations without reducing these to the reproduction of social relations of power, as absolutely central as this is.

I have, to this point, avoided defining joy and this is largely because, like most affects, it is hard to put into words. Tomkins famously talks about joy as the result of the reduction in negative effects.[38] In other words, joy here is a context-specific *relief*: We could argue that the joy of the school performance lies precisely in its specific location in a larger social and political context – the climate of fear fostered in Australia in the large context of international terrorism and panics about border security over which the local member had presided. This is one key dimension of the shared, collective nature of cosmopolitan sentiment. A second dimension is captured by Tomkins's notion of affect contagion – once an affect is activated, it has the capacity to be self-reproducing and to activate the affect in others. In colloquial terms, such joy is infectious: 'It is only when the joy of the other activates joy in the self…that we may speak of an animal as a social animal'.[39] This is not automatic: the contagious nature of joy considered here is, I would speculate, a direct consequence of recognising the shared social circumstances in which the 'joke' of the performance works, finding out that others also acknowledge that 'we're all in this mess together'. Joy is particularly significant to what Tomkins refers to as the different modes of social communion, not simply because of its expressive and communicative quality, but because it evinces an 'investment of social affect' that is crucial to the establishment of strong social ties. These attachments are fashioned through the ongoing development of the enjoyment of social communion: 'doing things together', he argues, is one of the key modes of communion.[40] The contagious nature of affect is significant not just because it is crucial to subjective development, but because

interaffectivity is central to defining the intersubjective nature of social life.[41]

Cosmopolitan festivity

There is another moment of communal, cosmopolitan joy I want to refer that, rather than located in a spontaneous response as discussed above, is found at the local festival in a more diffuse but sustained form. Bennelong has its fair share of multicultural festivals – such as Harmony Day and Chinese New Year – which are designed to 'celebrate' cultural difference. Such festivals are often rightly criticised for their trivialisation of multiculturalism.[42] But this is not what I want to discuss, because such events are primarily focused on the 'selling' of difference to the mainstream. Bennelong has a very specific event called the Granny Smith Festival which is not about multiculturalism per se. In fact, this festival celebrates 'Anglo' Australian history.

Located in Eastwood, the place where the Granny Smith apple was first grown – an icon of Australianness – the festival hosts 80,000 participants each year. Yet the festival has also become en event which 'showcases the area's diversity' alongside its historic, 'Anglo' origins.[43] There is a very strong presence of people from migrant backgrounds selling their wares or cooking 'traditional' food in stalls or participating in the vast array of events at the festival – local arts and crafts, school performances and so on. There is also the marked presence of cultural diversity amongst volunteers – information helpers, parents manning the sausage sizzle and the second-hand books stall in the school grounds. It is no longer simply an 'Anglo' affair which may engage in forms of cosmo-multicultural distinction in which we mark ourselves as sophisticated through the savouring of exotic difference[44], but nor is it multiculturalism. It is, rather, the banal fact of diversity and intercultural mixing woven into a local and national history which is the context for this festive

joy, captured in the images reported each year after the festival. For this reason I see it is a festival or 'ordinary cosmopolitanism' rather than multiculturalism. But I think this event goes beyond the mere presence of difference in the 'cosmopolitan canopy' that Anderson celebrates in the contemporary marketplace. Festivals are designed to foster good feeling because, as carnivals, they create a space away from the normal routines of daily life in which pleasure is foregrounded and many of the constraints of the workaday world are lifted.[45] But such festivals are also fundamentally places of public communion and in this case, the communion aligns diversity with locality and national community.

This focus on the possibility of communion, if only ephemerally, marks cosmopolitan joy analytically from what could be called multicultural pleasure – the delight we might experience in the consumption of otherness. This is at the heart of Hage's notion of cosmo-multiculturalism, in which the pleasure is structured around the maintenance of lines of difference, not their unsettling.[46] In practice, of course, this distinction is not always easy to make, because in situ this pleasure can be transformed into a greater self-awareness and a form of conviviality that at least partially dissolves difference.

In the week before the 2007 election which saw McKew unseat Howard, the Granny Smith Festival was slightly different, because the event became a key site for the campaign battle. While there was some criticism of this, the memory of the day remains caught in very clear and contrasting images: of McKew immersing herself in the partying, and Howard looking increasingly awkward.[47] I don't want to fetishise this event as the key moment in KcKew's victory, but several things resonate with my argument about the significance of cosmopolitan joy in Bennelong. The first is that it signalled a shift away from the politics of pragmatism that Howard had for many years deployed in sustaining strong support amongst the local Chinese and Korean communities. Howard had maintained this support

not by being a good local member (indeed, his role as prime minister meant that he was hardly ever there) but by espousing a rhetoric of strong and conservative economic management, which was seen to appeal to local Asian business and community leaders. There was a sense in which Howard had exploited this appeal one too many times, only turning up to fetes of ethnic communities during election time. Indeed, this was often seen as a cynical piece of politics: during the 2007 campaign, his office sent out hundreds of letters to people with the surname Lee addressing them as members of the local Chinese community, when, of course, this is not necessarily a Chinese name. Such an acknowledgement of local diversity was calculated and empty. This cynicism seemed to be in clear contrast to McKew's very personal relationship with the local Asian communities, including the famous Chinese-background MSG (Maxine Support Group)[48], and her willingness to immerse herself in joyous local celebration.

We could speculate here that Howard's inability to acknowledge the diversity which now typified his electorate demonstrated a greater failure to recognise the changes across Australia that migration had wrought, but it is just as important to argue that Howard got the mood wrong. Howard's policies articulated a binary between assimilationist and multicultural ideologies, frequently framed by a politics of fear in which cultural others could be made to carry the blame for complex social problems. Within this paradigm, ethnic others continued to be adjuncts to the real game of Australian social life, no matter how often Howard acknowledged their 'contributions'.

This is especially significant because through the cosmopolitan joy of the Granny Smith Festival, we can see how diverse residents and others develop civic, intercultural investments which operate at the local level, but translate into national attachments. Against popular assumptions that migrants exhibit little civic participation[49], this festival offers opportunities for intercommunal civic activity. These concerns

would suggest that many migrants invest themselves deeply in local and national space, and connect their biographies with wider narratives of belonging and place, making themselves 'at home' in the process. This is crucial to the question of cultural citizenship, understood not simply as the recognition of cultural rights, but as the practices of negotiating the ambivalent relations of belonging in a nation.

Conclusion

Cosmopolitanism is often seen to entail an abandonment of a strong claim to local and national belongings. This, however, does not do justice to the complex forms of attachment found in contemporary Australia. This chapter has argued through a discussion of events in Bennelong that would normally going unremarked in scholarly work but that exhibit forms of both 'ironic inclusion' and cosmopolitan joy which is central to the openness to difference of everyday life.

As Dobson argues, 'thin' notions of cosmpolitanism leave a motivational vacuum in terms of how people are connected to a commitment to interculturality.[50] As I've emphasised, I don't wish to romanticise culturally diverse settings as utopian – they may also be marked by racism or multicultural resentment.[51] But there are other things at stake – we need to explore with greater nuance how people develop empathy and 'fellow feeling' that crosses ethnic boundaries – how people develop a 'capacity to care' across difference.[52] The emphasis on joy is a very specific one, and owes as much to Spinoza as it does to Tomkins. Spinoza argued that individuals are driven by a conatus, the principle that each thing strives to persevere in its being. This is not just a conservative principle of self-preservation because each thing strives by trying to increase its power of action. Joy is that which we experience when the body's power of acting is augmented.[53] But this is not a purely individualised phenomenon – as Deleuze

reminds us, joy expands because it compounds with the power of the other, it unites with the object.[54]

While some conceptual work has proceeded on how cosmopolitanism might be construed as a set of dispositions or a habitus[55], it begs the question of *how* people become disposed in such a way, and how these capacities are formed collectively, rather than as individual attributes. The moments we have focused on above suggest that we need to examine those 'ordinary' events through which these capacities might form. It is not simply habituation to difference per se that produces a cosmopolitan disposition, but practices through which an affective investment in what Young calls 'living-in-togetherness' develops.[56] The school performance and the Granny Smith Festival both exemplify such an investment. Comparable moments of cosmopolitan *communitas* litter practices of cohabitation beyond Bennelong. They do not just specify discrete forms of identity with explicit traditions and values but make spaces of difference habitable, providing resources for a variety of forms of conviviality.

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Cosmopolitan Encounters

Alternative multicultural subjectivities? Indochinese cosmopolitanisms in Western Sydney

Ashley Carruthers

*I'm attending the wake [*heuan dii*] of an elderly Lao man at his family home in outer south-western Sydney. Lao wakes are not overly solemn affairs, and guests are encouraged to eat, drink, have fun and even gamble in order to give the departed soul a good send-off. A group of 1.5 generation Lao-Australian men I have become close to is laughing uproariously at a sound file they are bluetoothing to each other on their mobile phones. The piece is a prank call made by Turkish-Australian comic Tahir Bilgiç ('Habib' from* Pizza*), pretending to be a Vietnamese man phoning McDonald's to complain he has found a pubic hair in his Big Mac. The friends find this piece especially funny because 'He sounds so much like a Vietnamese guy. He even knows how to say '*đụ má*' [fuck your mother]!' Bilgiç, a native of Bankstown, clearly shares the cultural intimacy which these men have with their own Vietnamese neighbours and workmates – a familiarity that makes it okay to laugh at a Vietnamese-Australian accent in the most un-PC way imaginable. In fact, these Lao guys are Tahir's ideal audience, since they are expert judges of his performative competence as a 'Vietnamese bogan'. Profane as it is, this is the stuff of working-class immigrant cosmopolitanism, Western Sydney style.*[1]

Introduction

While the possibility of Australian multiculturalisms and cosmopolitanisms that cross minority/minority cultural boundaries is sometimes recognised in the literature[2], such interactions tend not to form the focus of our research. Yet there are compelling reasons to study these minoritarian trajectories. Arguably, these hybridities lie entirely outside of the state's vision of a harmonious and successful multicultural society. The prospect of minority communities that might interface with each other more readily, frequently and skilfully than with the host society seems guaranteed to upset liberal multicultural sensibilities. Do there indeed exist contemporary Australian multicultural subjectivities that are structured primarily around such logics rather than the ethnic community/host society relationship? Are there types of cosmopolitanism that are based mostly or exclusively on minoritarian cultural crossings? And might these subjectivities be formed without reference or with minimal reference to a paradigm of 'mainstream' Australian multiculturalism that demands and rewards only those cross-cultural excursions which traverse the correct lines?[3]

This chapter seeks to explore these possibilities by way of an ethnographic engagement with the Indochinese communities of Western Sydney. The community spaces of Lao- Cambodian- and Vietnamese-Australians in the Fairfield Local Government Area (LGA) can be usefully viewed, I will argue, as the site of an alternative Australian multicultural scene in which forms of cosmopolitan subjectivity founded on minoritarian cross-cultural trajectories are common if not dominant. Indochinese interculturalisms in Western Sydney are importantly structured through consumption, particularly in the commercial space of Cabramatta, but they also cross into other domains of life such as language, religion, kinship and workplace solidarity.

The context

Fairfield LGA, a thirty-kilometre drive due west from the Sydney CBD, is home to some 40,000 Australians of Indochinese ancestry. Roughly 2,000 of these Australians are Lao, 5,500 Khmer and Sino-Khmer, and the rest Vietnamese, including the ethnic Chinese-Vietnamese. Together, people of Indochinese ancestry constitute over a quarter of the LGA's population. The CBD of the orbital suburb of Cabramatta, sometimes known as 'Vietnamatta', is the commercial, cultural and culinary centre of this community. It is a strange and wonderful experience indeed to arrive in this bustling town, with its temples, Chinese gates, and Vietnamese, Lao and Khmer restaurants, grocers, and gold and fabric stores, out of the surrounding weatherboard bungalows, lawns and eucalypts of postwar Australian suburbia. One of the reasons for the presence of Indochinese-Australians in the Fairfield LGA is the fact that most refugee arrivals were initially housed in hostels in the area. Fairfield has a history as a migrant transition zone, and has hosted a succession of twentieth century arrivals including British, German, Greek, Italian and Yugoslav migrants. This history is reflected in the fact that two thirds of Fairfield residents speak a language other than English at home, the highest for any LGA in Australia (ABS 2007). Many Indochinese refugees who had initially settled elsewhere in Australia, including some who had been placed with sponsors in regional areas, undertook a secondary migration to the Fairfield area to join the nascent community. In addition to the attraction of Indochinese neighbours, groceries and restaurants, the area was appealing in that land and houses were relatively cheap and it was close to work in Western Sydney's manufacturing sector, where many new Indochinese arrivals found their first jobs. For new Indochinese migrants and sojourners – brides, students or workers on the 457 visa – Cabramatta still serves as a handy low rent (and low wage) point of first settlement. Although the hostels have long been closed, Fairfield is also still an attractive

settlement destination for Burmese, African and Middle Eastern refugee arrivals to Sydney.

The Australian Research Council-funded research in Fairfield and other parts of Western Sydney (particularly Campbelltown) which informs this paper stretched over 2007 and 2008. This research was primarily ethnographic in nature, involving participant observation in Cambodian and Lao community spaces, as well as an extensive series of interviews with refugees and more recent migrants. This focus on Lao- and Khmer-Australians complemented and was informed by earlier research projects with the Vietnamese community. The research concentrated on intercommunal relations between Indochinese communities, as well as the transnational dimensions of the lives of the predominantly working class members of the Lao and Cambodian communities. My interest centred on first-generation refugees and migrants, and '1.5 generation' (born in Laos or Cambodia and socialised in Australia) Lao- and Khmer-Australians in their twenties, thirties and early forties. I worked most closely with people who strongly identified with and actively participated in the lives of their respective ethnic communities in Western Sydney. This choice reflects my own interest in working-class migrant cosmopolitanisms and transnationalisms, but also reflects the fact that such involvement (which can take many forms) is the norm among the majority cohort I have identified. My conclusions have limited relevance to members of the second generation or to those living apart from the communities. There was also a multi-sited component to this research, and below the reader will find reference to urban and border contexts in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Demotic cosmopolitanisms

A number of writers have already tackled the issue of 'demotic', 'grassroots' or 'actually existing' cosmopolitanisms among

working-class migrants. Perhaps most instructive in this literature from an anthropologist's point of view is the exchange between Ulf Hannerz and Pnina Werbner.[4] As Werbner points out, Hannerz in his work has been careful to construct a distinction between 'true' cosmopolitans and merely globally mobile people. According to this view of things, the first category of people is disposed to turn towards the Other in an almost disinterested way, while the second turns away from him by building surrogate homelands or transporting enclosed cultural worlds. Werbner accuses Hannerz of elitism in largely excluding working-class transnational labour migrants from his definition of cosmopolitanism. She counters his critique by offering a brief ethnography of non-elite cosmopolitanism featuring a polyglot Pakistani worker employed on a Middle Eastern oil rig whose experience of overseas travel is one of 'triumphant mastery' rather than of alienation. Basically Werbner's argument is that working-class cosmopolitanism might look different to elite cosmopolitanism, but involves similarly complex processes of intercultural knowledge acquisition and negotiation, as well as a distancing from and relativisation of one's own primordial cultural values.

Werbner rejects this, but it seems significant to me that vernacular cosmopolitan skills may well be acquired by force of circumstance rather than by 'choice' (as in the case of Hannerz's 'true' cosmopolitan). I would add that while transnational labour migrants may in fact be *more* cosmopolitan than extraterritorial frequent flyers in their actual capacity to operate in a multitude of cultural and national settings, they typically have no way of converting (or have no disposition to convert) this cultural capital into the kind of *symbolic* capital that attaches itself to elite cosmopolitans. Demotic cosmopolitanisms, as cosmopolitanisms of necessity, might be understood in terms of a migrant or refugee habitus that becomes reflexive, flexible and relativistic as a consequence of having to routinely negotiate between two or more very different national social fields. However, it seems to me that such cosmpolitansisms are most likely to be 'dominated'

ones condemned to remain largely invisible and unrewarded outside the narrow social field of transnational workplaces such as the oil rig or the ethnic community marketplace. In my own research I have encountered all too many Indochinese polyglots occupying the most marginal of socio-economic positions: for instance a Khmer-Chinese woman who speaks seven languages and works for low and unreliable pay at the bottom of the feeding chain in a real-estate business owned by Italian-Australians; or a Khmer-Vietnamese man who speaks three languages with native fluency and has worked as a common employee in a Cabramatta fish market since his arrival in Australia twenty years ago.

Lack of recognition of one's cosmopolitanism by the wider society is but one vector of social exclusion, and may or may not be compounded by other forms of exclusion. As Luhmann reminds us, there is no single 'society' into which migrants are incorporated, but rather semi-autonomous spheres such as the economy, the law, politics, education, health and welfare.[5] All immigrants are included in some spheres and excluded in others. The sphere under discussion below might be described as that space in which claims to cosmopolitanism are made, contested, recognised or refused. If cosmopolitanism constitutes a kind of privileged multicultural citizenship, then the cultural capital that is valued in this social field is monopolised by those multiculturalists who succeed in having their own cultural capital recognised as legitimate.[6] As others have argued, the dominant form of cosmo-multiculturalism is constructed around a (white) multiculturalist who makes excursions into minority (non-white) cultures.[7]

Indochinese cultural contact zones

Since the commencement of Indochinese refugee settlement in Australia, Vietnamese communities (and by association Lao and Cambodian ones), particularly in Cabramatta, have tended to be subject to stereotyping as insular, secretive and unwilling

to assimilate. This persistent imagery no doubt has much to do with the fact these communities were the first Asian immigrants to arrive in Australia in significant numbers since the Chinese of the Goldrush era, and with the nature of their arrival as refugees from a failed neo-imperial adventure in which Australia was a participant. The kernel of truth in the 'insular' stereotype is that Indochinese communities in Australia do indeed have strong communal identifications in terms of spatial consolidation, cultural maintenance, religion, media ecology, endogamy and ethnically organised economic activity. Vietnamese-Australians continue to enjoy the highest rates of residential concentration of any ethnic minority group in Australia, and Vietnamese (alongside Arabic) is one of the two most successfully maintained community languages in the country. Despite the stereotypes, these social attributes do not mean that Indochinese-Australians inhabit hermetic and homogenous cultural zones. There also exists a parallel social reality in which Indochinese-Australians inhabit community spaces that are exemplary cultural contact zones, and in which many possess finely honed intercultural skills and knowledges.

As originally formulated by Pratt, contact zones are ones in which subjects and communities are constituted relationally. They are:

> social spaces where cultures meet, clash and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today.[8]

Elsewhere, Pratt says that her theorisation of the contact zone is: 'an attempt to invoke the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect.'[9]

The Indochinese neighbourhoods that were created in suburban Sydney as a result of the post-1975 refugee crisis are

in one sense exactly the kind of bringing together of people previously separated by geography and history of which Pratt speaks. Without doubt, many among the refugees had little or no pre-migration experience of being in such proximity to their Indochinese neighbours, and for them Cabramatta has been a site of 'first contact' not only with Anglo and other Australians, but with the other Indochinese. From another point of view, however, these new neighbourhoods have a distinct historical continuity with the spaces of Indochinese diversity and cosmopolitanism in the cities and border zones of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In many ways, Sydney's Indochinese neighbourhoods are reminiscent of border towns like Pakse in southern Laos or Svay Rieng in eastern Cambodia; or like ethnically diverse Mekong Delta settler towns such as Soc Trang and Tra Vinh. Recent humanitarian category arrivals from Phnom Penh have told me that settling into Cabramatta involved little or no culture shock for them at all, since the town's mix of Chinese, Vietnamese and Khmer merchants and residents was one that was already entirely familiar. The settlement of members of these groups next to each other in Sydney's western suburbs thus reproduces and intensifies a historical experience of Indochinese cross-border migration, trade and cultural transfer. In the Asian context, it has been argued that such socially diverse milieux, characterised by forms of Indigenous or local cosmopolitanism, constitute an alternative tradition that predates and challenges that other historical tradition of exclusionary national identities connected with the colonial state and its postcolonial successors.[10]

Encounters between Indochinese subjects in these new spaces of proximity are, nevertheless, informed and even over-determined by the nations' shared colonial and postcolonial histories. Indeed, the very use of the term 'Indochinese' becomes problematic in the light of these histories, connoting as it does French colonial domination, as well as postwar Vietnamese political and sometime military hegemony in Laos

and Cambodia. In the Australian context (as in the US), the institutional and social scientific appropriation of the category 'Indochinese' has generally described a Vietnamese experience under which the smaller Lao and Cambodian communities have been subsumed, thus creating a false impression of homogeneity. It is true that refugees from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam share interrelated histories of flight, similar circumstances of arrival in Australia, and comparable socio-economic profiles and residential patterns.[11] As communities of self-identification, however, the Lao, Khmer and Vietnamese differ greatly. In the diasporic context these differences often resurface as postcolonial struggles, something reflected in the fact that there is no strong political representation of an 'Indochinese' community, and that relations between the three communities are at times characterised by animosity and mistrust. The discourses they speak about each other do not lack for their xenophobic and even racist aspects, as we shall see below.

While essentialisms abound in the ways in which the respective communities speak and think about each other, it doesn't take much scrutiny at all to appreciate that the three national diasporic groups signified by the term 'Indochinese' are, internally, very diverse indeed. At least one third of both the Vietnam- and Cambodia-born communities is ethnic Chinese. In the Vietnamese case this reflects the ethnic cleansing of Chinese from Vietnam in the late 1970s, and the provision of legal (but still dangerous) pathways for their emigration by boat. In the Khmer case it reflects the composition of urban Cambodian populations in the war era, which were one third Chinese[12], and is also connected to the fact that many ethnic Chinese were able to escape in the early days of Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea. Teochiu Chinese are an important subgrouping in this context. Historically practised in cosmopolitanism, members of this group have to an extent sustained and reinvented their intermediary position as small-business owners and culture brokers from Cambodia to Cabramatta. Another small but important sub

community group is the Khmer Kampuchea Krom. This group speaks out for cultural and religious rights for ethnic Khmer in the Mekong Delta, and even makes an irredentist claim over that part of southern Vietnam that once belonged to the Khmer kingdom. It has an elaborately articulated (if sometimes phantasmatic) alternative history and geography of Lower Cambodia (Kampuchea Krom), and doggedly challenges mainstream histories of Vietnamese nation-building. These interstitial communities themselves embody the alternative, border-challenging histories of the region, existing as they do in the cracks between the national ethnic categories that comprise 'Indochina'.

Parochialisms

The numerical and commercial superiority of Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese-Vietnamese Australians over Lao and Khmer is reflected in the visual and spatial semiotics of Cabramatta's bustling CBD. The busier and more prosperous western side of the station is dominated by businesses owned by Vietnamese and Chinese-Vietnamese people, and the area's most distinctive architectural feature, the Pai Lau gate in Freedom Plaza, reflects the influence of the Sino-Vietnamese business community. There are a few Lao and Khmer businesses on this side of the tracks, but the more shabby and run-down eastern side of Cabramatta is known as the Khmer end of town. There one finds a few Khmer and Chinese-Cambodian businesses, as well as an unofficial temple, Wat Ketanak. The impression that this ethno-geography gives of Cabramatta as a 'Vietnamese' town is, according to 'May' (a second-generation Vietnamese-Australian social worker and public servant who has long been active in community advancement in the area), exacerbated by the way Fairfield Council has chosen to promote it. The Mid Autumn Moon Festival (*Tết Trung Thu*), a Sino-Vietnamese calendrical

festival, is the only major community celebration to take place in Cabramatta CBD. The Theravada Buddhist New Year (*Bpii Mai*), which falls around Easter, is not acknowledged in Cabramatta centre, and takes place rather on the Lao and Khmer temple grounds only. May also complains that government-funded Vietnamese community associations are unwilling to work with Lao and Khmer groups. Even though the Vietnamese organisations have resources such as case workers experienced in post-trauma and domestic violence issues, they typically won't share them, and fail to recognise that Lao and Khmer refugee communities share similar issues with the Vietnamese community. Some young people are attempting to extend Vietnamese community experience and resources to aid African and Middle Eastern refugees who are settling in Fairfield, but mainstream community association support is weak. The most significant of the tiny number of Indochinese-based institutions that exist in the area, the Mimosa women's refuge, was at the time of research undergoing severe administrative difficulties, partly as a result of poor intercommunal relations, and was under pressure to come under the direct control of the Department of Community Service (DOCS). This move would have meant abandoning the ethno-specific character of the refuge and turning it into a 'general' service.

Pathologies

Daniel Hiebert points to the importance of public space and local governments in enabling local 'cultures of hospitality' that engage immigrant populations, arguing that this type of hospitality fosters cosmopolitanism.[13] May clearly feels there has been a failure in building such a culture of hospitality in Cabramatta, and she uses the image of the railway tracks that bisect the east and west sides of the town to represent the gulf between the Indochinese communities, bemoaning the fact that

few are willing to 'cross the bridge' to the other side. One of my own excursions to the other side of the bridge involved a visit to Wat Ketanak. The shabby weatherboard bungalow that houses the unofficial Khmer Krom temple is situated at the point where the commercial zone becomes residential. The Khmer Krom are ethnic Khmers who hail from Vietnam's Mekong Delta, a piece of real estate swallowed up by the historical 'southward march' (*Nam Tiến*) of the ethnic Vietnamese, and which was in parts still Khmer territory until the advent of French colonialism in the mid-eighteenth century. At this temple, I spoke to two monks who grew up in Vietnam but who had emigrated to Cambodia as teenagers. They were in Australia on religious worker visas, although it seemed they would have to return before their year was up because the tiny community was running out of resources. They spoke with passion of the injustices done to the Khmer Krom by the Vietnamese in the past, and of the ongoing suppression of Khmer culture and religion in the Mekong Delta. They showed me a magazine published by an American Khmer Krom association that included a map of Kampuchea Krom extending from Cà Mau in the southernmost tip of Vietnam up beyond Tay Ninh and Ho Chi Minh City. This magazine featured an illustration of Vietnamese boiling their kettles on severed Khmer heads, a depiction of the alleged genocide perpetrated by the Vietnamese in their historical march southwards into Khmer lands. Even speaking Vietnamese as a lingua franca was painful for these monks, one of whom told me he had abandoned this language, which was so 'hard on the tongue', some ten years ago.[14]

Not only among Khmer Krom but in Cambodia in general, Vietnam is most frequently represented as a regional hegemon and quasi imperial power that is 'stealing' Cambodia and has been doing so for centuries. This discourse permeates everyday Cambodian life. For instance, on a recent research trip in southern Cambodia, in the car on the way from Phnom Penh to Svay Rieng our driver's main topic of conversation was the day's front

page story about an international telephone card that appeared in Paris called 'Le mellieur Angkor', with the word 'Vietnam' superimposed on an image of Angkor Wat. So sensitive is this issue that what was in all likelihood a simple piece of diasporic geographical confusion and/or dubious graphic design became a national issue for the day. On our journey's next leg, from Svay Rieng to Bavet, our young driver pointed out a distant mountain on the border, remarking that this was the only mountain in Svay Rieng and that Vietnamese settlers were creeping around the base of the hill and into Cambodian territory. In addition to these territorial fears one hears about Hanoi's persistent political influence in Phnom Penh, and also about what is imagined to be the uncontrolled influx of Vietnamese migrants into Cambodia. Cambodians in the diaspora are well aware of such discourses and, as the Parisian phone card example shows (editors in Phnom Penh were no doubt alerted by diasporic Khmer to its existence) are even active participants in the manufacture of anti-Vietnamese moral panics.

On the Vietnamese side, representations of Cambodians as 'lazy', 'dark' and 'savage', and of the country as 'backward' and 'underdeveloped' constitute a kind of common sense that penetrates almost everywhere, including those towns with large ethnic Khmer populations. Asking a motorcycle taxi driver in Tra Vinh one day if he had ever been into one of the many Theravada Khmer temples we were speeding past, I was surprised to hear him answer 'No, I'm a Buddhist!' The Vietnamese state pays lip service to multiculturalism in these regions but the everyday reality is that Khmer culture is considered inferior to Vietnamese culture, and young Khmers are targets for assimilation in Vietnamese schools. Despite the marked disagreement between Hanoi and the refugee diaspora on other issues, these civilisationist attitudes persist in Little Saigons around the world.

In Laos itself and among Lao refugees around the world there also exist powerful fears of uncontrolled Vietnamese

migration and political influence, and a concomitant discourse of 'disappearing nation'. A middle-aged Lao-Australian man whose family lives in a housing commission dwelling in Minto, and who is very active in community politics, assured me: 'Behaviour in Laos is changing because everyone is getting infiltrated with Vietnamese blood. Vientiane is now eighty per cent Vietnamese!'

A senior community leader remarked at the launch of a book of Lao refugee stories at a major arts institution in Western Sydney that, as a result of Vietnamese migration, 'One day the borders of the Lao nation may disappear.'

A more mundane example of Lao anti-Vietnamese xenophobia was given to me by a Lao-Australian social worker who looks after a Lao elderly group in Campbelltown. Given the small size of the Lao group, the centre administration had suggested joining the Lao and Vietnamese groups together. Most of the Lao group had been accepting of this suggestion, but in the end it could not be carried out because of the flat-out refusal of one of the members of the Lao group to join with the Vietnamese.

An extreme example of anti-Vietnamese racism comes from a middle-aged Khmer man who I interviewed in the poker machine section of the Cabra-Vale Diggers club. A former official of the post Pol Pot government and now a successful insulation contractor, this man told me: 'I don't like Vietnamese people. When I see them I get upset. My Cambodia and my people were destroyed by the Vietnamese. They made my country terrible.'

As the result of a recent divorce, this man is living alone in a cheap apartment in the heart of Cabramatta. Despite the convenience, he tells me he never buys anything in Cabramatta, and doesn't even eat there. He has someone else do his shopping for him, and goes and eats McDonalds and KFC rather than having to eat alongside Vietnamese diners in the suburb.

> '[If] I hear Vietnamese language I'm upset. I don't like them but I don't do anything. If I had the power…I like Lao. They're like Khmer – polite, they bow their head when they walk past you, talk soft.'

When he hears Vietnamese people speak, by contrast, he finds them so incredibly rude he 'wants to punch them'.

Cosmopolitanisms

Lao, Vietnamese and Khmer nationalist historiographies are in some ways powerfully reactivated by the co-presence of the refugee communities in Western Sydney. However, they are also significantly challenged by a multiplicity of local, familial and other histories of grassroots cultural contact, hybridisation and intermarriage in Indochinese cities and border regions, and now in Australian suburbs. Below, I would like to examine a number of these domains of everyday cosmopolitanism in Fairfield.

Food

I am more sanguine than May about the possibilities for Indochinese cosmopolitanism held out by the culinary and commercial space of Cabramatta CBD. Just as Cabramatta is a culinary tourism site for Anglo-Australian and other non-Indochinese visitors (now especially including Korean-Australians), so it is a location for Vietnamese-, Lao- and Khmer-Australians to explore each other's food.

The Lao restaurants in Cabramatta and nearby Fairfield all have Vietnamese menus and most have some Vietnamese-speaking staff. An outing to one of these eateries with Vietnamese friends is something of an excursion into the exotic. Eating sticky rice in baskets (*dip khao*), dipping it into *jeo*, and maybe even ordering raw beef or raw fish *laab* flavored with pungent Lao

fermented fish paste (*bpaa deek*) are all experienced as novel and even daring things to do. By contrast, going with Lao people to eat Vietnamese food is a much more mundane culinary event. Many Lao people prepare the more popular Vietnamese dishes, such as beef noodle soup (*phở*) and fresh rice paper rolls (*gỏi cuốn*), at home. A shopping trip to Cabramatta with Lao people is not complete without a bowl of *phở*, and restaurants popular with Lao customers have come to learn about the Lao predilection for adding fish sauce and shrimp paste to their *phở* stock. Some Vietnamese restaurateurs even speak basic 'kitchen Lao'. Vietnamese butchers in Cabramatta have also learnt that Lao people use cow bile (*bi*) in their cooking – an ingredient never used in Vietnamese cooking – and have intact spleens available specially for these customers.

Contrary to the Vietnamese experience of eating Lao and Khmer foods as culinary tourism, for many first-generation Lao migrants, eating *phở* in Cabramatta evokes the homely experience of eating Vietnamese food in Lao cities and towns. Younger Lao-Australians might use the culinary possibilities of the Fairfield area to make themselves 'at home' in different ways. Leaving the Vietnamese disco at the Cabra-vale Diggers club late one night with a group that included '1.5 generation' Lao-Australians and some very recent migrants from Laos, I was impressed to find that they knew some restaurants in Canley Heights stayed open late to accommodate the casino and nightclub crowd. Deciding we were hungry, we repaired to the *Điểm Hẹn* (Meeting Spot), where one of the recent arrivals from Vientiane ordered fish congee for us in very competent Vietnamese.

In other restaurants, the hybrid histories of the region are represented not only in cross-cultural eating practices but also in the dishes themselves. The single Cambodian-Chinese restaurant on the western side of Cabramatta serves the staple noodle dish *Ka Tieu Phnom Penh* (Phnom Penh noodles), which reflects the historical presence of Chinese migrants in Cambodian cities.

There is also a Vietnamese version of this dish popular in the South called *Hủ Tiếu Nam Vang*, reflecting a historical process of Chinese-Cambodian migration to Vietnam, especially during the Pol Pot period, and the attendant process of culinary transfer and appropriation.

These cultural proxemics arguably reflect the colonial and postcolonial histories of political subordination and superordination that connect Lao, Khmer and Vietnamese people, and which continue to some extent to structure their interactions in this context of arrival. For the purposes of illustration we might point here to the enduring presence of Vietnamese migrants in Lao cities from the colonial era onwards. Indeed, in French Indochina, Lao cities (with the exception of Luang Prabang) were Vietnamese migrant cities before they were Lao, and in-migration from Vietnam continues. For Vietnamese urbanites, by contrast, familiarity and intimacy with Lao and Khmer neighbours is historically far less common an experience because of the asymmetrical nature of Indochinese migration.

These relations are, however, subject to change in the new context of multicultural Australia. One of the best food stories I heard in the course of my research was told to me by 'Noi', a Lao-Australian woman in her twenties who works in a canning factory alongside her mother. Many of the workers in this factory are Indochinese and, with the encouragement of management, they have instituted 'food-sharing days' on which one of the groups is responsible for supplying lunch for everyone, thus creating an opportunity for culinary exchange on a new, and perhaps more equal, platform.

Religion

One evening an elderly Lao couple invited me to go to Wat Pa Buddharangsee, the Theravada Buddhist temple in Leumeah, near Campbelltown, to listen to a famous visiting Thai monk. The evening began with about an hour of chanting. Seeing that I was lost beyond the basic forms, a young bespectacled man

sidled up next to me and handed me a prayer book with English transcriptions of the tongue-twisting polysyllabic Pali chants – a guide that had been provided for visitors who spoke neither Lao nor Thai. Later I learned this man was of Malaysian-Chinese background. After the chanting, the visiting monk set up before him a mini cassette-recorder and an alarm clock and spoke in Thai for an hour, without hesitation and without the aid of notes. Given that my Thai is limited, I was beginning to wonder why my elderly friends had invited me along. At this point, the monk finished, and the temple's abbot, an ethnic Lao man who had spent most of his life in Thailand before coming to Australia, gave a potted English translation of the sermon. My friends, who had obviously known this was coming, beamed at me with satisfaction as I heard about the 'five powers' I was meant to cultivate. Subsequently, a lively Thai dialogue between the monks ensued, and I watched the Lao and Thai faithful follow this instructive discourse with rapt expressions. For them, this was clearly the only place in Sydney worth being at that moment.

The faithful rushed the podium at the end of the evening to buy CD copies of the visiting monk's sermons. This Thai-speaking audience included representatives of the local working-class Lao community, who do the majority of the day-to-day work of feeding and looking after the monks, and those of the more affluent Thai restaurant-owning community, who had commuted from closer to the metropolitan centre. This was primarily an event for the initiated, and yet efforts had also been made to make the proceedings accessible, at least in a limited way, to non-Thai speakers like myself and the Malaysian-Chinese worshipper (one of a small group of Malaysians who, for various reasons, have chosen to explore Theravada Buddhism and frequent the temple.) Thus even in one of its more esoteric moments, this temple made inclusive, exoteric gestures, as if by a cosmopolitan impulse. English featured here not so much as the language of the host nation but as a lingua franca for non-Thai-speaking devotees.

The Theravada New Year (*Bpii Mai*) celebrations are a moment when this particular temple, known for its multi-ethnic constituency, goes more fully into 'inclusive' mode. The temple association organises a multicultural food fair in which the cuisines of the congregation are represented. There are Lao, Thai, Burmese, Khmer, Sri Lankan and Malaysian-Chinese stalls. Beauty queens dressed in the national costumes of all of these groups compete, and the first prize diplomatically circulates among the communities year to year. Vietnamese food and dress are not usually represented, but one certainly bumps into Vietnamese visitors. One Vietnamese-Australian family group I chatted to visited Wat Pa Buddharangsee once a month on their regular round of visits to Theravada temples in Western Sydney, including Burmese and Khmer ones. Other Vietnamese people who frequent the Wat Pa Buddharangsee are not exclusively Theravada Buddhist, but combine worship here with visits to Mahayana temples as part of an ecumenical, not to say entrepreneurial, religious praxis. The presence of Vietnamese people in the crowd was marked at one *Bpii Mai* celebration by the playing of a 'greatest hits' CD from Vietnam over the PA. Unfortunately, the limits of the temple association's Indochinese cosmopolitanism was revealed when 'Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh', a revolutionary song guaranteed to upset people of Vietnamese refugee background, began to play at full volume.

Because of their shared Theravada faith, Lao and Khmer communities have a higher degree of interaction and cooperation than with the Vietnamese. The main Lao and Khmer temples in Fairfield LGA are situated close to each other in Bonnyrigg. The Khmer community succeeded before the Lao in establishing Wat Khemarangsaram in the 1990s, and the Khmer temple association subsequently advised the Lao community about matters such as securing a land grant from the NSW government and setting up a temple constitution and board. The precondition for securing a free lease through the Minister for Housing was that the land be designated not solely for religious use but for dual religious

and 'cultural' use by the community. The Khmer community helped the Lao navigate through the legal and administrative process, and the unfamiliar concept of establishing a temple and mixed-use building on the same grounds, and they were in the end successful in establishing Wat Phrayortkeo, which is almost within sight of the Khmer temple. Appropriately, the lawyer daughter of one of the key movers behind the Lao temple happens also to be married to a Khmer-Australian man. Ironically, both temples have since run into severe difficulties caused by disputes between the temple and cultural associations over the ownership and use of the multipurpose buildings, and the Sangha in both temples have expressed dissatisfaction with the idea of secular cultural activities being organised on what they see as temple grounds.

These hitches aside, members of the Lao and Kmher communities are mutually supportive and attend both temples during festivals around the rains retreat, Visak and especially Theravada New Year. There is some coordination among the various temples to stagger the day on which *Bpii Mai/Chnam Thmei* is celebrated to ensure that they are not competing for the same pool of attendees. Thus the crowd of some 3,000 people at the 2009 *Bpii Mai* festival at Wat Buddhalavarn, the smaller Lao temple in Wedderburn, near Campbelltown, was possibly one quarter Khmer.

Flexible ethnicity

In the course of this research I undertook many interviews with Cambodian-Australians who were practised in cosmopolitanism and flexible ethnicity prior to coming to Australia, either because of their hyphenated ethnicities, the experience of living on borders, or the exigencies of survival in and escape from Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea. The story of 'Hy' and 'Kara' is not atypical. They are ethnic Khmer sisters in their thirties, who

work together in the administration of an inner-city hospital. I chatted with them in Vietnamese and English at the Khmer Krom temple in Rossmore, Liverpool and was surprised by their native-sounding Vietnamese. They informed me they had acquired their language by osmosis while growing up in Svay Rieng, Cambodia, just across the border from Gò Dầu, Vietnam. The pair fled Cambodia in the late 1980s by making their way to Thailand. At that time, Khmers were no longer being granted refugee status quickly. In addition, the Khmer refugee camps were dangerous places because they were partly controlled by the Khmer Rouge and Khmer Royalists, who recruited from them, and were at times subject to shelling by Vietnamese troops from across the Cambodian side of the border. So Hy and Kara went to a Vietnamese refugee camp, where they passed themselves off as ethnic Vietnamese. Once safely settled in Australia, they reclaimed their Khmer identities.

My interviews suggest that the majority of Chinese-Cambodian refugees in Australia escaped the Pol Pot years by going to the border and 'passing' as Vietnamese. For a few months at the beginning of the Democratic Kampuchea period, while the Khmer Rouge and Hanoi were still cooperating, those of Vietnamese descent were permitted to make their way to the border and cross into Vietnam. Chinese-Cambodians, fluent to some degree in Vietnamese from their role as merchants and culture brokers, and in some cases having relatives in Vietnam (particularly in Chợ Lớn and the Mekong Delta), took advantage of the opportunity to present themselves at the Vietnamese border, where they were quizzed by Vietnamese troops about their origins. 'Hoa' recalls a night journey by boat through the Cambodian countryside into the Vietnamese border town of Hồng Ngự. Khmer Rouge troops along the banks stripped them of everything but gold and other small valuables they had sewn into the seams of their clothes. At Hồng Ngự, troops asked in Vietnamese for the names and surnames (*họ* and *tên*) of those in the boat. All were able to answer convincingly. In Hồng Ngự,

Hoa was met by her aunt, who still lives there to this day. Her most vivid memory of that night was being taken to eat the local version of *cháo* (rice porridge), which fittingly was (and still is) a unique and hybrid dish reflecting the Chinese, Vietnamese and Khmer elements that give this border town its distinct character.

Like many other Chinese-Cambodians, Hoa was taken in by relatives in Vietnam, in her case in Chợ Lớn. Others waited out the Democratic Kampuchea period in open refugee camps on the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City. The Chinese-Cambodian refugees I spoke to who lived in Vietnam during this period were not singled out for special surveillance or discrimination. Because of their family connections and capacity to pass as local, these people were able to keep a low profile but shared the hardships of post-war recovery and misguided experimentation with Stalinist central planning. It seems that few of these refugees remained in Vietnam. In Hoa's case, a marriage was arranged with a Chinese man in Paris. Others chose to escape 'back through Cambodia' once the fighting between Vietnam and Pol Pot's remnant forces lessened. Although still high-risk, Chinese-Cambodians took this route rather than leaving directly from Vietnam (as was far more common for both ethnic Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese-Vietnamese) drawing on their ability to operate in both Vietnamese and Khmer. Networks could then organise for them to be stowed away on Vietnamese military trucks entering Cambodia and make introductions to Khmer 'people smugglers' on the other side. The refugees trusted in their own ability to pass as Khmer-speaking locals on the other side of the border, and judged that there was less risk of capture and imprisonment in Cambodia than in Vietnam. Once they boarded boats on the western coast of Cambodia and made landfall in Thailand, many then strategised to avoid the Khmer camps and gain entry to the Vietnamese ones. In some cases they passed as Vietnamese for extended periods.

Cosmopolitans

Hoa, whose story is mentioned above, is of Teochiu origin. She was able to introduce me to many in her extensive network of Toechiu Cambodian friends and family living in Sydney. On visiting their houses and workplaces, I was constantly amazed by their capacity to operate in a number of cultural idioms, confirming a feeling I already had that Teochiu are indeed the exemplary Indochinese cosmopolitans. In one house, family members watched DVDs of the latest Vietnamese pop singers on their huge television set, and studio-quality family portraits taken in Saigon decorated the walls. In another house, a Cambodian man watched a Vietnamese television documentary about the Mekong River, bemused but not offended by the film crew's somewhat patronising take on 'exotic' Cambodia, and apparently enjoying the experience of watching this culturally encoded text simultaneously from contrapuntal vantage points. Still another interview was conducted in the back office of a hardware store in Canley Vale. The owner of the shop punctuated our interview with trips out to the counter to advise her shop assistants and deal with customers having complicated demands. She dealt confidently with both the technical and cultural aspects of interacting with the clientele of Indochinese and Lebanese tradesmen who came in the door in a constant stream. Intriguingly this woman, who is of Cambodian-Teochiu origin, was carrying on in Cabramatta what had been an ethnic niche industry for the Hokkien in Cambodia.[15]

Hoa herself worked for a local real estate business that was owned by Italian-Australians, descendants of an earlier wave of migrants who settled in the Fairfield LGA. Given the almost entirely Indochinese nature of the clientele, Hoa was a highly desirable employee, since she could speak to Lao, Khmer and Chinese customers in their own languages. She in fact speaks seven langauges: Teochiu, Cantonese, Mandarin, Khmer, Vietnamese, English and French (from her time in Paris). Hoa's

performative cosmopolitan skill is formidable. I have seen her present herself as an insider, and be accepted as such, by Khmer Krom monks, Vietnamese restaurateurs and Chinese-Cambodian businesspeople, in both Fairfield and Indochina. Yet Hoa has succeeded in converting this 'demotic' cosmopolitan cultural capital into economic capital only within the marginal economy of Fairfield LGA. A small number of Indochinese-Australians – and Luke Nguyen is the most prominent recent example – have carved a niche for themselves as interpreters of Indochinese culture to other Australians. However, the kind of practical cosmopolitanism Hoa embodies, grounded as it is in a working-class migrant milieu on the city's vulnerable fringe, is an entirely different kind of cultural knowledge, one unlikely to be recognised by the social or economic mainstream. Hoa finds herself working in the 'traditional' role of Indochinese-Teochiu, as intermediary between classes, ethnic groups and market sectors, and ironically also finds herself occupying the marginal economic position that many migrant Chinese did in the past.

I first met Hoa as an interviewee and was so impressed by her skills that I asked her to work as my research assistant in Vietnam and Cambodia. Through her, I met diasporic Khmers and Sino-Khmers in Phnom Penh who were opposition ministers and high-ranking public servants. In addition to playing the political game they speculated in real estate around the margins of the city. Arriving in Bavet, a casino-studded border town on the highway between Ho Chi Minh City and Phnom Penh, Hoa immediately activated one of her Cabramatta connections to get us free accommodation. The owners of one of the casinos, it transpired, were a Chinese-Cambodian couple Hoa knew from 'Cabra'. They had made their money with a famous Chinese restaurant on John Street, and invested some of it in this casino on the Cambodia-Vietnam border. Apparently they were yet to become fabulously rich from this cottage-industry version of transnational capitalism – they professed that as yet they were

merely breaking even on the good months – but clearly they had sufficiently impressive local connections to navigate their way through the maze of legal permissions, patron-client obligations and bribery necessary to establish this enterprise. On the staff and customer service side of things, the couple's fluency in Vietnamese was also invaluable, as the vast majority of gamblers and a good number of the workers in Bavet are from across the border in Tay Ninh. Naturally the casinos supply Vietnamese food, but the 'Cabra' couple that ran the casino we stayed in were well enough versed in Vietnamese culture to know that they had to supply vegetarian food options as well. Hoa and I expressed dismay at the idea that people engaged in gambling would continue religious observances, but our hosts assured us that it was so, thus teaching the anthropologist something about culture.

Venturing up the road to another casino, we were reminded again of the links between this strange border zone and the Indochinese contact zone of Fairfield. In the largest casino in Bavet, one owned by a Korean consortium (where we went to cadge the free food and beer), a respectable-looking middle-aged Vietnamese woman sidled up to our table. She asked Hoa if she would ask me in English whether she could borrow some money from the 'foreign gentleman'. When I replied in Vietnamese, she acknowledged the game was up with a wry smile, and began to chat with us. It turned out that she was friends with one of the owners of another casino on the strip, a Vietnamese-Australian who also owned a restaurant in Cabramatta, a favoured place to hold wedding receptions. The woman had recently spent a few months there visiting her children. Sadly, she is a true gamblaholic. She informed us that her husband had divorced her because of this vice, and she had gambled away the two houses she got in the divorce settlement. Despite this melancholy tale, and the depression born of having lost all one's money, we all experienced a brief glow of fraternity as Hoa established that she did indeed know this woman's children, and had visited their

house. The sense of transnational intimacy in that otherwise alienating, intimidating place has stayed with me as a vivid impression. It was a demotic milieu indeed, yet an unmistakably worldly one.

Conclusion

This glimpse into my ethnography of Fairfield LGA (and its transnational annexes), framed as an Indochinese contact zone, reveals a rich field of intercommunal practices. Some of the interactions we have looked at are most definitely not cosmopolitan, and it would be idealistic to deny that parochialisms or even hatreds continue to inform relations between Indochinese-Australian communities and individuals in Western Sydney. On the other hand, we have encountered practices, identities, cultural products and social sub-fields (religion, food, etc.) that are undeniably cosmopolitan, albeit sometimes in a demotic idiom. The ethnography contains evidence of the historical continuity and reinvention of both the nationalist and 'hybrid' traditions of Indochinese cultural contact, as well as demonstrating that these traditions are subject to transformations wrought by the Australian context. The possibility of making such observations, it should be noted, requires an ethnographic strategy that is capable of situating migrants locally and transnationally, and in the present as well as the past. Hence the use of a multi-sited fieldwork model, and research emphasis on migratory histories as well as contemporary practices and identifications.

We began with the question of whether migrant cosmopolitanisms and multicultural subjectivities based on minoritarian cultural crossings in fact exist in Sydney's spaces of diversity, and whether such configurations of identity might challenge the centrality of the host nation/minority structure that organises Australian multiculturalism. I believe that the

material presented above shows evidence for the existence in Fairfield LGA of a robust zone of what Amanda Wise[16] calls 'transversal' contact among Indochinese-Australians. Such zones are without doubt products of the Australian multicultural context, but they also have historical and extraterritorial logics which themselves transcend and transform that context.

It is indeed true that many first-generation and some second-generation Indochinese-Australians lack English skills or have little 'mainstream' cultural capital, for instance, in terms of knowledge of the high (or even the popular) culture of the host nation, or the ability to engage in consumerist multiculturalism. However, this failure to engage with majority Australian culture, or to engage with it in a way that is visible or recognisable from the mainstream point of view, clearly does not mean that Indochinese subjects live in monocultural bubbles. We tend to think about 'resistance' to assimilation in terms of retreat into the home culture. This research shows that reluctance, inability or refusal to engage with the host culture does not necessarily mean that migrant subjects are not exploring other intercultural possibilities. The standard political economic perspective on Fairfield as a 'vulnerable community of the urban/metropolitan fringe' excluded from the benefits of globalisation[17] does not take into account the grassroots engagement with globalisation that is represented by the intercultural knowledges and transnational connections that refugees and migrants have brought to the area. These interculturalisms are certainly not popularly thought of (if they are ever thought of at all) as being paradigmatic or even desirable forms of multiculturalism. Yet such minor cosmopolitanisms, locally at least, potentially act to decentre the majority culture of the host nation as that which defines 'virtuous multiculturalism', and confers and indexes the status of 'cosmopolitan'; replacing them instead with situated, specific and transnationally negotiated versions of what it means to live alongside and interact with the Other in multi-racial Western Sydney.

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Notes

1 Notes from my field research in Western Sydney, 2008. Listen to Tahir's prank call at your own peril: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMPwZRCXWqg>

2 A. Wise, 'Everyday multiculturalism: transversal crossings and working class cosmopolitans', in A. Wise & S. Velayutham (eds), *Everyday Multiculturalism*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 21–45.

3 Singaporean multiculturalism overtly polices the boundaries between the major ethnic communities through means such as 'mother tongue' language

education policy. Thus it would be very difficult for an ethnically Indian Singaporean to study Mandarin in primary or secondary school. In the case of the children of mixed marriages, the primary language of education for the child is arbitrarily based on the father's 'mother tongue', thus limiting the parents' ability to define the family's ethnicity in the way they might desire. In the Australian case, we can argue that the 'policing' of migrant assimilation is performed in a less formal way, via means such as pronouncements made in the public sphere by influential government and media actors, and censure and withholding of recognition in everyday social practice.

4 U. Hannerz, 'Cosmopolitans and locals in world culture.' *Theory, Culture & Society*, vol. 7, nos. 2/3, 1996, pp. 237–251. Hannerz, *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places*, Routledge, London & New York, 1996. P. Werbner, 'Global pathways: working class cosmopolitans and the creation of transnational ethnic worlds', *Social Anthropology*, vol. 7, no. 1, 1999, pp. 17–35. Werbner, 'Cosmopolitans, anthropologists and labour migrants: deconstructing transnational cultural promiscuity', Paper presented at the Humanities Research Centre, The Australian National University, 23 April 2004.

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11 Scholars in the US find the term 'Indochinese' problematic, and tend to speak more of individual communities of Lao, Khmers, Vietnamese, Hmong, and even a separate community of Chinese-Vietnamese. This approach is justified in part by the somewhat schizogenic settlement patterns of these communities in the US, and in part by a distaste for the perceived colonial resonances of the term. In the Australian context, by contrast, this colonial-sounding word arguably remains relevant because the patterns of settlement and interaction of the communities have made it so. Distinct but historically interrelated experiences of war, flight, resettlement and community formation have sustained and enhanced a sense of cultural intimacy between the various groups. The (re)establishment of this zone of cultural contact has arguably

assisted Indochinese refugees to build a homely space in Australia, and has provided a realm open to cultural exploration by tentative cosmopolitans for whom access to the host culture, and that of other minorities in their neighbourhood, has been blocked off, be it subjectively or objectively.

12 W. E. Willmott, *The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia*, Humanities Press, New York, 1970.

13 D. Hiebert, 'Cosmopolitanism at the local level: the development of transnational neighbourhoods', in S. Vertovec & R. Cohen (eds), *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice,* Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 209–226.

14 See Khmerkrom.net, Khmerkrom.org, khmerkromngo.org.

15 W. E. Willmott, *The Chinese in Cambodia,* University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1967.

16 Wise, p. 1.

17 S. Baum, P. Mullins, R. Stimson & K. O'Connor, 'Communities of the postindustrial city', *Urban Affairs Review*, vol. 37, no. 3, 2002, p. 343.

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Cross-country cosmopolitanism: openness, place, contamination

Jesse Shipway

Openness

Within what might be called the political field, the subject who is without name or rank, a stranger perhaps to herself as well as others, an absolute stranger even but at home nonetheless in the *kosmos* as 'order, ornament, world'[1], conducts herself as autonomous *for* herself and, in doing so, is disposed, in a more or less open manner, to the others she encounters and knows. The silent 'other' who is designated here might be conspicuous by virtue of her race, or her clothing, her accent, or her gender or even her sexuality. Whatever the difference she seems to epitomise, this *other* faces the subject and demands a response.

The degree to which we are open to the other effects our interpersonal relations in a fundamental way. It can coordinate and direct our orientations, inform our opinions, give content to snap summations and imbue instant impressions with a decisive valency: I hate you/I like you; I grew here/You flew here; You're like me/You're not like me; I belong here/You have no right to be here.

I would like to claim that if this characterisation of openness to the other conduces to the truth in Tasmania it will also apply elsewhere, in Mexico City say, or Brazzaville. Which is also to say that cosmopolitanism, with its definitive emphasis on openness, is largely the same kind of phenomenon wherever it is played out. The decisive cosmopolitan antinomy – people are open or people are closed – is, I would like to suggest, a non-place-specific formulation. In a different language it might even be called universal.

Don't human beings discriminate in their essence? Aren't we all predisposed to separating other human beings into the basic categories of friend and enemy? Aren't we all at least a little bit wary of strangers – suspicious, superstitious even? And before that, more intimately, don't we take care to identify our loved ones, families and neighbours, singling them out from the crowd of faces that confronts us?

From the moment we are born, we enact and then articulate more or less unconscious hierarchies of care, hierarchies of *being* as care and engagement. We construct universes of moral obligation and act, for the most part, from the known, navigable reaches of those universes. This choosing is only voluntaristic in the weakest sense. It is, one might say, the degree zero of free will as the right but not the obligation or even the capacity necessarily to deliberate rationally. We are, of course, embedded without consent in our familial *chora*. We bond with our loved ones before we are reasonable. Love of this kind is the opposite of reason and is constitutive of the subject as much as it is constituted by the subject qua subject.

And we hate just as vehemently, just as clinically. How profound and intense are the processes of splitting and renunciation that lead to ethnic cleansing and mass graves, to the complete abrogation of responsibility toward an *other* who is consigned to pariah status, scapegoated, objectified in the strongest sense, dehumanised, ostracised, exiled. We care, when we do, with prejudice and preference and a variable intensity

that wanes and flags as the objects of (dis)affection become more remote. I think here of a set of concentric circles or ripples on a pond radiating out from around a sinking stone cast by an unknown hand. Distant suffering is seldom felt in the bones. Even so, the openness to the other as radical other, the one whose face Levinas has famously described, must imply a constitutive capacity on the part of the subject to *be open* to the other, as other, as distant other, as absolute stranger even. And it is also useful here to think of Kenneth Surin's distinction between the *subjectum*, Kant's republican citizen who is more or less free, and the *subjectus* who operates under a kind of self-inflicted tutelage.

> The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep…most important of all he regarded this state of affairs as normal. Certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further improvement.[2]

I mention freedom here at the beginning of this chapter because, as I read the situation, cosmopolitanism must be freely chosen if it is to hold any significant emancipatory or redemptive value. In fact, I wish to claim that openness to the other and capacious tolerance as endogenous, instinctive properties or tendencies are perhaps, in their own right, not as significant as the hard won decision to switch from the *non-cosmopolitan* to the *cosmopolitan* world view, to choose openness and broadmindedness voluntarily, that is, over insularity, homophobia, xenophobia or misanthropy. In other words, if we seek to promote the cosmopolitan cause, there is little use in preaching heterogeneity to the multicultural converted.

To continue the argument, a 'liberal' dose of what Isaiah Berlin called 'positive freedom' seems to be required to generate and sustain the cosmopolitan orientation. We must be free to think of others' needs, free to recognise difference and diversity,

free to imagine a common humanity hidden beneath superficial racial or religious differences.

One of the major lines of inquiry I develop in this chapter concerns the distinction between the cosmopolis and the township. As a number of writers have made clear, for the first time in world history more human beings live in urban centres than the countryside. The township is on the back foot. And freedom is to blame. Free markets have accelerated urban growth and reduced employment in agricultural production. The free flow of information has brought the country to the city and opened people's eyes to change, affluence and, to quote the poet Andrew Sant, 'speed and other liberties.'[3] Relaxed restrictions on internal migration have given more people the right to move 'freely' from the township to the cosmopolis. In simplistic terms, as we have become more free we have also freely chosen to become more urban and thus, also perhaps, more cosmopolitan.

The 'stereotypical' cosmopolitan 'citizen' tolerates, celebrates and embraces the habits and *habitus* of the multifarious human beings who have come to dwell in the same *topos* as herself. In these terms, to be cosmopolitan is to be familiar with the world, to know its variety, to have travelled widely, to be willing to try the new foods, music, clothing and so on that come *here* from somewhere else. On this view, cosmopolitanism also names a fundamental openness to alterity that goes beyond nations and ethnicities to the other factors or strata of identity formation such as gender, sexuality, age, disability and so on.

> Foot passengers, jostling one another's umbrellas, in a general infection of ill-temper, and losing their foot-hold at street-corners, where tens of thousands of other foot passengers have been slipping and sliding since the day broke (if this day ever broke), adding new deposits to the crust upon crust of mud, sticking at those points tenaciously to the pavement, and accumulating at compound interest.[4]

Maintaining full empathetic openness to the other, though, has always been demanding. Politically, we might speak of recognition primarily in the present tense, but a good test of academic openness has always also been historical in nature. For instance, Carlo Ginzburg's reconstitution of the inner world of Menocchio – the sixteenth-century miller in *The Cheese and the Worms* – is primarily a work of the imagination, a work, that is, of a human faculty that is sometimes neglected and even maligned by those who more readily appreciate the value of straightforward, practical intelligence. This 'humanist' imagination is empathetic, convivial, reconstructive, curious, rare and even perverse. It sometimes drives obscure, economically dubious imperatives such as Stephen Greenblatt's 'wish to speak with the dead' that framed his *Shakespearean Negotiations*. In postcolonial studies too, the gulf between subject and object of knowledge is sometimes held to be intractable and the demands on the empathic imagination too great to be overcome. In his essay, 'Proximity: from asymptote to zeugma', Alan Lawson uses those eponymous rhetorical figures to symbolise the impossibility of seeing from the perspective of the Aboriginal other and of imaginatively inhabiting the body of the interrogated subject.

The cosmopolitan urge to understand, to tolerate and to remain open to difference in all its synchronic and diachronic variety, also structures a popular Whigish narrative in which the Enlightenment West is portrayed as moving inexorably from an insular past to an open, capacious future. Constructions of the non-cosmopolitan past thus serve a similar function to the science fiction narratives whose fictional futures allow us to rethink our own present as the past of an imagined world that is yet to come.

It certainly seems at times as if the rush to frame the past as obdurately non-cosmopolitan is motivated by a desire to imagine our present as an incremental stop along the way to the fully cosmopolitan future. What is clear from Ginzburg's work and from Greenblatt's too is that the past *is* another country, and

that they *do* do things differently there. Equally it seems that the openness to the other that inspires some of the finer works of the humanist imagination within the disciplines of history, literary criticism and postcolonial studies is not unrelated to the openness to the other that is so central to cosmopolitan theory and practice. A good humanist scholar then might just be one who can truly be said to *tolerate* the past.

The leap through time that would denaturalise late capitalist individualism and enable an uninhibited communion with the historical other has a synchronic equivalent: the act of recognising a different kind of other concurrently, in our own time, in our own practice of everyday life, as a human being with as rich an inner life as we possess ourselves. And of course, if we recognise the essential equality of ourselves and our others, we must also tacitly grant those others the same kinds of rights and responsibilities that we enjoy. If we ostracise them or make them invisible we are refusing this affinity. If we poke fun at their customs and demand through our strength of numbers that they conform to our own mores, we close ourselves off to the possibilities of cosmopolitanism.

In this context then, the repudiation of the right of any 'other' to the rights one claims for oneself is the anti-cosmopolitan gesture *par excellence*. Such a repudiation is almost certainly going to be driven by the hermetic, insular logic of boundedness, homogeneity and separatism. But when exclusivist or fundamentalist positions are not shackled to extreme projects such as 'ethnic cleansing' or institutionalised racism, they tend to be expressed in ordinary meanness. As such, most anti-cosmopolitan gestures are small, mundane and curmudgeonly.

Equally, bestowing the right to claim a right on the excluded other outside of formal legislative or juridical settings doesn't have to be an earth-shattering act. It can mean simply looking at or talking to a stranger in the same way one would interact with any other citizen. Recognition of this kind can be considered a cosmopolitan act of 'generosity', but I would like to contend

here that such a gesture is not necessarily as generous as it first seems. The offer of recognised equality and co-humanity really only embodies a weak generosity, it seems to me, in so far, as nothing is actually given up when the offer of recognition is made. The other may accept this recognition with gratitude but the subject who gives it has lost nothing in the transaction. In fact they might even be said to gain from the exchange – they can now ground and sustain a more fulsome humanitarian self-regard and may even be able to look forward to living in a more harmonious society. Later perhaps they might be struck by the ambiguity of their new situation. If I'm not actually *better* than this other who I previously defined myself against, how then *am* I in relation to them? What is my dasein in relation to them? What is my being when it is not a negatively defined *not-being*? The clarity of paranoid schizoid ideology, splitting and hatred is followed, according to Melanie Klein, by depressive ambivalence. Perhaps this cosmopolitan equality of recognition renders us all finally in the same shades of grey.

I think it's highly likely that the hegemon who gives the gift of recognition will, in the end, have given as much to themselves as they have given to the newcomer or fringe dweller that has been brought into the fold. Which is not to say that this sort of situation cannot enable a more substantial symbolic transaction. When the individual who habitually elevates herself above a group of marginalised people surrenders her idealised, smug and superior self-image, then and perhaps *only* then, has something of value been sacrificed in the cosmopolitan conversion. This strikes me as the most meaningful kind of cosmopolitanism; chosen cosmopolitanism, hard-won cosmopolitanism, sacrificial cosmopolitanism.

Another kind of weak openness to difference is the culture-as-consumer-choice scenario. Here, invariably, wealthy customers partake of a smorgasbord of ethnic foods, clothes, music and so on, comparing and contrasting the flavours of the world on shopping expeditions to air-conditioned malls or tours

of holiday towns in the sunnier corners of the globe. Just as unpromising is the patronising 'welcome mat' cosmopolitanism laid out by the conscientious citizen revelling in her role as 'national' host. In this last mode, the right to bestow a right also reveals one of the basic limits of cosmopolitanism as it seems to manifest most commonly, and exposes it also as emergent at best and marginal at worst. Simply put, it would be regarded as odd to expect Muslim refugees to Australia to make a statement fundamentally recognising the rights of Anglo-Celtic Australians with generational ties to the country to reside here with them. The cosmopolitan white Australian, on the other hand, is given the 'opportunity' to prove her open-mindedness by welcoming her 'new' compatriots with open arms. The newcomer has little choice but to accept the embrace with the self-conscious awkwardness of second-class belonging.

Cosmopolis

The adjective 'cosmopolitan' is sometimes used to designate a state of affairs in which people of different colours, creeds and kinds co-mingle in a loosely demarcated location or jurisdiction called a *cosmopolis*. I imagine the cosmopolis as a vast commercial city that hectically blends the third and first worlds, the old and the new, the sacred and the profane. I picture it as a place where everything – bodies, bonds, briefcases – has its price, where traders hawk exotic wares from earthenware jars (saffron, betel nut, frankincense) where a polyglot cacophony of languages thrums and throbs in the dust and gasoline haze, where salary men trade securities on their iPhones and Armani punks walk three pugs at a time, where billboards spin and flicker and reflections are caught in the blacked out glass of passing limousines.

This cosmopolis is a fantastical beast, a chimera or a gryphon, part *Blade Runner*, part *Mad Max Beyond Thunderdome*, part

Dickension London, part *Manhattan Transfer,* part *The Sheltering Sky*, part *American Psycho*. It is a restaging of Italo Calvino's *Invisible Cities*, Augustine's *City of God*, a composite of the real and the imagined, a vision of paradise and of torment, a zone of freedom and of imprisonment, a site of virtue and a site of vice. Cosmopolis *is* and *is to come*. It invites fervent speculation or, as Walter Mignolo writes, 'Let's assume then that globalization is a set of designs to manage the world while cosmopolitanism is a set of projects toward planetary conviviality.'[5]

Cosmopolis is *real* even though it doesn't exist. And it is also not just mine. The human imagination seldom speaks in a private language. The texts from which 'my' cosmopolis are pieced together mobilise the scopic regimes of both literature and film and have a social life that is enduring. They are not moribund, in other words, but are waiting instead to be re-animated in art and story. With this 'real unreality' in mind, I would like to contend that the intensity of the lurid, exotic fiction of 'my' cosmopolis is an index of the desire that drives it, a desire that is not mine alone either but emerges more properly from what Fredric Jameson called 'the *political* unconscious'. The cosmopolis is wanted so vividly, its attraction has generated so many high definition cultural images, precisely because its absence – wherever that absence is felt – makes the non-cosmopolitan subject feel so lousy and left out.

Except, of course, for when it doesn't. I would like to contend here that the constitutive outside to the cosmopolis is to be found in the countryside and the township and even in the small city that has already made some progress toward attaining cosmopolitan status. These are the cosmopolis's others: samey, familiar, hokey, daggy, comforting, claustrophobic, stifling, narrow-minded and prissy:

> In the soft, unseasonable warmth the village seemed comfortable and homelike – not dignified, not impressive, certainly not beautiful, but not unattractive. One saw few signs either of

> private wealth or of public spirit. Not only was there nothing ostentatious, the whole look of the place was informal and a little unkempt – like the kitchen of an easy-going but really not slovenly housekeeper. A city person might even have found the scene rather sordid, but to me it suggested comfort and a certain indifference to appearance.[6]

Comforting but unglamorous, sordid and cloying, even, from the perspective of the cosmopolitan, the township is a place to grow up and a place to retire to. It's not necessarily such a great place to make 'something of yourself', or at least not for one of Granville Hicks' 'city people', something I suppose that I had become, at least partly, after spending a couple of years studying and working in Melbourne, a city that aspires to cosmopolitan status even as it offers up substantial resources of suburban insularity. My own home town of Hobart has long been shaped by a variation on the logic of the excluded middle – the running joke of a few years back, when population decline was starting to feel permanent, envisaged the place as a 'a nursery and a retirement home in a national park'. We only half laughed.

Hobart's demographic profile is often represented as an apple core – lots of kids and oldies but not much in between. Which also means fewer bookshops, publishing companies, film production outfits, architects' offices, law firms doing interesting work and so on. Above all else it still feels overwhelmingly as if culture comes to Hobart from somewhere else, a more cosmopolitan elsewhere that is somehow both local *and* universal, while Hobart can never escape its irrelevant particularity. My wife and I returned from Melbourne in our mid-twenties to raise children in close contact with our extended families, to buy an affordable house and to 'give back to our local community'. Which is more or less what we did: our children are now happily ensconced in South Hobart Primary School, a five minute walk down the road from our house; our parents seem

to like having us around, (my wife's live next door and mine are in neighbouring suburbs); and our neighbours are an invaluable source of borrowed ladders and socket sets. Not a day goes by though when I don't think of friends who have moved to glamorous cities like London and New York and imagine what shape my own life might have taken if I had stayed away just a little bit longer.

I suppose I am, if nothing else, a product of my times. Indeed, numerous writers have commented on the seismic shift that is making, or might indeed have already made, the city into the 'natural' habitat for humans in the twenty-first century. Who, we are forced to ask ourselves now, would stay in the dreary, hard-graft township when the neon bustle beckons?

> Sometime in the next year or two, a woman will give birth in the Lagos slum of Ajegunle, a young man will flee his village in West Java for the bright lights of Jakarta, or a farmer will move his impoverished family into one of Lima's innumerable *pueblos jovenes*. The exact event is unimportant and it will pass entirely unnoticed. Nonetheless it will constitute a watershed in human history, comparable to the Neolithic or Industrial revolutions. For the first time the urban population of the earth will outnumber the rural.[7]

From the sprawling port and government town where I am writing this, a village in West Java sounds pretty cosmopolitan but that's probably a mistaking of the realities of the object with the flavour of the intercession of observer and observed that would be brought out if I was to plonk my own 'modern' Western ways of doing things down in the middle of the Indonesian countryside. The exotic – which is a more or less subjective category – should probably not be confused with the cosmopolitan, which seems to tend more toward the objective and the empirically verifiable. How many people live in your town? How many restaurants are there? What is the ethnic mix?

Do you have an opera house? A financial district? A fashion week? Any racist hate crimes lately? The Hobart authorities obfuscate of course when it comes to staking a cosmopolitan claim. To be not-quite cosmopolitan might be worse a fate than to be way off the mark:

> A short stroll from any of the major hotels or transit points you'll find Tasmania's premier commercial centre Hobart's CBD. A lively, friendly destination with that magical blend of pavement, arcade and centre shopping, providing easy access to national department stores, fashion outlets, Tasmanian souvenirs and crafts and a cosmopolitan cafe society.[8]

Hobart is, in fact, a good focus for concentrating our thinking about the way in which cosmopolitanism is staged beyond the city walls of the demonstrable and self-evident cosmopolis. Hobart presents a good snapshot of what happens when openness, diversity, cafes and subcultures spread to the cosmopolitan township, or, indeed, the compact cosmopolitan city, but still run up against relative poverty, isolation, jingoism and boorishness. Its population is diverse for one thing, it offers a decent range of cultural pursuits from speedway racing to ten-pin bowling to orchestras and art galleries, it even has a couple of restaurant strips where you can get a Vietnamese laksa or a Turkish kebab. However, even though Hobart may have some of the characteristics of a cosmopolitan city, the sheer fact of its small size makes that urbanity feel paper thin, forced even, as if co-ordinated remotely by some well-meaning federal bureaucrat in a far off (and genuinely cosmopolitan) centre. My Croatian barber (he came here in 1961 and has been cutting hair out of the same premises in Liverpool Street for 45 years), tells me that back in the 60s, Hobart was busier and more vibrant than it is now. The trains were still running then and the suburban shopping malls in Glenorchy, Clarence and Kingston hadn't been constructed. Hobart was a genuine, bustling commercial

centre in miniature. 'You had to wait an hour for a cappuccino,' he tells me, 'Everyone loved that Italian stuff.'

> So what is it that defines the workable scope of a community of trust? Rootless cosmopolitanism is fine for intellectuals but most people live in a place defined by space, by time, by language, perhaps by religion, maybe – however regrettably – by colour and so forth.[9]

Cosmopolitan dreams wrestle with the angel of chauvinism. Dreams of purity wrestle with the spectre of miscegenation. Harmony and cooperation, the brotherhood of man, *The Last Whole Earth Catalogue*, visions of unity, cooperation and collaboration, United Nations and free-trade zones, borderless states, liberty in the strongest sense, ecumenical tolerance – can all be considered expressions of the cosmopolitan urge. Old scores unsettled, family feuds, long held animosities, self-righteousness, bigotry, entrenched power, property rights, Jim Crow laws, patriotism, civic duty, homeland, the two-state solution and native title are all about boundaried separatism. I wish to contend here that this duality can be imported into a spatial imaginary that codes cities – especially large cities with dense and numerous trade links to other parts of the world – as cosmopolitan, while assigning the status of provinciality, homogeneity or backwardness to the countryside and smaller regional cities and towns. This transposition however does not necessarily endorse or recuperate the dualistic distribution of political valency sometimes assigned to the cosmopolitical versus the bounded where the former is held up as an unalloyed good – progressive, enlightened, forward looking – while the latter is consigned to anachronistic irrelevance as retrograde, conformist and stifling. For one, there are some well-known examples of cosmopolitan diversity to be found in smaller human settlements – take Broome in Western Australia with its large Aboriginal population and community of Chinese

pearlers or the thriving municipality of Kingborough, south of Hobart, with its prominent Dutch community. And second, while smaller settlements may not offer a dizzying array of cuisines, museums or red-light districts, they do still have their own virtues, some of which actually derive from the very same anti-cosmopolitan characteristics that are derided by the flashy, accelerated folk from the city:

> In thoroughfares nigh the docks, any considerable seaport will frequently offer to view the queerest looking nondescripts from foreign parts. Even in Broadway and Chestnut streets, Mediterranean mariners will sometimes jostle the affrighted ladies. Regent Street is not unknown to Lascars and Malays; and at Bombay, in the Apollo Green, live Yankees have often scared the natives. But New Bedford beats all Water Street and Wapping. In these last mentioned haunts you see only sailors; but in New Bedford, actual cannibals stand chatting at street corners; savages outright many of whom yet carry on their bones unholy flesh. It makes a stranger stare.[10]

Smaller communities need not by necessity be hotbeds of patriotism, boosterism, insularity, intolerance or prejudice. They may offer instead a still-intact safety net of residual social relations and duties of care, intimacy, familiarity and mutual support that larger centres have long since dispensed with. Beggars and drug addicts are cosmopolitan – conspicuous like consumption, they are often concealed in the more modest, bashful township – well-supported local football games with cars parked up against the oval are not. The cosmopolis that vouchsafes the seductive offer, 'Be what you wanna be, do what you wanna do', also says, 'don't expect us to clean up after you when things get messy.' Cities are lonely. Towns are suffocating. Neither is perfect.

The free and easy cosmopolis with its kaleidoscope of sights and sounds, performances and spectacles masks a carelessness

and indifference that is more than skin deep. It may even be an enabling detachment. In a true cosmopolis, citizens (denizens?) can do what they want precisely because nobody really cares what they do. From this angle, the cosmopolis will applaud divagations from the norm when they lead to a lucrative and successful Mardi Gras parade or a soccer league or even a souvlaki shop, but when people fail, it will promptly ensure that they become as invisible as everyone else. A truly cosmopolitan acceptance of economic diversity is still yet to come and may, after 30 or 40 years of neo-liberalism, have been pushed even further out of reach. Which reminds us of course of the argument that the so-called cosmopolitan diversity in first world cities actually masks a massive exploitation of third world or 'Southern' regions. Magdalena Nowicka and Maria Rovisco alert us here to critical readings of triumphalist 'notions of cosmopolitical coexistence' that have little time for:

> (The) vision of a cosmopolitan global public sphere which remains oblivious of the neo-liberal logic of global capitalism, especially with regards to the imbalance in power relations created by an allegedly cosmopolitan North that is sustained by global exploitation.[11]

In one now-clichéd figure, free-market economics pictures the individual subject as a 'rational, utility maximiser' The human actor left to his own devices must succeed or fail in an indifferent society (economy) where competition is the dominant behavioural mode. If he fails there is no safety net to catch him before he hits the ground. Opportunity and risk are maximised. In the township on the other hand, support networks abound. People cooperate. Reputations are valued and valuable. Gossip spreads around. Familial ties offer extra-market solutions to housing and other problems. The family firm is still intact. In this sense the following figure might be of use:

	Cosmopolis	Township
Good	Open	Supportive
Bad	Oblivious	Closed

Figure 1: Compromised Habitations

But this is a schematisation and also a generalisation. The picture on the ground is more detailed and variegated. Anonymity, for instance, is one of the cardinal virtues of the cosmopolis and something coveted with particular vehemence by émigré's from the township. To be free to fashion the self in the company of others rather than under the watchful eye of others, free to renew and to be renewed, free to find support in affinity groups of one's own choosing, achieved instead of ascribed status: these are virtues of the cosmopolis. Maybe the embrace of the township is more like a straitjacket. Think again of the way we greet the other in incidental interactions. How do we see them? How do they see us? How do we judge without judgement? Maintaining a genuine openness that doesn't engulf us is not an easy task.

Contamination

I would like to conclude by pursuing a line of argument that might help draw together the other threads that run through this chapter. I suggested above that cosmopolitanism is enmeshed in a series of more or less binary relationships with other terms. I looked in some depth, for instance, at the idea of the cosmopolis versus the township. I considered the open cosmopolitan society versus the closed provincial culture. I contrasted universalism with bounded separatism and conceptual clarity with epistemological murkiness. There is, however, another

direction in which the semantic energies generated by the term cosmopolitan take us. The etymological root of cosmopolitan is, of course, cosmos, a word that the *Australian Oxford Dictionary* defines as 'the universe esp. as a well ordered whole, an ordered system of ideas and the sum total of experience'.[12] Notice here the emphasis on order and consider the often caricatured line of anti-cosmopolitan resistance – Pauline Hanson's 'Migrants just don't blend in' – that bewails the flux and diversity, the disorder, in other words, that seems to be part and parcel of the cosmopolitan configuration. In *Cosmopolitanism*, Kwame Anthony Appiah dedicates an entire chapter to describing some of the lineaments of this phenomenon that he neatly entitles 'Cosmopolitan contamination'. Contamination, with its implication of a soiled or diluted purity, is a useful phrase to capture the felt effects of unwanted change inflicted on townships and provincial locations in the name of cosmopolitan progress. Appiah writes of his home city of Asante:

> Above all relationships are changing. When my father was young, a man in a village would farm some land that a chief had granted him, and his *abusua*, his matriclan, (including his younger brothers) would work it for him. If extra hands were needed in the harvest season, he would pay the migrant workers who came from the north. When a new house needed building, he would organize it. He would also make sure his dependents were fed and clothed, the children educated, marriages and funerals arranged and paid for. He could expect to pass the farm and the responsibilities eventually to one of his nephews. Nowadays everything has changed. Cocoa prices have not kept pace with the cost of living. Gas prices have made the transportation of the crop more expensive. And there are new possibilities for the young in the towns, in other parts of the country, and in other parts of the world.[13]

This is surely not an unfamiliar story. The future of cosmopolitanism, turns, it seems to me, on whether its

consolidation in global cities and its arrival in townships and provincial centres and even in the countryside itself are experienced primarily and then decisively as contamination or cure. If the excitement and opportunity of open universalism trump the safety and security of bounded separatism then our global future is probably cosmopolitan. If not, we may see a reversion to traditional, exceptionalist communities or some other newer form may emerge that sutures coherence and continuity over new forms of possibly subcultural identity. Whatever happens we cannot be absolutely certain that cosmopolitanism does not carry within itself an auto-negation, a shadow, the seeds, in other words, of its own destruction. The truly open society when taken to its logical conclusion might also be the indeterminate, random, anomic, entropic dystopia glimpsed in films like *A Clockwork Orange*, *Soylent Green*, *Batman* and *Children of Men*? Can the cosmopolitan centre really hold, in other words, or, as Yeats asked of another place at another time, will it ascend to a dismal hegemony where pseudo-diversity reigns and yet another kind of 'mere anarchy is loosed upon the world?'

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Love on the streets

Mary Zournazi

The match

In this essay, I convey a short anecdote that explores ideas of love, community and belonging. In mid-2004, I found myself in the midst of European football fever. I have never been a soccer fan nor really much interested in sports, but in that year, the UEFA championship saw the two finalists, Greece and Portugal, share a spirit that translated into a shared love of the game. But even more than that, it saw what might be usually called patriotic fervour transform into a spirit of love and joy on the streets of Marrickville and Petersham, where I lived, suburbs at the heart of Greek and Portuguese communities. In that same year it felt that Australia was reaching a point of cultural divisiveness – it was a post-9/11 environment with the coalition government focused on international terror and national security, alongside strong public reactions to asylum seekers and refugees. Much hope for more compassionate and even generous public spaces seemed to be evaporating as peoples' responses to each other became tainted by misinformation and fear.

Amidst this feeling, the European football final felt like an event that showcased in a strangely paradoxical way the best of the 'Australian way of life' – coming, most unlikely, from the fringes and the streets. Greece and Portugal had never been in a major soccer final and they were the most unlikely of teams to be international sporting heroes. Combined with this underdog status, the very fact that soccer is not generally considered 'football' in Australia and that it is often considered foreign and exotic, the lived experience of this event seemed to put the 'Aussie battler' and 'fair go' myth in a very different light. Even more so, since these colloquialisms were used extensively during the Coalition government's reign to separate people rather than bring people together in a spirit of generosity and good faith.

The European football finals got me thinking of patriotism at its best as the displays of love of country and of the game saw different communities come together and share the thrill of participation in the event. But I tell this story not in terms of fans or patriotism or identity, rather what I convey is a story of what exists when identities dissolve and bonds of love and community emerge. What occurred during the time of the football finals felt very special and unique in my experience of Australian cultural life, which is not to deny the violence and aggressive forms of patriotism that can take place at a football match. What I reflect on here is a brief moment in time when the 'paradoxical plurality' of our humanness, that is, the recognition of our uniqueness and difference was ever-present and communal.

Effervescence – a spirit of love

My most vivid recollection of the build-up to the football finals was waking in the early hours of the morning to the ecstatic cries of my neighbours. Through the passionate shrills and shrieks of their voices that seemed to defy the normal human vocal range, I followed the highs and lows of the game. I felt

the excitement even though I was not in front of a television and despite the fact that my knowledge of the game, the team and the players was minimal. But as each game was played, the intensity of the excitement became contagious and electrifying and I felt I was sharing something exceptional with my fellow neighbours. Over time I noticed that the streets, too, came alive with this electrifying feeling as Greek and Portuguese sporting paraphernalia appeared and supporters wore their national colours and team jerseys. Local shops and cafes were painted with team colours and houses and cars displayed many a national flag and soccer emblem. And, in this version of cosmopolitan living, the streets were transformed by Greek- and Portuguese-style sporting facades that provided a distinctive character to Australian federation homes and postwar architecture and urban design.

In the early hours of the football final, the electrifying energy on the street was palpable for kilometres; cars displaying the national flags and coloured streamers of Greece and Portugal honked religiously at each other like greeting rituals between clan members, but in this instance it did not matter which country or clan you belonged to. Regardless of Greece's final victory, the streets became a place where everyone shared the success and joy of the game as well as the disappointment and grief. What emerged was a strong human bond and communal connection rather than the usual divisiveness and hostility that can emerge out of such sporting events when the game itself becomes the battleground for pent up anger and frustration.

In the early morning gatherings and on the streets, people were transported out of their everyday worlds into something special and extraordinary – these ephemeral moments inspired people and created the space for new social bonds and connections. The sociologist Emile Durkheim describes these bonds and feelings as collective effervescence, that is, the individual loses himself or herself as they merge with others and the world appears through the sacredness of this collective experience at the same time the feeling is contagious, unpredictable,

harmonious and/or tumultuous. For Durkheim, it is in these moments of collective effervescence that religious ideals and the social are enacted and born. Similarly, this type of collective feeling translates into a range of other cultural rituals and events such as music concerts and political rallies and demonstrations that may evoke collective transcendence.

Although the football final was not necessarily a religious event in a traditional sense, the event nevertheless enacted a religiosity through the daily ritual of watching the game as well as the sacred nature of the experience that expressed people's love and loyalty to the game and to their country. National flags and symbols often demonstrate individual and collective forms of love and loyalty, representing the sacredness of such events. As Durkheim writes:

> …the sign takes the place of the object, and the emotions it arouses are attached to that sign. The sign is loved, feared, and respected; the sign is the object of gratitude and sacrifice. [1]

Visual displays and emotion invested in national flags and sporting emblems are markers of patriotic love and pride, yet it is clear that when uncertainty and insecurity is the general feeling of a nation, the collective effervescence can transform into violence and public outrage and flags become the symbol of exclusivity and social differentiation (c.f. Cronulla riots and the display of flags in public and media coverage). So when the collective feeling in a nation is fear or hatred, flags and other markers of national pride and identity become the bulwark of people's identities and people become troubled and threatened if they feel these sacred objects are desecrated. It is then that ethnic tensions and conflicts can ignite a defensive and exclusionary practice of patriotic love as we have witnessed at local and international sporting events.[2]

As a counterpoint to this type of patriotism, what really struck me as significant during the football finals was the display

of Greek and Portuguese flags crossing each other as symbols of unity, initially in shop fronts and cafes and later adorned on cars. This unity of flags saw a different type of border crossing: the flags were the signs of an harmonious crossing of national borders and frontiers and displayed a different type of love and communal bond. In this act of love, we might suggest the transformation and enactment of 'social ideals' creates new personal relations and social bonds.

So while the European soccer finals had all the markings of patriotic fervour for Greek and Portuguese peoples the quality of the experience was something altogether different. The excitement of the football final offered something unique that altered the feeling of resentment and fear in my community that had plagued much of the contemporaneous sense of identity in Australia. What I saw during that time was love and pride for nations that outstripped any identification for one particular country or team as well a different sense of what it felt like to be on the streets. And at the end of the day, what became important to me in this football event was that people were willing to risk being together, to share the experience, to lay down their arms, so to speak, from the usual combative nature of sport and oppositional teams and forces. What was shared together was a sense of community and belonging as well as dignity and respect – needless to say there was wholehearted appreciation of the skills of the team players and the game. What I want to turn my attention to now is how this communal belonging forges alternative ways of understanding the public, identity and difference.

On the streets

What I felt and heard during the European football finals could only happen on the Australian streets where I lived because of the unique blend of our urban environment and migration

history. The gathering together of the Greek and Portuguese community felt like the best of Australian myth and reality coming together. And it was no accident that Australian stories of nationhood seemed to lack the diversity of its inhabitants as the Howard-speak of the time was based on national insecurity and intolerance. The football final provided me with some hope in this political wasteland and a feeling of love, respect and gratitude for being part of something that felt definitively Australian.

In many ways, the spirit of love and community that emerged on the streets echoes a version of the public that the philosopher Hannah Arendt calls the gathering of the world itself as that which is *common*. We can fully appreciate what this notion of the world might be when we take note of the etymology of the word 'common', that derives its meaning from a shared event or experience, and the etymology of the word 'public', in its historical usage that suggested the world itself as *common* to all. In Arendt's terms, it is the appearance of the world through our being with others that offers ways to consider social relations and versions of history and storytelling that can transform the everyday and our usual stories of love, belonging and nationhood.

In particular, what the gathering of people together on streets made visible was a shared public space in which love for game and country became part of the appearance of the world as common, at the same time, the public in which we participated provided the recognition of our separate identities just as much as our identities dissolved and we became part of the public space. Coming together through the collective spirit of joy and exaltation, I felt more Greek than I ever had in Australia, but I also felt part of something that transformed my individual identity and experience and connected me to my fellow neighbours and community. My identity dissolved and the boundaries of *who* and *what* I was seemed to evaporate and became part of the communal experience. The love and feeling

created temporary bonds and changed how we viewed one another and what we understood our identities to be. In this view, the question of who you are and who others are changes and the issue becomes the acceptance of what Arendt calls the 'paradoxical plurality of unique beings'. It is in this acceptance that lies the potential for the recognition of our human frailty and bonds, because without this mode of recognition, as Arendt poignantly writes, the question of *who* somebody is leads us astray and leads us to say *what* somebody is, that is, we define people through our language and our identities and we stereotype each other and our behaviours. But as Arendt notes this question of acceptance always involves risk and disclosure:

> …[the] revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore where people are *with* others and neither for nor against them – that is, in sheer human togetherness. Although nobody knows whom he reveals when he discloses himself in deed or word he must be willing to risk that disclosure…whenever human togetherness is lost, that is, when people are only for or against other people, as for instance in modern warfare, where men go into action and use means of violence in order to achieve certain objectives for their own side and against the enemy. In these instances, which of course have always existed, speech becomes 'mere talk', simply one more means toward the end whether it serves to deceive the enemy or to dazzle everybody with propaganda…[3]

In this sense, Arendt speaks of a risk and disclosure that may allow us to ask the question of what constitutes a political project where the collective spirit of joy and love give rise to different social and moral codes in which our identities dissolve and what matters is the recognition of our 'paradoxical plurality', that is, both our uniqueness and commonality. Perhaps this political project involves the recognition that wherever there is joy there is creation and in this creation lies the possibility of recognising

human bonds that can transform even the most hardened political beliefs and frameworks of national identification.

I tell this story of European football finals as it happened in my community and on the streets in a way that I had not experienced in Australia beforehand, and it brought home to me the possibility that a love for a country and its 'heroes' can be shared amongst people, and for a moment in time, this love outstripped the ugliness of social divisions and forms of patriotic fervour that can drive people apart. In many ways, the vicissitudes of love and social dimensions of shared aliveness and collective joy saw the potential transformative qualities that Durkheim suggests when he says that 'the ideal society is not outside of the real society; it is part of it'.[4]

The European football finals presented for me, at least, a moment where our identities dissolved and the notion of the public became what we shared in common – the love and joy of a ritual and an event that transformed the every day and stories of our nation hood.

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Notes

1 E. Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Carol Cosman, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001, (1912), p. 165.

2 My argument here does not pursue the intricacies of violence. Needless to say, in this country we have witnessed the worst of media reportage on ethnic tensions and sport.

3 H. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1958, p. 180.
4 Durkheim, p. 317.

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